The average citizen in Yemen no longer enjoys the competence of choosing his own decisions regarding basic needs in everyday life unless he engages in a complex maze governed by tribalism, partisanship and regionalism. After the dream of Yemen’s unification comes true, it drags a combination of battered governance institutions burdened with a cumulative legacy of conflict, assassinations and violence — whether tribal or political. Therefore, it is difficult for the average citizen to become an influential element in empowering the people of Yemen. Yemeni people cannot choose their political fate and the political process is carried out and directed by the tribe or a party composed of several tribes governed by their own tribalism (Assabiyah).
Although the tribe has not always been an impediment to civilian rule in Yemen, and did not always seek to annul the influence of law and order, what is happening in the country these days indicates that the tribe helps transform events in a limited and narrow tribal range, whereby it serves the interest of its leaders and members and marginalises the average citizen, who is seen as a burden rather than a voice of value.
The unfolding events suggest that the tribe in Yemen has prevailed and is now taking centre stage in the course of events in the country. This is true both for Al Houthis rebels, their allies and their opponents. This also shows the failure of government and civil institutions, either because of the freezing of their operations or because of the loss of credibility and legitimacy as a result of the spread of corruption, chaos and favouritism.
Yemen today has become an incubator for feuding tribes, where each tribe seeks access to power by force in the absence of common ground. Therefore, the elements of civil rule in the country have lost their validity, given the absence of the state and the absence of law and order.
After the events of January 20, Al Houthis may have succeeded in grabbing Sana’a, but they certainly have failed to control Maarib, which was historically the second capital of the ancient kingdom of Sheeba. This may be the real justification for their rapid movement during the past few days to siege the presidential palace to strengthen their front, enabling them to face up to the strong opposition within the tribal entities in Baida, Maarib and Al Jawf.
Accusations of corruption against Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi (who resigned from his post as president on January 22) his son and his office manager are not new or unfamiliar, but choosing this time was solely connected to Al Houthis’ goal of ensuring their success in the Baida and Maarib confrontations, as these two places are still beyond their control.
Given their relentless quest to control the government in Yemen, the Al Houthis continued to adopt a tribal approach, away from civilian channels and outside the boundaries of the law, to impose a culture of force in order to compel Hadi to implement the peace and national partnership agreement. Neither of them have the guts to play the role of victim as they know that the Yemeni people are the real victims and they are the perpetrators.
What happened on January 20 can’t be described as a coup d’etat because Al Houthis actually have been the real masters of Yemen since September 21, after the fall of Sana’a. Al Houthis’ occupation of the presidential palace could be described more precisely as the second phase towards the possession of the throne of Sana’a and securing their hold on power, which might be followed by a third and a fourth phase in the coming days in an irreversible march to impose their rule on all Yemen — with or without their allies (former president Ali Abdullah Saleh and the multiple forces loyal to him) who participated with them in the invasion of the capital.
Is Yemen ready for a partnership culture between the different political parties to govern the country, given the conflict between tribes? And does it mean that Al Houthis’ insistence on the implementation of the peace and national partnership agreement is a mere formality to justify the political movements that will prevail in the end in capturing all the levers of power in the state?
Historical perspective
Yemeni history confirms that ancient kingdoms such as Sheeba, Maeen, Osan, Qataban and Hadramout have always been governed by a number of people, whether brothers or priests. Sharing power was common in ancient Yemeni history. But Yemen’s modern political history, both in the south and north, deviated significantly from this approach. This was witnessed during the Imamate in the north or in the period that followed the revolution of September 26, 1962.
This has also been demonstrated in the south through the absence of a partnership culture after the departure of the British colonists and the emergence of rivalries between different political forces, which led to bloody confrontations. The same applies to the post-unity period, which also saw the absence of political harmony between the ruling partners, both the Socialist Party and the General People’s Congress or the latter with Islah party.
Al Houthis’ occupation of the presidential palace and the resignation of Hadi and his government point at another issue in addition to tribalism: Regionalism. This has pushed the theme of unity between north and south Yemen to top of the agenda for both parties after the two were in a state of undeclared agreement to avoid controversy over this matter for multiple reasons. However, regional and tribal affiliations began to emerge after the intensification of the confrontation between the two rivals.
Hadi has mastered the art of playing the Al Qaida card to confront his opponents — fellow former rulers of the Islah party and Al Mushtarak party or to confront Al Houthis themselves — but he will probably now abandon it for a while. This, especially after the same card has been used by many parties to secure political positions and international legitimacy and to gain American and regional support. Moreover, Hadi knew that he himself is no longer a trump card for the US government in countering Al Qaida. Therefore, Hadi may move in the coming days towards playing the southern card to preserve what is left of his political gains and to secure the future of his supporters.
The exploitation of the issue of the south to reach other ends may create potential clashes between the southern Hiraki leaders and symbols of the local authorities that support Hadi, which could give rise to another kind of conflict among southerners themselves and contribute in weakening the cause of the southern people and the loss of their rights.
In a statement issued by the southern revolutionary forces after Al Houthis’ take-over of the presidential palace, it was pointed out that “the battle in Sana’a rotates between... the centres of power in Northern Yemen, and [that] the South is not a part of it”.
However, the succession of events in the south led some southern elements to hold meetings in an attempt to unify the southern front, though this does not mean that such meetings may succeed in bridging the gap between various southern factions and lead to the formation of a revolutionary united front.
Secession of the south?
While fighting is raging in Sana’a, Radaa and Maarib, external observers believe that the secession of the south may be a partial way out of the worsening crisis in Yemen. The geographical location, social and intellectual configuration highly prepare the southerners for a civilian rule, away from tribal rivalries.
In international law, there is no such right of a section of the people to break away from their homeland willingly but this is linked to the ability of the state to manage its affairs without differentiating between people and treating them equally. South Yemen may have a unique case as it used to be a state and had entered into a unity agreement through its leadership, which has failed dramatically. Going by international law, it is difficult to break away.
This view was adopted by Canada in a court ruling issued by the country’s Supreme Court in 1998 that prevented the central government from granting independence to Quebec because the government did not have this right. The same judicial ruling was issued by the Spanish Supreme Court to invalidate the legitimacy and constitutionality of the referendum on Catalonia’s independence in November 2014. But the approach adopted by Britain may be in conflict with these situations, where Scottish citizens exercised their right to self-determination through a referendum and voted legally, away from violence and with the consent of the British government, despite the absence of racial discrimination and social injustice. The Scottish people then decided to stay under the umbrella of the United Kingdom.
Some may wonder about the legal rationalisation to give the people in southern Yemen their right to self-determination, especially given that discrimination and social, economic and political unfairness exist. This approach could lead to another debate concerning the role of the people in the Yemen crisis — politically and economically.
Why is the fate of people being decided by politicians and mediators, especially when those leaders lack the backing of the people?
One of the priorities of a good government is to solve the biggest standing issues in Yemen and not to adopt a ready “prescription” without linking it to the characteristics of Yemen that distinguish it from other countries in the region.
Al Houthis and their allies know that they cannot strengthen their hold inside and outside Sana’a without considering the demands and desires of the people, whether in the north or in the south.
Credit: Haifa AlMaashi is a former professor at the University of Aden and a senior researcher in ‘b’huth’ (Dubai).
