Shifting roles in the Middle East

The late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed a dramatic shift in the world order. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought new players onto the political scene; states which had enjoyed political independence had moved towards advanced degrees of economic and political quasi-federal arrangements, such as the European Union; and the former bipolarity of superpower influence had changed, with the United States emerging as the single major political power.

The scene in the Middle East was no different. The Gulf countries seemed to be the dark horses on the horizon, which many analysts explained, was a natural result of the new theory of geo-economics. This theory was influenced by the American economist Edward Luttwak, replacing the German historian Ratzel's old dated theory of the geo-political role of nations.

The dramatic rise in oil prices, from less than $100 billion in 1998 to $1,000 billion in just ten years, was one of the concrete pillars on which the Gulf nations constructed their political and diplomatic roles. Consequently they were able to achieve what the Arab League, Egypt and even the US had found difficult to accomplish.

Meera Ryan, a professor of political science and international affairs at the University of Washington, said in an e-mail interview that in foreign-policy terms, the Gulf states individually or collectively through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have emerged as important international players.

"This larger role started to manifest simply because the Gulf states had developed enough confidence in their abilities. [They have] the financial muscle to stand up and take major responsibilities on their shoulders, in addition to wide contacts which enabled them to negotiate with both sides of any argument," she said.

A prominent British diplomat added: "A few years ago nobody would have really paid much attention to Gulf mediation, but things are different now. The Gulf states cannot be ignored. It is now up to them how far they are willing to extend their roles in international diplomacy."

The past decade witnessed many diplomatic initiatives by the Gulf states. These initiatives showed that the GCC states had started taking action concerning regional security matters, challenging the political monopoly of countries such as Egypt, Syria and Jordan.

The year 2002 was a significant marker. Saudi Arabia presented the Arab League Summit in Beirut with its Arab Peace Initiative — a role which traditionally was played through Egyptian diplomacy — which was subsequently accepted by all members.

The Arab League re-endorsed the plan in 2007 and it remained the only document that all Arab states have signed and gained widespread approval from Israel and the whole international community.

Later in 2007, Saudi Arabia brokered the Makkah Agreement, which sought to reconcile internecine Palestinian rivalry, after King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia called upon both parties to negotiate a unity government. Surprisingly, both parties agreed within hours to reach an agreement in the holy land. Despite its limited results on the ground, the Makkah Agreement, along with the still-extant Arab Peace Plan, remains hugely solid evidence of Saudi Arabia's ability to deliver a certain degree of Arab unity on one hand and, on the other, its preparedness to act solely.

A new diplomatic force

However, 2008 marked a noteworthy success for the Gulf nations, especially Qatari diplomacy, as Doha succeeded in halting the long-running conflict in Lebanon, doing what neither Amr Mousa nor French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner (who spent many fruitless weeks trying to solve the Lebanese mess) were able to do. It was a major demonstration of the increasing role of the Gulf states in regional and international conflicts.

Qatar was able to bring the sides together because "it is trusted by Lebanese factions who knew that it was not pushing its own political agenda", said Mohammad Al Misfer, a Qatari political analyst. The intensive Qatari shuttle diplomacy was a clear indication of the ambitious role Qatar desires to play in the political arenas. Many experts believe that this Arabian Gulf peninsula state has the friendly ties with all parties to reach any agreement with both Iran and the United States and Hezbollah and Israel, which might qualify it to handle the huge responsibility — that might be beyond its own geo-political potential — on the international stage.

Dr Mahmoud Khalil, a media professor at Cairo University, told Weekend Review that Qatar has utilised the media as an effective means to serve its political aspirations in the region. "In terms of its gross national product, Qatar has recently been pegged by economic analysts as the richest country the world. Therefore, it tries to establish a unique role for itself. I think it has used the soft power of its superstar channel Al Jazeera strategically to make up for the relatively modest history and diplomatic heritage compared to Egypt or Syria," he said.

Is Egyptian influence diminishing? The new order has made Egypt and other historically key players (Syria, Jordan and to some extent Iraq) begin wondering about their role in the new equation.

Many political analysts, such as Osama Ahmad, who has been examining this phenomenon closely for more than ten years, told Weekend Review that we are now in the era where "gravity has shifted from the old centres of Egypt, Syria and Jordan to [those on] the periphery".

""The post-Cold War environment has posed a major constraint for Egypt's role in the region. The declining utility of a large military force means giving up one of its key strategic assets, which made other key regional economic players fill Egypt's gap by paying the monetary cost of prestigious political roles" he said.

Long-held viewpoint

That follows what Mohammad Heikal, the famous Egyptian journalist, had embraced for more than 20 years — that Egypt no longer had the aspiration to lead "the nation from the rumbling ocean to the rebelling Gulf" — as his friend and pan-Arabism leader Jamal Abdul Nasser used to call the Arab region, recognising that Egypt's influence was declining in relation to other countries, especially those in the vicinity of Arabian Gulf.

The widely respected writer has many books on Gulf history. In his book Gulf War: The Illusion of Victory and Power, he discussed the background of the Gulf War, indicating to readers the deeply complex differences and conflicts within the GCC's six members themselves.

"There is an apparent shift in terms of political influence. Although I don't mind other countries such as Saudi Arabia leading these heated negotiations, the Egyptian influence on the Arab world is noticeable, mainly as the agenda setter for the region. Egypt is still capable of exercising regional influence as a core country, linking various sub-regions or circles," he said in his TV show on Al Jazeera.

Ahmad believes that nowadays the political influence depends mainly on the ability to finance any political move and not on political demagogy, however justified they are. "For example, the wealthy Gulf countries have been active donors to the Palestinian Authority, helping it to develop its economy. At the 2008 Palestinian economic reconstruction conference held in Egypt, the GCC states pledged more than $1.65 billion to help with humanitarian and reconstruction aid in the Gaza Strip," he said.

From Ahmad's point of view, if the most populous country wants to regain its influence, it needs to accomplish an exhausting agenda. First, Egypt needs to complete its peace mission. Second, it should aim at building a moderate consensus in the region, bringing states such as Syria into the mainstream. Third, it should carry out a review of its economic capabilities. And finally, utilising its military as multinational settings to promote regional stability.

On the other hand, Dr Tarek Fahmy, head of Israel studies at the National Centre for Middle East, told Weekend Review that he strongly supports the return of Egypt's regional role but not at the expense of Egyptian soldiers and bloodshed. He believes the Egyptian army has no real role other than to protect Egypt.

Fahmy said the Gulf's extensive influence is born of its economic boom. "While some of the Gulf states' confidence to operate independently comes from the relative degree of success they had in building regional diplomacy, it more readily stems from the region's much greater economic clout. Economic strength offers a political leverage," he said.

Regarding the other historic player, Syria, Canadian columnist Jim Miles in his book Syria and Iran explained the country's complicated geo-strategic role in the region, especially with respect to the clash with Iran.

"Hafez Assad, Ruhollah Khomeini and their successors have viewed the region as a strategic whole and regarded their alliance as a vital tool to further Arab-Islamic interests and increase regional autonomy by diminishing foreign penetration of the Middle East. As a result, to advance their common agenda over the years, both countries have put long-term interests before short-term gains," he says.

It is noteworthy that the United States has ended a four-year diplomatic embargo on Damascus. President Barack Obama's administration sent two high-level officials to Syria last year for "preliminary conversations", presumably on improving relations.

"Syria plays a key role with respect to stability in the region and Israel's security," says Debra DeLee, president of Americans for Peace Now. "The American engagement with Syria, both on bilateral issues and in support of Israel-Syria negotiations, is critically important in determining whether the role Syria plays in future will be positive or not."

Opinions on Egypt's role

Strategic experts such as Dr Abd Al Moneam Saeed, director of Al Ahram, would like Egypt to adopt a more "isolationist policy" in the region and dedicate its resource and attention towards solving internal problems such as Islamic revival, illiteracy and economic deprivation.

"Egyptian diplomacy must focus its efforts mainly on serving Egypt's interests abroad and preventing American officials attempting to have serious dialogues with Islamic groups that promote internal instability," he said.

Some commentators even went so far as to question the Egyptian monopoly in the General Secretariat of the Arab League. Abdullah Al Ashaal, former assistant to the Egyptian foreign minister, nominated some prominent Arab figures such as the Saudi intellectual Dr Gazi Al Kosaibi and the Lebanese former prime minister Salim Al Hoss.

Unlike what the public may believe of the harmonious relationships between Arab countries, experts see that there is a basic divide among them. Countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other conservative states are seen by their adversaries as being in America's thrall while those such as Syria, Qatar and others are seen by the US as being in league with Iran.

Syria, which makes no secret of its strategic alliance with non-Arab Iran, has seen a perceptible warming of its relations with Saudi Arabia recently but not at the expense of breaking ties with Tehran.

However, many economists believe that US strategic designs in the region are more directly related to the petro-dollar than specifically to oil itself. Even if its own reliance on oil was reduced, it would still need to ensure the security of oil supply to sustain the global demand for dollars. The petro-dollar has underpinned US economic strength since the establishment of the dollar as the global reserve currency in the early 1970s.

Economic analyst Essam Al Gohary argues that this development raises questions on the continued viability of the petro-dollar, not least since it makes no sense to sell a commodity in a currency which immediately declines in value.

But increased cooperation among Gulf states, which will likely result in the introduction of a single currency in the GCC, will place further pressure on the dollar, since a single currency will most likely result in the dismantling of the Gulf currencies' dollar peg.

Through cooperation, the Gulf states can gain monetary independence.

Historically, Saudi Arabia's power did not extend beyond the Gulf. When the Arab nationalistic wave spread across the Middle East and several governments were overthrown in a series of revolutions and military coups, the Saudis faced a major challenge. Consequently, until the end of the 1960s, Saudi resistance to Nasserism pushed the monarchy towards reliance on its Western allies.

Many believe that the Gulf countries' — especially Saudi Arabia's — regional role can be attributed to a number of major events, the first being the Arab defeat in 1967 by Israel, which spelt the decline of Nasser's Arab National Movement.

However, the second reason which affected Egypt's image negatively and promoted Saudi Arabia's dominance was the Camp David peace treaty with Israel which was concluded under Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, ending the prospects of a united Arab military front.

This triggered a wave of criticism by Syria, Libya, Iran, Iraq and the Palestinians — who considered it a stab in the back. It also led to a boycott of Egypt and the shifting of the headquarters of the Arab League from Cairo to Tunisia.

US support for moderate regimes

The American administration observed this transformation and promoted a Middle East doctrine asserting the necessity of supporting moderate regimes, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, to counter Soviet interference in the Middle East.

Therefore, Saudi Arabia's and Iran's dependence on America grew significantly during the seventies. And by the early eighties, three major petroleum producing countries (Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran) were playing a larger role in Middle East affairs while a weakened Egypt struggled to maintain its position.

However, Saudi diplomacy experienced setbacks throughout the nineties. The initial reason for this was the first Gulf War (1991) when America and Saudi Arabia orchestrated the formation of an international coalition to liberate Kuwait and stop Saddam Hussain's attack on his neighbours. Saudi Arabia's invitation to American and other western troops was opposed by Arab nationalists and Islamists across the Middle East and inflicted inconceivable damage on its image among ordinary Arabs opposed to American foreign policy.

The situation worsened when the second intifada (2000) erupted following the failure of peace talks. Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries such as Egypt and Jordan, were criticised for not putting more pressure on their American ally.

Although Saudi Arabia did argue seriously with the Bush administration over the devastating situation in the Palestine-occupied territories, these efforts were overshadowed by September 11.

The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center had a catastrophic impact on Saudi Arabia-US relations and in many ways limited the former's role in the region.

For more than three years, Saudi Arabia faced significant challenges, specifically American pressure, to initiate changes in the social and education system. It was also up against an increased terrorist threat within the country and problems such as poverty and unemployment, all of which required serious attention.

This large number of internal conflicts in this part of the world, with Syria and Lebanon, Fatah and Hamas, the Arab states and Iran and even in Iraq itself, triggered a large question-mark about the identity of the next leader.

An Egyptian political blogger, Amr Salah, wonders whether the Gulf countries are capable of seizing this historic opportunity of wide-scale access to the distinguished global elite when the world is in the middle of a flux intellectually, economically, politically and even spiritually in a way which could lead the Arab world into the greater good.

Raghda El Halawany is a journalist based in Cairo.