Surveillance is part of modern life

The West has accused us of curbing the liberties of BlackBerry users, while America, Israel, Britain and other countries are allowed access to all transferred data," declared Lieutenant General Dahi Khalfan Tamim, Dubai's affable Chief of Police, who cracked the Israeli Mossad assassination of Mahmoud Al Mabhouh, a high-ranking Palestinian official killed on January 19, 2010. Now comes news that Israel has developed an ultra-sophisticated listening post that routinely taps into most calls. How useful are these spying mechanisms?

In the BlackBerry matter, and based on press reports, the Canadian Research in Motion (RIM) company is estimated to have about half-a-million users in the UAE. BlackBerry's messenger application remains a popular feature in many Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, though the data is encrypted and sent to servers in Canada where storage and retrieval are possible. Consequently, local tracking is impossible, unless RIM provides secure access to the data, as it apparently agreed to do in India.

For Dahi, the issue is clear: The UAE needs to retrieve sensitive communications to hunt potential spies, assassins or militants anxious to spread havoc. Neither Dahi nor other officials privy to secret negotiations with RIM and Western security agencies can understand the reluctance to cooperate with local organisations, except to give an advantage to Israel.

Indeed, concerns over Israeli access to data must be viewed as a legitimate preoccupation, especially as Dubai painstakingly demonstrated that Israeli spies enjoyed unfettered access to British, French, Australian and American passports to circulate throughout the Gulf region. These are serious matters and while London and Canberra lodged public complaints, no visible changes were introduced, save for the proverbial promises to be more careful next time around.

Still, and as reported by Nicky Hager in a damning essay in the September 2010 issue of Le Monde Diplomatique, Israel has many tools in its arsenal. At the Urim base (close to Be'er-Shiva), sophisticated communications antennae tap into all telephone, facsimile, e-mail and other means of electronic exchanges. According to Hager, the author of Secret Power: New Zealand's Role in the International Spy Network, the book that revealed the existence of the "Echelon" network, Israeli eavesdropping capabilities are far more impressive than any Mossad prowess or even the country's nuclear weapons.

Hager maintains that Israel spies on governments, international organisations operating in the region, foreign companies under the illusion that their encrypted data is safe, as well as individuals who either rely on smart or dumb gear. Remarkably, the well-protected Urim facility is visible on Google Earth, near Route 2333, with a slew of satellite antennae, including high frequency/direction finding equipment, as well as phased arrays, which are used to measure angles or rotate them (goniometry) and which are the bread and butter of signals intelligence (SIGINT).

Vast reach

Needless to say that Israel has the wherewithal to tap into Intelsat, Immarsat, as well as many orbiting satellites. According to Hager, the Urim base's capabilities are similar to those of Echelon, which is the ultra-sophisticated surveillance system operated by the US, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Powerful computers at Urim can distinguish key words and track, as well as tap, classified telephone numbers too. Collected data is then transferred to Unit 8200, the Israeli army Intelligence Corps responsible for SIGINT and code decryption, for translation and analysis. Unit 8200 is a large element of the military establishment and boasts functions that are comparable to those of the US National Security Agency. In fact, as far as the Middle East is concerned, chances are excellent that western agencies rely on Unit 8200.

Still, what does this mean, especially as Urim operators routinely target friends and foes alike? Simply that surveillance and eavesdropping are now so common that any real secrets cannot be put on paper, spoken on the telephone, faxed, e-mailed or even whispered in the confines of the "cleanest" rooms imaginable. Real secrets are no longer in one's head but in the heart, the type that cannot be revealed, for they have no value to anyone except their owner. Everything else is known by everyone willing to devote the energy and resources to set up listening farms manned by officers anxious to uncover plots. Naturally, such mechanisms can ferret out potential troublemakers, but tiny minorities nowadays commit themselves to open sources or even encrypted devices. Everyone with an electronic gadget either knows or suspects that the equipment is "public".

The UAE and Saudi Arabia, the two countries at the centre of the BlackBerry controversy and primary candidates for Israeli eavesdropping, may have little choice but to suspend the popular messenger, e-mail and web browser services until such time they receive access to encrypted messages. Yet, because the spying will not end, it behooves local authorities to understand the parameters of what may be useful, and allies to appreciate the limits of surveillance. In the end, while the ability to collect raw data is undoubtedly impressive, success is measured by how one can link the so-called dots. In the Al Mabhouh case, Dahi displayed his wherewithal, which confirmed his impeccable credentials.

Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is a commentator and author of several books on Gulf affairs.