Nato finds ways of staying relevant

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) celebrates its 60th anniversary next year.

As a grouping that brought together countries in three continents during the Cold War to shield Western Europe from the influence of communism and Soviet domination, Nato proved especially resilient and the Soviets were forced to cobble together the Warsaw Pact as a counterweight.

The first Nato secretary general, Lord Ismay, minced no words when he said it was meant "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.

As a politico-military organisation that today counts 26 member countries in its ranks, Nato reflects the truth in the old adage, "In international relations, there are no permanent enemies and no permanent friends." It forged partnerships with former Soviet bloc members like Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. Other entrants to the fold hail from a certain geographical region former US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld had once sarcastically sought to dismiss as "New Europe".

Ideological shift

The Czech Republic and Poland, the erstwhile headquarters of the Warsaw Pact, in fact, have taken the ideological shift one step further by emerging as potential sites for American radar and missile defence systems, a move that has not gone down too well in Moscow.

Turkey and Greece joined Nato in the 1950s. When the Berlin Wall fell, many thought Nato had accomplished its mission: Communism had been defeated, the West had triumphed and Nato officials could afford to brag without having had to do as much as fire a shot.

Even as the future of Nato became a point of debate, the organisation shook off the doubters and reinvented itself, identifying in "Islamist fundamentalism" a new enemy in the post-Communism era. Former Belgian foreign minister and Nato secretary general Willy Claes warned in 1995 that the "green scare" was no less dangerous than communism. Ever since, Al Qaida and the "war on terrorism" have become its preoccupation and, in the process, made it look almost indispensable for world peace.

Nato, as a legitimate tool in the hands of the US, became the final arbiter in world disputes and effectively sidelined the UN. It took on the mantle of the "world cop" and annoyed the Russians to no end.

It is ironic that the organisation did not resort to the use of force until after the fall of the Soviet Union and the disassociation of the East European countries from the bloc. Nato was drawn into the Balkan conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo.

A major realignment of Nato's objectives, however, came in the wake of the terrorist attacks in the US. When Nato invoked Article 5 to ostensibly defend the US and saw itself drawn into the war in Afghanistan - amid much acrimony - it tried to project itself as an organisation in tune with international needs.

Collateral damage

The collateral damage and killing of Afghan civilians have hurt Nato's image and have given conspiracy theorists reason to question its role in this region.

In 2004, after the US and the Group of Eight (G8) industrialised nations coined the new term "Broader Middle East and North Africa", Nato launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), an ambitious joint-venture endeavour with the GCC countries. The agreement offers the GCC countries assistance for energy security and pledges to "foster security and regional stability". The initiative is not a security commitment, or treaty as such and does not necessitate Nato military presence or any obligations on that count. It, however, answers the need for cooperation in areas the individual GCC states lack or need.

The GCC states may select from a menu offering 19 areas of cooperation covering over 250 different programmes. Since 2004, only Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE have joined the initiative. Saudi Arabia and Oman, the largest two countries in the GCC, have opted to stay out of the ICI and observe how it approaches the GCC states individually rather than collectively.

A sensitive aspect of the ICI is the clause that it "should be complementary to the alliance's Mediterranean Dialogue and would complement Nato's specific relationship with the partner countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue. The problem with such wording is that the Mediterranean Dialogue counts Israel as one of its seven members, the others being Arab North African countries. Oman is apprehensive the ICI stands the risk of being interpreted by Iran as an attempt to rope in Nato to intimidate it.

The smaller GCC states however see in the ICI the assurance of additional security with the chance to express the region's political ambitions in a mutually beneficial manner. Theoretically, the initiative is a win-win initiative for the smaller GCC states but as long as Saudi Arabia and Oman show only lukewarm interest, it will fail to be seen as wielding much strategic significance.

The GCC states need to put their heads together about shaping a viable security strategy rather than being content with outsourced solutions provided by either the US or Nato.

Dr Abdullah Al Shayji is Professor of International Relations and the Head of the American Studies Unit, Kuwait University.