A multinational peacekeeping force arrived in a war-torn Lebanon only to find they were not wanted there
U.S. Marines in Lebanon: 1982-1984,
At the height of the Lebanese civil war — that started well before 1975 and extended long after 1990 — an international peacekeeping force was created to help separate various factions involved in the conflict.
When Israel re-invaded Lebanon in 1982 to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), Beirut became the first occupied Arab capital. Large chunks of the country were under Syrian tutelage, and Ambassador Philip Habib — then Washington’s Special Envoy — negotiated with warring parties an end to the fighting, which revolved around the evacuation of PLO troops.
A three-nation (France, Italy and the United States) Multinational Force in Lebanon (MNF) was created after the Lebanese government requested UN assistance, as 850 American, 860 French, and 575 Italian marines and sailors oversaw the successful evacuation of chairman Yasser Arafat and a contingent of his fighters to Tunisia.
The MNF withdrew after it completed its mission on September 10, 1982.
On September 14, 1982, President-elect Bashir Gemayel was assassinated, and during September 16-18 his partymen (Phalanges-led Lebanese Forces) carried out massacres at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, where at least 762, and perhaps as many as 3,500, civilians perished.
It was this incident that prompted the United States to organise a new MNF with France and Italy (later joined by the British) that, for better or worse, sealed the fate of many of these brave men as they rushed to bring peace and security where neither was sought.
Benis M. Frank avoids Lebanese political ambivalences, but he provides the reader with a nearly complete history of various military deployments, which illuminate and clarify many aspects of this presence for nearly two years.
His heavily illustrated book, with black-and-white photographs and several newspaper cartoons, cross the t’s and dot the i’s. Frank raises key concerns in his subtle approach; he is anxious to discuss military apprehensions about what were, undoubtedly, poorly calculated decisions.
On September 29, 1982, for example, as the new MNF entered Beirut with about 1,400 marines, Frank writes of military anxieties regarding the stated mission — to help the new Lebanese government rebrand the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and assume authority — while maintaining a relatively neutral position.
He manages to describe several positive developments, especially during the exceptionally cold 1982-1983 winter when US Marines rescued civilians trapped in mountain villages (page 53), provided sorely needed medical and dental care (page 41) and, most important, trained LAF units to regain their significantly eroded powers.
Though officially neutral, MNF troops soon found themselves mired in local conflicts, even as they intervened to prevent attacks from various Lebanese factions as well as occupying Israeli forces, earning the wrath of the latter.
Frank reports several American-Israeli clashes (pages 44-46 and 56-57), which highlighted the kind of abuses US members of the MNF endured — not just from Druze or Shiite factions. The MNF came under fire from all sides, especially Walid Jumblatt’s PSP (Druze) and Nabih Berri’s Amal (Shiite) militias.
Nevertheless, while patrols were routinely conducted to gather information, the MNF acknowledged that it lacked human intelligence, which meant that it failed to track down potential enemies.
It was not long before tragedies struck.
First, a terrorist detonated himself in a car in front of the US Embassy on April 18, 1983, killing 63 people, including several of the CIA’s elite Middle East analysts. Terrorists struck again on October 23, 1983, when two truck bombs targeted US and French barracks, killing 241 American servicemen and 58 French soldiers.
For the marines, it “was the highest loss of life in a single day since D-Day on Iwo Jima in 1945” (page 3). On President Ronald Reagan’s orders, the marines stayed a little longer, before they gradually left Lebanon to its favourite internecine engagements. Italy and Britain pulled out on February 20, followed by the US Marines on February 26, while the last French troops left on March 31.
The US lost 265 servicemen in Lebanon during its 18-month-long deployments, all but nine in hostile incidents, and all but 24 in the bombing of the barracks. An additional 159 were wounded. The French lost 89 soldiers and Italians two.
When MNF troops left, the LAF was not able to restore order as it, and the rest of the country, endured years of fresh conflict.
Frank’s thoughtful military history does not pretend to decipher what went wrong in Lebanon, though his honest descriptions stress intrinsic problems that put brave men in harm’s way. He provides a full list of the names of the fallen (pages 178-184).
Among these is one Lance Corporal Jeffrey J. Boulos, probably an American of Lebanese origin, who died in his ancestral homeland to defend his native country’s foreign policies.
Dr Joseph A. Kéchichian is the author of the recently published “Legal and Political Reforms in Saudi Arabia” (London: Routledge, 2013).