Afghan offensive must deliver durable security

Event: The US and allied offensive in Helmand, southern Afghanistan.

Significance: The offensive underway by US Marines in the Helmand River valley is a strategic gambit on whose success US President Barack Obama's Afghanistan policy will, in part, be judged. There are few signs that the necessary elements of a winning strategy are in place.

ANALYSIS:

In the 'Strike of the Sword' operation, more than 4,000 US Marines have fanned out across the lower Helmand River valley, consolidating control of the territory between the provincial capital Lashkah Gah and the town of Garmsir - previously the most southerly position held by Nato and the Afghan government. By July 9, they had also pushed approximately 75 kilometres along the river to establish a new forward position at Khan Neshin, itself, some 100 kilometres from the Pakistani border.

Meanwhile, UK-led troops, in an operation known as 'Panther's Claw', have advanced into territory between Lashkah Gah and the town of Gereshk, the province's second largest town, which is located on the strategic Highway One - Afghanistan's national circular road artery.

Marine offensive: The US Marines deployment represents the first prong of a theatre-wide summer offensive designed to provide maximum security for the August presidential elections. It aims to implement a new strategy based on counter-insurgency principles, designed to secure the civilian population by avoiding unnecessary use of military force and maintaining long-term domination over captured territory.

Helmand theatre: The Marines have entered a challenging environment shaped by the UK military presence since 2006:

1. Geography. The province of Helmand is mostly arid desert. The population is concentrated in principal towns and along a narrow strip of cultivated land alongside the perennial waters of the Helmand River, its seasonal-flowing tributaries and nearby canal systems. Known by the military as the 'Green Zone', this strip is also the principal battle space.

With protection from the air, Nato forces can manoeuvre relatively freely through the surrounding desert, encumbered only by the threat of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) left at vulnerable 'choke' points - usually wadi crossings. However, they are more vulnerable to attack within the cultivated strip, where insurgents can shelter among the population and obtain cover from lush vegetation and high-banked irrigation systems.

The principal economic activity in Helmand is opium cultivation. According to UN estimates, Helmand produces more opium than any entire country outside of Afghanistan. The poppy economy provides large revenues for tribes, strongmen and officials that are often connected to both the insurgency and government.

2. The insurgents. The Helmand insurgency comprises a range of fighting groups rendered more chaotic and quite possibly more extreme by the systematic US/Nato strategy of 'decapitation' operations. Best regarded, at least in Helmand, as a tribal revolt rather than religious movement, the Helmand insurgency was substantially provoked in 2006 by tribal competition for drug revenue.

Tribes and officials loyal to President Hamid Karzai's government, such as the Alokozai, were suspected of attempting to corner the market.

The arrival of foreign and Afghan troops not only stoked nationalist feeling but was regarded as a threat to the drug fields, bringing the revolt fresh finance from drug traffickers and a supply of seasonal fighters from among the farmers.

Although genuine 'foreign fighters', such as Chechens or Arabs, are few in number and largely seen as a burden, a substantial portion of the most dedicated fighters are from Afghan refugee families in Pakistan, who have arrived from religious schools in the North West Frontier Province or Karachi. Taliban commanders have typically been local tribal leaders or strongmen who may have merely passing sympathy for their movement's extreme ideology.

3. Campaign evolution. When UK forces arrived with a 3,300-strong force in the spring of 2006, the plan was to establish a central zone of security (the 'Helmand Development Zone') around Lashkah Gah and Gereshk. Yet a spreading revolt and the collapse of governance in outlying towns - Now Zad, Sangin and Mousa Qala to the north; Garmsir to the south - led to the stalling of civilian development plans. Most fighting strength deployed was deployed north to small garrisons that, under-resourced and facing constant attack, succeeded in reducing their surroundings to rubble and causing the populations to flee.

A slow build up of UK forces to about 8,000 by the middle of this year has led to more durable battalion-strength garrisons, backed by enhanced Afghan army forces, to secure these same rebellious towns and a small perimeter around them. Yet despite re-establishing control of the major district centres, the surrounding Green Zone has never been brought under control. Troops in Helmand invented the term 'mowing the lawn' to refer to sweeps through the countryside that captured territory briefly, at great cost, only for these to return to Taliban control afterwards.

4. Drug dynamics. Until autumn 2008, little fighting took place in the Nawa, Nad Ali and northern Garmsir districts, where the current US/UK offensive is centred. Regarded as the centre of development and reconstruction efforts, as well of poppy production, this whole area was neither garrisoned nor seen as hostile.

The fighting that erupted this winter was initially blamed on displacement of Taliban groups due to successful operations elsewhere. Yet of equal importance was an uptick in counter-narcotic efforts, beginning last spring, that threatened the huge landholdings of a key tribal leader. Aggressive eradication operations by the national Poppy Eradication Force (PEF), mentored by private firm Dyncorps, led to a growing cycle of violent resistance, retaliation by security forces, and an expanding revolt.

Campaign challenges:

Under guidance from US commanders well-versed in counter-insurgency philosophy, the new offensive seeks to emphasise a population-centric approach that radically abandons 'mowing the lawn' and imposes a durable security on the region. However, it is clear that the military resources and tactical choices of the Marines will face a stern test in Helmand:

1. Resource adequacy. As they seek to establish control of one the world's most lucrative fields of illegal narcotics, US Marines and their UK allies will be stretched to find and resource a strategy that combines the 'population-centric' approach of garnering local support with the over-arching goal of confronting the poppy trade.

The recent revolt in central Helmand illustrates the consequences of ill-thought-out interventions in previously benign districts. While the 'Clear, Hold, Build' doctrine is laudable, it is quite impossible to envisage 'holding' the entire populated countryside. Commanders and political leaders have yet to accept the unpalatable implication: that large swathes of territory must for now be left under the control of hostile elements .

2. Untested tactics. US commander General Stanley McChrystal is determined to deliver security and economic gains for the population while avoiding civilian casualties. Initial signs are that the Marines are proceeding with such goals in mind. However, implementation will become increasingly difficult:

As casualties mount, the need to emphasise force protection may bring tactical choices that embitter local populations.

With intelligence capabilities and cultural skills wanting, it will be hard for forces to adopt 'non-kinetic' measures such as genuine dialogue with local communities to ascertain and then remedy grievances.

Without progress towards genuine political-military integration, made hard by the weaknesses of the Karzai government, US and UK forces will struggle to offer Afghans credible promises that their complaints will be answered.

CONCLUSION:

However carefully calibrated, the Helmand offensive risks inflaming further revolt. Tactical-level intelligence capability must be a priority if the troops are to engage successfully with the varied and local roots of the insurgency, rather than focusing counterproductively on eliminating the enemy 'chain-of-command'. A further danger is of tactical overstretch, particularly if the Marines rush to seize maximum territory before the August election instead of deepening control of already-occupied areas.