The world is full of ironies. The Christmas I grew up in held "nativities" in which three "wise men" from the East took gifts to the infant Jesus. An American, John Henry Hopkins, interpreted the events into a carol changing wise men into kings: "We three kings from Orient are, bearing gifts we travel so far..."

The irony of the "western" religion (founded in the Middle East) and supported by three kings from "the east" isn't lost on present day events.

The modern ironic equivalent might feature "western" banks. Let's take Citigroup, Morgan Stanley and UBS as an example, being supported by "gifts" from The East. In this instance, our three Oriental kings are: The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority's (Adia) bailing out of Citigroup, The China Investment Corp (CIC) assisting Morgan Stanley, and The Government of Singapore Investment Corp supporting UBS.

Comparison

The ironic comparison leads to a painful recognition: my "traditional" upbringing in western markets, with its "blue chip", "can't fail" security, is under pressure. The world's "lender of first resort" is, seemingly, on the move. Tradition would have it that, if a bank got into trouble, shareholders and the markets would pick up shares on the cheap (in the first instance), and regulators "as a last resort" would stomp up the monies for troubled banks.

In our modern irony, western troubled banks have been heading eastward to take gifts from oriental financial kings.

Saga one is the story of Citigroup. More accurately, the second chapter, as in the 1990s Saudi Prince Al Waleed Bin Talal had already been to Citi's rescue. The Economist referred to the act in an article headed "Dishdashing to the rescue" leading with "Citigroup may have lost its bearings and its chief executive, but has not lost its memory".

Ironic that in a year when US interests made such a fuss about DP World's interests in US ports, Citigroup, the biggest bank in America - without checking shareholder opinion - went to Adia to raise $7.5 billion in capital, a move that might eventually net about five per cent of the company.

You can understand Citi's plight. The credit crunch means they need capital if they are to maintain their status within the lending/banking world. Gulf states are reported to be creating current account surpluses at about $200 billion per annum.

The sovereign wealth funds from the Gulf are known to have deep pockets and long-term investment horizons, with little appetite for the politics of managing the business. They make an appealing alternative to "activist" investors that the markets throw up. Ironic?

Saga two is the story of Morgan Stanley. Only the details of the plot differ. The main theme remains the same: sub-prime write-downs, need for capital, and the sale of shares in a complex matrix over a period of time to a sovereign wealth manager with a long-term investment horizon and little interest in management.

The cast and their numbers differ. The CIC replace Adia, although even the absolute sum is similar at $5 billion, the potential stake however differs with CIC targeting a 9.9 per cent holding. This was the CIC's second such move this year in that they have also taken a $3 billion stake in US private equity firm Blackstone. It does make you think that, if sovereign wealth funds are not particularly "bellyaching" about the "d-word" (as some brokers are calling the US dollar plight), then why should we? Why would they collect so much in dollar assets if the dollar were, in their view, likely to continue on a depreciation curve? Adia, of course, have much of their value in dollar assets, but the other "financial kings" in our story are less well attached to the "d-word".

The third of our sagas follows the same aforementioned plot but this time features the world's biggest wealth manager in UBS. The "financial king" produces its money out of the vast surplus created by the government of Singapore, and the likely stake in UBS will end up at around nine per cent. A twist to the tale is that the Singaporeans are joined in their venture by an undisclosed Arab interest, depending on who you read, either a Saudi Arabian or an Omani interest.

Again, this isn't a sole strike into global financial services interests by the Singaporeans. In 2006, Temasek (a government investment arm) purchased an 11.55 per cent in Standard Chartered Bank.

What does it all mean? Three conclusions stand out as harbingers of trends into 2008. The first is that many global banks have been significantly hit by the 2007 sub-prime drama. At least to the extent that they have desperately needed capital in order to satisfy "capital adequacy" rules. The global banking system needs to be watched.

Secondly, the drift towards a global financial services system has been accelerated. For the next few years, many systems and firms will boast of their uncorrelated attributes. Increasingly though, this number will shrink. Globalisation is firmly upon us.

Thirdly, the biggest investment decision makers in the world had already been joined by the ranks of private equity interests. The emergence of sover-eign wealth interests as a counter balance is clearly more obvious than it was.

- The writer is Chairman of Mondial Financial Partners.