Uncertain legacy of flawed campaign

When the awful images of the 9/11 attacks filled British television screens and Tony Blair said the United Kingdom stood shoulder to shoulder with America, few could have suspected his vow would lead to a grinding military campaign in an obscure south-western corner of Afghanistan.

Faced with the onslaught, the Taliban quickly fled. Bin Laden escaped from his mountain holdout in Tora Bora, but the country gained a charismatic, western-friendly leader in Hamid Karzai and its people were keen to rebuild. It is here that many believe the coalition made the most grave of what would be many errors in the Afghan campaign. With the country seemingly secure, American and British attention turned to Iraq, leaving Afghanistan largely ignored. As the allies invaded Iraq and then found themselves bogged down in chaos and civil war, London and Washington had little time to worry about a campaign they believed they had already won. But while their attention was diverted, the Afghan campaign had in fact begun to stumble and the initial optimism was evaporating.

Karzai’s weak government was unable to bring the reconstruction it had promised. The warlords he and the West relied on were preying on his people. Clumsy counter-terrorism campaigns led by international troops were alienating Afghans. Corruption was rampant and opium-growing was rife. As the promises of 2001 soured, the Taliban began to re-emerge. Then, in late 2005, another pivotal decision was made. As Nato began to extend into the south of the country to back up development efforts, Britain said it would take on the province of Helmand, capital of the country’s opium-growing area. From then on, Britain’s Afghan campaign would be synonymous with Helmand. How and why the decision was made when Britain was already fighting in Iraq is hotly debated.

John Reid, then defence secretary, had notoriously said in early 2006 that he would be happy to see the Helmand deployment end in three years without a shot being fired.

Instead, when 3,300 soldiers arrived in the province that summer, they found themselves fighting for their lives in some of the heaviest combats British forces had seen since the Second World War. Overstretched and facing a hornets’ nest of Taliban fighters, the soldiers of the Parachute Regiment had precious little time to support the building of schools and hospitals. Strung out in platoon houses in towns such as Musa Qala and Sangin — that would soon become infamous — they found themselves in daily fire-fights and calling in air strikes to keep the insurgents at bay. That bloody summer set the pattern for those that followed.

British troops launched regular offensives to clear Taliban from areas, but were unable to hold the ground afterwards. Many Helmandis already distrusted the British because of their previous imperial entanglements in Afghanistan and the constant fighting and use of air strikes turned many more against them.

Commanders also too often found themselves unknowingly drawn into local disputes, where they were propping up predatory police chiefs or government officials that the residents disliked more than the Taliban. British troop numbers grew, but by 2009 and after years of official insistence, all was progressing well, it was clear that something more was needed to try to break the stalemate.

In Helmand, that came with the arrival of thousands of US Marines. US President Barack Obama’s pledge to end the war in Iraq and concentrate on the war in Afghanistan saw more than 20,000 marines poured into Helmand. By 2010, there were more than 30,000 international troops there, only four years after British politicians and commanders had said they could do the job with a tenth of that number. The now notorious districts of Sangin, Musa Qala, Kajaki and Nowzad were handed over to the Americans and British troops regrouped around Lashkar Gah, Nad-e Ali and Nahr-e Saraj. With fewer areas to patrol and a greater density of forces, a change began to be slowly seen. Bit by bit, the Taliban were pushed out. Fledgling Afghan forces began to grow in competence. Development finally began to be seen and violence lessened. But even as there were finally glints of long hoped for progress, patience was running out in the West.

In Britain, the war was unpopular and a new government felt it had been saddled with a conflict belonging to its predecessors. At the Lisbon Nato summit in late 2010, it was decided Britain and its Nato allies would transfer security duties to the Afghan forces as quickly as possible and finish their combat mission by the end of 2014. British commanders say they are going home having given the Afghan people the best chance they could. But in private, one senior general describes Britain’s campaign against the Taliban as a score draw, which is a long way from the government’s optimism in 2006.