Beware the deadly lure of referendums. In the United Kingdom, referendums are proposed for the wrong reasons — and even after they have been offered are rarely held. Leaders make the offer not because they have discovered a sudden passion for new forms of direct democracy. Their motive is the precise opposite. They fear losing control and hope that the prospect of a vote at some seemingly safe distant point will make life easier for them in the meantime.

Instead, they become even more trapped. Leaders are drawn towards referendums only to be torn apart the closer they get to a full embrace. They have a mountain of evidence to warn them of what will happen, yet they make their fatal moves.

David Cameron is the latest to be caught out. In January, he offered his “in or out” referendum — not because he wanted to do so, but because he hoped that his Conservative party would unite around the policy and that the UK Independence Party (Ukip) would be undermined. Predictably, the opposite has happened: Ukip soars while his party becomes even more worked up. In theory, there are four more years of this destabilising stirring before the referendum is actually held — if indeed it ever is.

Because the zany pattern of national referendums is that they can be proposed, but are rarely staged. Before the 1997 elections, both the Conservative and Labour leaderships offered one on the single currency. The Conservative party calmed down for around half a second when John Major announced his reluctant support for one. Soon his MPs were demanding another on the next European Union (EU) treaty. In an eerie echo, Tory MPs have upped their demands on Cameron since January.

After 1997, the referendum on the single currency was never held. Nor was the one on electoral reform, another plebiscite that was promised in Labour’s 1997 manifesto and was once again the source of endless angst.

On the rare occasions when a national referendum is held, it solves nothing. The legislation that gave the go-ahead for the referendum on UK membership of the Common Market in 1975 was supposed to be “legally binding” on future parliaments. The then prime minister, Harold Wilson, held it for a single reason — to keep his party united. It proved to be neither binding nor unifying. Soon after 1975, his party fell apart, largely over Europe. By the 1983 elections, a mere eight years after the binding referendum, Labour was pledged to pull out of Europe. The breakaway Social Democratic party (SDP) was formed partly because of Europe.

If she were alive today, Margaret Thatcher — who had campaigned energetically for a ‘yes’ vote in 1975 — would probably emulate Ukip, Education Secretary Michael Gove and others in wanting to leave the EU, although Gove hides behind the protective shield of Cameron’s “renegotiation”. As Nigel Lawson [Thatcher’s chancellor or finance minister] and others have noted, this is likely to prove a tiny shield. In the meantime, Cameron faces the nightmare of being asked whether he will vote to leave the EU if there were a referendum now. He will not answer on the basis that there is no referendum now. But he will look evasive because he is being evasive.

Let us assume for a moment that a referendum is held in 2017. Once more, it will solve nothing, whatever the outcome. In terms of party management, the Conservatives will have split at least three ways by then and will not come together very easily in the aftermath. If the result of the vote is to stay in, the campaign to pull out will revive within a few minutes. If the outcome is to pull out, there will be political conflagration, after which calls to go back in, or to hold a second referendum in favour of continuing membership once the terms have been re-renegotiated, would start to be heard.

The same pattern applies to the Scottish referendum, a potentially explosive event taking place in the autumn of 2014 — a few months before the general elections. Admittedly, the context for this poll is different. The Scottish National party (SNP) rules in Scotland and has, in theory, wanted this referendum for a very long time. Alex Salmond will be less keen if the opinion polls continue to show majority support for the union. However, if he loses, he will argue that the next stage should be “devo max”, bigger powers for the Edinburgh parliament. Senior members of the SNP tell me that their campaign for independence will pause briefly and then return. If the opinion polls prove to be wrong and Scotland does vote for independence, there will be demands for a referendum in other parts of the UK on the issue of separation. There will be chaos, crisis and no resolution.

As for the referendum on electoral reform held in this parliament, it resolves nothing. If there is a partnership between Labour and the Liberal Democrats after the next election, expect electoral reform to be back on the agenda.

I am not suggesting that if Cameron had stood firm and refused to offer an in/out referendum, he would have discovered a primrose path to the next general elections. However, the route would have been less hellish than it is now proving to be.

His offer is dependent on a Conservative majority that seems even less likely since the referendum was dangled in front of his troops. Like most other national referendums, it may never be held, although Labour will be under huge pressure to offer one too, dooming its leadership to a nerve-wracking nightmare if it wins the next election. Ed Miliband could well be the next leader to offer a referendum, even though he does not believe it would be in anyone’s interest and might destroy his leadership.

In theory, referendums are a noble form of empowerment, but not the way they arise here: Offered, postponed and withdrawn with leaders, in a state of neurotic panic, misguidedly hoping the deceptive device will give them peace and stability. Referendums have nothing to do with calmly devolving power to the voters.

— Guardian News & Media Ltd

Steve Richards, a political columnist and broadcaster, regularly presents BBC Radio 4’s Week in Westminster.