China's new Silk Road

Towards the end of the Second World War, the godfather of geopolitics, Nicholas Spykman, offered his famous analysis that was to become a rule of thumb for many strategists ever since: Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia, and who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world. In this ‘Asian Century', Eurasia is dismissed as having lost its importance after the Cold War. But China is rediscovering the importance of Central Asia and is hoping that this could lead to the geopolitical reorganisation of ‘Asia' itself.

There are two proud itinerant traditions in Chinese history that did much to extend the reach of its civilisation, the trade and tributary system. The first is the seafaring one best exemplified by Admiral Zheng He's leading the Ming dynasty's immense Armada of hundreds of vessels on seven epic voyages that went as far as Indonesia, India, Africa and even Arabia some 600 years ago.

The second is China's significant role in the development of the land-based Old Silk Road which connected East, South and West Asia with Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. At its peak, the Silk Road ran for more than 11,000 kilometres and served as an established route for traders, missionaries and soldiers across Eurasia for over 3,000 years.

China extended its influence in East and Southeast Asia through its seafaring tradition. After all, it imports most of its energy needs and over four-fifths of these sail through the US-patrolled Malacca Straits. But China remains at a huge disadvantage to its east and southeast by virtue of its maritime encirclement by the US and its network of littoral allies and partners. Its great strategic vulnerability is reliance on energy imports that are transported by sea.

But although geography is permanent, geo-strategy is not. China is seeking to change the geostrategic parameters of the existing game and this is where its second great tradition the Old Silk Road comes in.

Reshaping geo-strategy

While attention is focused on the naval rivalry simmering in East and Southeast Asia, China has been using a ‘New Silk Road' strategy that it hopes will reshape geo-strategy in Asia.

First, it is attempting to build its own ‘hub-and spokes' system in the region. Bear in mind that through the multi-lateral Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Russia are in practice building strategic, economic and diplomatic relationships with China.

Second, Old Silk Road routes offer China the prospect of growing relief from reliance on sea-based energy imports leaving the Strait of Hormuz and the Malacca Straits. For example, there are pipelines linking Kazakhstan (with three per cent of the world's proven oil reserves) to Chinese refineries. There are gas pipelines stretching from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan through Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and ending in China. There are plans to develop pipelines from the port of Gwadar in Pakistan, winding all the way to Xinjiang, China's westernmost province.

Third, if Central Asia experiences a new economic renaissance via energy resources, Beijing has plans to be the future hub between Central Asian states and those in East and Southeast Asia.

There are inherent limitations to even the best laid plans. For example, an Afghanistan leaning towards the US and India would seriously compromise proposed gas pipelines stretching from Gwadar through Afghanistan and into Turkmenistan. Even if the Kazakhstan-China pipeline operates at full capacity, more than half of China's oil needs will still come from the Middle East.

Even so, as far as China is concerned, broadening the geostrategic construction of ‘Asia' to include Central Asia makes sense. By creating a second, land-based centre of strategic importance, it is well placed to dilute the traditional geostrategic order based on control of the seas in Asia. Although Beijing still has some distance to go in realising these plans, current strategists would do well to re-read their Spykman.

— Opinion Asia, 2010

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Dr John Lee is the Foreign Policy Fellow at the Centre for Independent Studies in Sydney and a Visiting Fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C.