From the presidential palace in Mukalla to the presidential palace in Sana’a there is a long list of targets exposed to possible terrorist operations by Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Between the two palaces one can see gatherings of the Yemeni army and hear the echo of massive bombardments by the security forces and American drone attacks against Al Qaida training camps in the southern provinces of Abyan, Shabwa and Hadramout. The latest attacks have been ongoing since April this year and the death toll is in the hundreds. But not all the dead belong to Al Qaida.
According to statements by Yemen’s Interior Ministry, only a few victims have been identified so far and the government is still trying to identify the others. With an explicit recognition by the government, there have been civilians among the dead.
Abu Basir or Nasser Al Waheshi managed to dig a long tunnel in the political security prison in Sana’a to make good his escape in 2006 and earn the leadership of AQAP with the blessings of the then second-most senior man in the organisation, Ayman Al Zawahiri, in 2009. Al Waheshi holds the title of “Prince of Mujahideen”, and had been declared to be among the dead during a US drone attack in April. However, according to subsequent reports, DNA samples have confirmed that he was not among those killed. This means that Al Qaida leaders in Yemen will continue to be chased, whether by the Yemeni authorities or the US government through the use of drones and with the support of US Marines. On the top of the US list are Al Waheshi, Ebrahim Al Asiri and Qasim Al Rimi. Yemen is the “safe haven” for Al Qaida or at least this is what the CIA has believed — throughout its exhausting mission against the group since 9/11. The term “safe haven” has been used by Washington to indicate that the most senior figures in Al Qaida — whether in Pakistan, Afghanistan or the militants released from Guantanamo — moved to Yemen after the formation of AQAP. They found a safe haven in Yemen, away from the prying eyes of the various security agencies.
It is a fact that Al Qaida in Yemen does not only embrace Yemeni fighters, but rather a mix of fighters from different countries, including Saudis, Chechens, Pak-istanis, Egyptians and others. Perhaps the emphasis on the presence of these foreign fighters demonstrates that Al Qaida in Yemen has become a regional centre, not just a branch of the organisation, and that the leaders present in Yemen have the right to plan, guide and initiate attacks not only in Yemen, but also around the world to achieve the objectives of the organisation. The episode involving the Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallib, who tried — but failed — to blow up a US airliner over Detroit confirms that. He had planned it inside Yemen with the help of the late Al Qaida leader Anwar Al Awlaki and Saudi Ebrahim Al Asiri. The video launched to announce the establishment of AQAP was titled ‘From here we start and in Al Aqsa mosque we meet’.
Recurrent theme
The ideology of the organisation, as described by its members, is aimed at establishing an army in Yemen to wage battles in “Belad Al Sham” (Syria), under the slogan “Yemen is the land that contains the supply of fighters (Al Madad)”. According to AQAP, 12,000 fighters have come from Abyan and Aden. Perhaps all this gave the Yemeni regime, both before and after the 2011 revolution, the legitimacy needed to eliminate the organisation and get rid of members through arrests, imprisonment or execution (either following a trial or through the open skies with the use of American drones). It is also a fact that AQAP has carried out terrorist operations — from the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 to the recent bombings in Sana’a and most notably the incident at Al Ardi Hospital in the Ministry of Defence compound in December 2013. And throughout this period, violence, kidnappings and assassinations have been a recurrent theme in all the governorates of Yemen.
However, the recent escalation of clashes between AQAP and the Yemeni security forces and the gross use of different mediums — whether political, military or the media — to eliminate Al Qaida, particularly in the southern provinces, may indicate that the Yemeni authorities have started mixing fact with fiction. This may lead to an outcome that may end up benefitting AQAP, rather than eliminating the organisation. The demand by the Committee to Protect Journalists that the Yemeni government grant two journalists, Adam Barron and Ted Rock, the permission to re-enter Yemen and report freely may be seen as a universal condemnation of the decisions of the government. It also leads to suspicions that the Yemeni government may be using AQAP as an excuse to protect its interests and to obtain external support — whether political, financial or military — and that its efforts against AQAP are not aimed at the eradication of terrorism.
Barron, one of the journalists deported from Yemen, had pointed out in an article a year ago that “any unrest in south Yemen is often immediately linked to Al Qaida. This is not wholly without reason. For much of the past two years, local fighters affiliated to Al Qaida effectively controlled southern towns. But the anxiety over the current situation in the south ultimately has little to do with the infamous terrorist franchise”. This may suggest that the Yemeni government uses the narrative of Al Qaida to conceal or suppress other political events in the country that have no connection whatsoever with Al Qaida — whether it is separatist demands in the south or confrontations with the Al Houthis in the north or an attempt to overlook the application of the resolutions of the national dialogue conference, which concluded in January this year.
Some even believe that America supports the approach of the Yemeni government in this regard. According to Critical Threats, an initiative of the American Enterprise Institute, “the claims of secession in the south and military confrontations between the Al Houthis and the regime in the north may put the strategy of the US government to eradicate terrorism in Yemen at risk”.
This analysis of the attitude of the American government towards what is happening in Yemen may seem a rather superficial one that does not reflect a clear vision or an honest picture of the complex and interrelated political reality in Yemen. However, it confirms that the US puts its own interests first, not those of the Yemeni people. This may have played a key role, directly or indirectly, in shuffling of papers and in the loss of facts, which granted the present Yemeni regime and the former one the green light to utilise the narrative of Al Qaida in a negative way.
If the Yemeni government’s main aim is to fight terrorism by eliminating Al Qaida, then the methods that are being used — whether military or political — may not be approved by international observers. It may actually weaken the position of the government and raise doubts concerning the scale and limits of its battle with Al Qaida.
Not all southerners belong to Al Qaida. And not all members of Al Qaida are southerners, but the large-scale presence of the Yemeni army in the southern provinces — whether the National Security Agency or reserve forces under the command of the head of state, President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, or Yemeni air defence forces or military reinforcements from the US with the support of some local tribes in Abyan and Shabwa — may convey a wrong message to the Arab and international public that the south is a hotbed of Al Qaida activity. And that all political activities in the south, such as public demonstrations or protests, are an extension of Al Qaida.
The political history of the south before Yemen’s reunification indicates that the Socialist Party was the arch-enemy of Al Qaida and this was reflected in the visions and attitudes of extremists in the 1990s. In addition to that, the “jihad” against the Socialist Party was the latest action by Al Qaida in South Yemen before reunification and this continued later on when Osama Bin Laden had ordered his followers in Yemen to engage in a battle against the Socialists and to fight alongside the Northern Yemen army to overthrow “communism”.
The declared goal
The intervention of Al Qaida in the military confrontation between the southern part and the northern part of Yemen in the 1994 war raises many doubts about the existence of hidden political alliances between Al Qaida in Yemen and elements of the political system at that time. That reflects negatively on the credibility of the previous government and its declared goal of fighting Al Qaida. These doubts may extend to include political figures in the present regime in Yemen.
Al Hirak, the most prominent political movement in South Yemen, currently claims that it adopts a peaceful and moderate political approach and aims mainly at the revival of southern states. Perhaps the claims of retired military southerners to get equal rights with their counterparts in the north in 2007 were the first spark in working towards this goal.
There are fears that the Yemeni government will continue to confront Al Qaida as an element of political unrest in Yemen in a way that is far removed from the real scale of the problem. It uses it to justify a military sweep of the southern provinces and to justify the killing of innocent citizens. This short-term political move may grant the Yemeni regime limited results in its battle with Al Qaida, but in the long term it may cause damage to the fight against the organisation and may provide fuel for it to expand.
We cannot rule out the assumption that the Yemeni government fabricates events and victims to carry out an outdated political agenda that has not achieved the desired results. The time has come to change these shabby agendas and correct the wrong policies so that Yemen can win its battle against Al Qaida.
Haifa AlMaashi is a former professor at the University of Aden and a senior researcher in ‘b’huth’ (Dubai).
