Brexit: Hard interests battle potent emotion

An astute American foresaw Britain’s troubles in Europe long before a common market was a mere glint in the eye of Jean Monnet. Edward Stettinius, then United States secretary of state, told president Franklin Roosevelt, as the Second World War drew towards a close in 1944, that the British would always be uncomfortable in any club that they did not lead.

There are many explanations for the singularity of Britain’s view of its own continent, among them history, geography, political culture and self-image. It really does matter that 1,000 years have passed since the country was last invaded and that the chamber of the House of Commons is laid out for combat rather than consensus. The original sin as far as the European Union (EU) is concerned, though, was to come late to an organisation, in which, leadership had already been claimed by Paris and Bonn.

Britain’s European question is as much about temperament as about the dastardly designs of those on the other side of the Channel. Standing aside in 1957 from the founding Treaty of Rome, before scurrying a few years later to climb aboard, spoke to a frame of mind that ricochets between innate superiority and recurring insecurity.

Britain may be convinced it does not need the EU, but history recalls it must not allow its neighbours to conspire against it. So successive governments have rarely ventured more than halfway in — an arrangement formalised in opt-outs from the euro and the Schengen frontier-free zone.

The psychodrama is unlikely to be front and centre in the referendum on EU membership. Modern campaigning, we are told, is about pocketbook issues. Jobs, growth and living standards take precedence over grand visions. This, I think, is a mistake. Britain’s relationship with Europe stirs deep-rooted emotions and impulses.

The “outs” have it that plucky Britain is better off striking out alone than bending to the will of Brussels. If anyone is nervous about being excluded, the sceptics add, the United kingdom will get a good deal if the vote is to leave. Hmmm. British Prime Minister David Cameron is rehearsing the dubious claim that renegotiation has secured “the best of both worlds” — a place at the table along with an exemption from all that stuff it does not like.

Valiant souls such as the Conservative Kenneth Clarke are in a minority even among pro-Europeans in recalling that the Union is an essential pillar of peace and security. For the most part such sentiments are seen as relics of the Cold War. Today’s deracinated political discourse demands that British pro-Europeans instead sing the praises of, say, the single market in mobile telephony. They are the ones living in the past. Britain is neither safe nor secure. Russian revanchism, terrorism and surging migration — these are not threats susceptible to national resolution.

The UK carries considerable clout: Economic, diplomatic, cultural and military. It also confronts an ineluctable strategic fact. Decisions taken by Germany, France, Italy and the rest, whether about hard security, energy supply, climate change, economic management or financial regulation, have an impact on Britain’s national interest. The in-out choice is one between being a maker or a taker of the rules.

Inevitable brouhaha

For now, the “ins” are in the grip of a certain complacency. Buoyed by largely favourable polls you hear them whisper that the die is cast. For all the inevitable brouhaha of the coming campaign (everyone expects a deal next month in Brussels to be followed by a referendum in June), the British will play it safe. They will opt, albeit with a certain sullenness, for the status quo rather than take a leap into the unknown.

The pro-Europeans have a point. The glaring weakness of the ‘out’ campaign is the absence of any credible alternative. The sceptics are profoundly divided on the extent to which Britain should cut itself loose. Some look to the Norwegian or Swiss example — outside but playing by the single market rules. Others see the inherent absurdity of going to the trouble of leaving and then signing up again for all the rules. Singapore, they say, is a better model.

Clarke calls the sceptics old-fashioned right-wing nationalists, and there is much of that tradition among the Tory sceptics and in Nigel Farage’s UK Independence Party. But Europe is an issue on which far right and far left meet. Jeremy Corbyn, the hard-left opposition Labour party leader, is as hostile to the EU as any right-wing populist. He is kept quiet only by the threat of open civil war in his party.

What the pro-Europeans miss is the powerful emotional pull of the “outs”. Their appeal is to a mood that rejects the political elites, demonises big business and banking, and casts Brussels as the agent of unfettered globalisation and uncontrolled migration. In truth, there is no guarantee that when the British come to cast their ballots that they will prefer cold economic logic to the siren call of national self-discovery.

Stettinius offered his observation as Britain entered the twilight of empire. His concern was that Britain would struggle to adjust to the emerging world of two superpowers. He did not imagine that, seven decades later, Britain would still be vexed by an innate reluctance to accept anything much less than leadership. Cameron says the referendum will settle the matter. He is mistaken. Britain’s European question is about a lot more than membership of the EU.

— Financial Times