Red Sea cable chaos: Why the Internet didn’t go dark

Submarine cables are digital bridges of the modern world.

They enable people across continents to talk to each other at a minimal cost.

Today, more than 95% of international data traffic flows through subsea cables, making them as critical to modern economies as air routes, ports, and energy pipelines. 

When submarine cables are cut, millions are affected.

On Saturday (September 6, 2025) multiple undersea submarine cables in the Red Sea had been severed, causing widespread internet disruptions across parts of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

The incident serves as a stark reminder: the link that serves as global digital arteries is vulnerable.

These cuts have forced internet service providers to reroute traffic through alternative, longer paths, exacerbating delays for cloud services, streaming, and general browsing.

John Wrottesley of the UK-based International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) stated tht early analysis points to “commercial shipping activity”, likely a vessel dropping and dragging its anchor across the cables. 

It is surprisingly common, ICPC notes 1.7 million km of global cables face 150–200 incidents yearly.

But here’s the upside: redundancy (rerouting) usually limits total internet “blackouts”. And now, there are satellite-based alternatives, such as Starlink, to provide broadband internet, as backup.

Major cables impacted include South East Asia–Middle East–Western Europe 4 (SEA-ME-WE-4), India–Middle East–Western Europe (IMEWE), and FALCON (operated by GCX). 

The IMEWE cables are near Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, while the FALCON GCX cable in Kuwait was also impacted. 

Together, these cables form a vital corridor linking Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.

Microsoft Azure said traffic is being rerouted via alternative routes but warned of “increased latency.”

Cloudflare reported delays of up to 30% between India and Europe. The Red Sea is one of the internet’s weakest links. 

Subsea cables here face risks from busy shipping lanes and tense geopolitics.

Microsoft Azure, a key cloud platform, reported the outage starting at 05:45 UTC on September 6, noting higher latency for traffic traversing the Middle East, particularly routes between Asia and Europe. 

The company has since rerouted traffic and stated that non-Middle East paths remain unaffected, but full recovery depends on repairs. 

Cybersecurity firm NetBlocks confirmed degraded connectivity in countries including India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait, attributing it to failures near Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 

In the UAE, networks like Etisalat and Du experienced slowdowns, while Kuwait's authorities reported direct impacts on the FALCON cable.

Experts estimate disruptions may last up to six weeks in some areas, as ships must navigate conflict zones and obtain permissions from multiple countries. 

The Red Sea remains a critical chokepoint, with 15 major cables passing through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, carrying about 25% of global data traffic between Asia and Europe. 

The internet, by design, is a "network of networks".

It has no single "hub."

Data is stored and processed across millions of servers worldwide, so a failure in one region doesn’t cripple the entire system.

When a cable is cut, routing protocols like the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) automatically reroute traffic through alternative paths.

For example, if a submarine cable is severed, data can be rerouted through other cables, satellite connections, or regional networks.

Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) and Tier 1/2/3 ISPs maintain multiple interconnections, ensuring no single point of failure.

Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) like Cloudflare or Akamai cache content closer to users, reducing dependency on long-haul connections.

If a cable cut isolates a region, locally cached data can still be accessed.

Its ability to avoid total blackouts despite cable cuts or catastrophic events like a nuclear war stems from its decentralised, resilient design, rooted in its origins as a fault-tolerant communication system.

With data traveling across multiple physical pathways (fibre-optic cables, satellite links, etc.) the internet utilises redundant pathways.

A 2023 report noted that over 500 undersea cables globally carry 99% of international internet traffic, with redundancy built into their geographic distribution.

The Red Sea has seen a surge in submarine cable disruptions since late 2023, amid heightened maritime tensions from Houthi attacks on shipping. 

The timeline of key incidents from 2024–2025 is based on reports from telecom operators, NetBlocks, and the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC). 

These events have repeatedly affected Asia-Europe data flows, with outages lasting from days to months.

This timeline highlights a pattern: incidents peaked in early 2024 due to Houthi-related shipping chaos, with sporadic faults continuing into 2025.

Submarine cables are powerful links, but are fragile fibre-optic lines laid on the seabed.

They're vulnerable to both natural and human factors.

In the Red Sea, causes blend accidental maritime activity with geopolitical risks. 

Globally, 100–200 cable faults occur annually, but the Red Sea's concentration (15 cables in a narrow strait) amplifies risks.

Here's a breakdown of the reasons for cable cuts:

#1. Accidental damage from commercial shipping (most likely for recent incidents):

Experts from the ICPC attribute 30% of global cable faults (60 per year) to dragged ship anchors, especially in shallow waters like the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (depths <2,000 metres). 

For the September 2025 cuts, ICPC's John Wrottesley stated early analysis points to “commercial shipping activity”, likely a vessel dropping and dragging its anchor across the cables. 

The Red Sea’s congestion — exacerbated by Houthi attacks rerouting ships — heightens this risk. Historical examples include the 2008 Alexandria cut (accidental anchor drag, which led to a 1-month outage that affected millions).

#2. Geopolitical issues or indirect effects from Houthi actions:

Yemen's Houthi rebels have attacked Red Sea shipping since late 2023 to pressure Israel over Gaza, leading to indirect cable damage (e.g., hit ships dragging anchors).

In early 2024, Yemen's government alleged Houthi plans to target cables directly, though rebels denied involvement. No confirmed sabotage in 2025 incidents, but warnings persist. 

US officials noted 25% of Asia-Europe traffic affected in 2024 events, possibly from Houthi-damaged vessels. Broader concerns include state actors (e.g., Russia, China) testing hybrid warfare via cable sabotage elsewhere, but no evidence ties them here.

#3. Other tactors (less common in Red Sea):

Repairs cost $1–3 million each and require specialised ships (e.g., Léon Thévenin), often delayed by permits and security in conflict zones. 

The ICPC notes 1.7 million km of global cables face 150–200 incidents yearly, but redundancy (rerouting) usually limits total blackouts. Ongoing Red Sea tensions may prompt new resilient routes, like land-based India-Middle East-Europe coridors.