The unexpected visit of the Iraqi oil minister Adil Abdul Mahdi to Baiji refinery on September 11 emphasises the importance of this plant not just to the government but to the people of Iraq.

The refinery — with 290,000 barrels a day capacity in three production lines, (one of 150,000- and two 70,000 barrels a day) — was responsible for almost 48 per cent of oil products production in Iraq in the first-half of this year. But the refinery has been a battleground for just over three months now in the mayhem that engulfed the west and northwest of the country.

The latest we know is that the defenders of the refinery are surrounded by anti-government militants and can only be supplied or reinforced by air. This situation generated many battles, but to no avail for either side. Damages to the refinery are expected to be substantial, with some tanks catching fire, but no actual survey is available to estimate the extent of damage to all equipment and systems.

Reuters reported on September 4 that Ashti Hawrami, the Kurdistan Regional Government Minister of Natural Resources, said in a speech at a conference in Istanbul that “it would take more than a year to repair the Baiji refinery”. The minister did not elaborate as to the basis of his assessment.

Of course we have to wait until peace comes to the region before any assessment of damages and repairs can be undertaken, but there is no doubt that the process will not be easy. One of the more serious concerns is the way the refinery was shutdown in June as the fighting approached Baiji and the staff fled the region to save themselves and their families, especially after their housing complex became a target for air attacks.

Procedure

To shut a refinery or any process plant for a long time needs the application and maintenance of certain procedures of mothballing, which under the circumstances were not followed. Without this, the damage of idle process units could even exceed the physical damage reported so far.

The Iraqis practiced and learned carefully these procedures during the war with Iran in the 1980s, during which time the most extensive programme of preservation was designed, implemented and maintained for the Basra refinery and other plants close to the war zone.

The equipment had to be drained from hydrocarbons, dried and pressurised with inert nitrogen gas to prevent corrosion by the ingress of air. Boiler systems were filled with treated water and corrosion inhibitors and tests were regularly carried to ensure effectiveness. Fragile instruments were removed and stored safely. Machinery was kept clean and rotated periodically.

Cooling water circuits were maintained with certain levels of inhibitors to prevent corrosion in this very vital section. The effort needed to achieve a successful programme was tremendous and supervision was at the highest level. The only indicator of success was the ease of the refinery operation after almost eight years of downtime.

Unfortunately, the Baiji refinery was not given the opportunity by the combatants for a safe and clean shutdown, never mind an elaborate preservation programme. Therefore it is anybody’s guess as to the extent of internal damage to equipment and systems.

Production lines

Once some normalcy returns, a detailed survey of the entire refinery is needed and a plan for repairs and system modification is needed in the shortest possible time to achieve operations. Some tanks may have to be bypassed as their repairs usually take a long time and may need a complete replacement. The refinery staff is capable of doing this even if they have to be supported by external help or contractors to save time.

We have to remember that Baiji is a complex with three production lines and it may be possible to start these lines in succession rather than wait for repairs of all the lines to be completed. The same applies to the lube oil refinery in Baiji and the chemical detergents plant, but these are probably less urgent than the fuel sections in the complex.

Personally, having been in charge of the Baiji complex for a long time in the past, I wish there was a way to neutralise this plant for the benefit of all Iraqis, rather than turn it into a futile battlefield. I am told that there were such attempts at the beginning but went largely unheeded. My thoughts are with the staff of the refinery, where at least a number of them have lost their homes and belongings and have to shoulder the repairs and operation of the plant when the time comes.