Squandering a hard-earned credibility

Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters have tried to frame the current crisis in religious terms, casting opposition to their speedily drafted constitution as the petulance of an anti-Islamist, liberal elite. Media analysis has often replicated this theme: In one corner stands Muslim Brotherhood-propelled President Mohammad Mursi, who has the supposed blessings of a religious population. And in the other corner, the “secular” opposition, banging on about small details of a constitution that is not that bad. Such wrongheaded analysis prompted Egypt expert Dr H.A. Hellyer from the Brookings Institution to politely request that western media “knock it off”.

However, the result of Egypt’s first referendum on the constitution (a second referendum takes place tomorrow, in districts that have yet to vote) has exposed some of the real sticking points. The referendum had to be split into two stages because so few Egyptian judges agreed to supervise it. And for all its legendary mobilising powers, of the votes cast, the Brotherhood was not able to get more than 57 per cent for its constitution. Not long ago, the Brotherhood could rely on voter support reaching more than 70 per cent. And less than a third of the electorate turned out — though that might be because of the long queues and the difficulty in voting. In an atmosphere of mistrust and mismanagement, allegations of vote-rigging are rife.

However, if Egyptians are, as results indicate, losing faith in the Brotherhood, it is not because the organisation is Islamist, but because it has so far been rubbish at ruling. Many believe the Brotherhood has kept its promises to power, but not to the people. Crucially, President Mursi’s economic policy has deepened the neo-liberalism that brought so much misery during the Mubarak era and was a key component of the uprising against him.

This economic stamp is all over Mursi’s policies, both before and as a part of the proposed constitution — which was completed in a one-day marathon, by an Islamist-dominated assembly, after Christian, liberal and female members walked out. Earlier this month, he announced an end to fuel subsidies — so household bills for gas cylinders and electricity, for example, are set to spike.

Meanwhile, an International Monetary Fund loan of $4.8 billion (Dh17.65 billion) currently being negotiated is conditioned on what has been described as the biggest wave of austerity cuts since 1977 — when subsidies on staple food were removed in one crippling hit, prompting the “bread riots”. Today the plan is to reduce public spending, cut subsidies, increase tax on basic goods and devalue the Egyptian pound. This package was delayed because of the current turmoil. But why should Egyptians swallow such a Shock Doctrine-style deal, when one of the key tenets of the revolution was a call for social justice?

Meanwhile, the proposed constitution reveals more of the Brotherhood’s conservative economics. It has a clause that pegs wages to productivity. It stipulates that only “peaceful” strikes (whatever that means) are allowed. It keeps military interests intact and invisible to public scrutiny — in a country where the army is thought to own anything from 10 per cent to 45 per cent of the national economy (nobody knows for sure because it’s all so secret). It is all the more evident that Mursi is not, as he claims, trying to “protect the revolution”, but wants to protect the interests of an entrenched elite at the expense of everyone else. Indeed, this year, a Bloomberg report referred to the wealthy, controlling echelons of this Islamist group as the ‘Brothers of the 1 per cent’.

Small wonder, then, that the factory-dense city of Mahalla declared itself an independent state, in protest at Mursi’s anti-union laws. Since he came to power, there has been a wave of strikes; not just factory stoppages, but also health worker strikes and consumer protests at eroding public services. And Egypt’s rapidly growing independent unions have been mobilising nationally against the constitution, using its trampling of social justices as the hook.

All these concerns have come on top of the constitution-driven attempts to erode personal freedoms, especially for women and minorities, and give religious clerics the final say over legal rulings — all through a process that disdains plurality and vital consensus-building. This, rather than any knee-jerk hostility to Islamists in power, is what prompted such large and widespread protest across Egypt. However, while his economic policy makes Mursi unpopular on the streets, it is precisely what makes him acceptable to the West — power-serving economics coupled with a foreign policy that does not rock any regional boats, crucially with Israel. Using standard paternalistic filters, the US is banking on the idea that the Brotherhood’s religious credibility will underwrite its reactionary politics, thereby maintaining the status quo. In this sense, the American administration does not really care if it is a Hosni Mubarak or a Mursi in power, as long as these interests are preserved.

It is true, of course, that the Brotherhood still won majority support in the first referendum — although that might be as much about public desire to put an end to this constitutional crisis.

However, the drop in support for the Islamist group shows that Egyptians will not be fobbed off any more — and therein lies the power of the revolution. Post-uprising polls reveal that Egyptians are more concerned with work, housing, health, security and public services than with the pantomime identity politics of Muslim Brotherhood versus the liberals.

The results of the referendum show that the opposition, as it grows more focused and more organised, might be able to turn popular concern for these issues into real political mobilisation, which could gain momentum in the parliamentary elections slated for early next year. Then the Brotherhood might find out that with such disregard for the Egyptian people, its credibility, garnered during those hard, repressive years in opposition, can easily be squandered.

— Guardian News & Media Ltd

Rachel Shabi is the author of Not the Enemy: Israel’s Jews from Arab Lands.