India has a role to play

The US is struggling to implement a strategy for Afghanistan that will improve the lives of the Afghan people and allow US troops to go home. Part of what makes it so difficult is the way Washington views the conflict: through the lens of what officials have dubbed "AfPak", a war in the southern part of Afghanistan and the adjoining border areas of Pakistan. Though the acronym is falling out of official favour, the AfPak mind-set remains.

A different shorthand for the war might help. "AfPInd" may be less catchy, but it is far more useful. Peace in AfPInd requires not US troops on the ground, but a concerted effort to bring India and Pakistan to the negotiating table, where under the watchful eyes of the international community they can end their hydra-headed confrontation over Kashmir.

But that's not how the US sees this conflict. Mutual mistrust has bedeviled the US-Pakistani alliance since the Afghan war began in 2001. Certain suspicions surfaced again recently in military documents revealed by WikiLeaks alleging that members of the Pakistani intelligence agency collaborated with militant groups fighting the US in Afghanistan. Both Pakistani and US officials have said that the information is old, unreliable and not true to the situation on the ground.

In 1947, when Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan were partitioned into two countries, the status of the region of Kashmir, with a Muslim-majority population and a Hindu prince, was unresolved. The United Nations said Kashmiris should hold a referendum, but both India and Pakistan seized parts of the territory, and since then the two countries have been at each other's throats.

Enter the US — not once, but three times.

Start of the cycle

In the 1950s and 1960s, Pakistan and the US were allies. The US gave Pakistan weapons and $2 billion (Dh7.35 billion) in economic aid; it thought that the Pakistani military would be a bulwark against communism. The Pakistani military thought the US would help it against a much larger and hostile India. Then India and Pakistan went to war in 1965. American leaders castigated Pakistan for using US-supplied weapons and terminated the alliance.

Fast forward to the 1980s, and Pakistan and the US once again were allies. The US gave Pakistan weapons and $3 billion in economic aid; it thought that the Pakistani military would be a bulwark against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The Pakistani military thought the US would help it against a much larger and hostile India.

Then the Soviets were defeated. The US castigated Pakistan for developing nuclear weapons and terminated the alliance.

Today, Pakistan and the US are allies for a third time. Over the past decade, the US has given Pakistan weapons and $4 billion in economic aid; it hopes that the Pakistani military will be a bulwark against terrorist groups in the region. The Pakistani military hopes the US will help it against a much larger and hostile India. Then ...

By now, the recurring failure in the Pakistan-US alliance should be obvious: The Pakistani military views it primarily as a means of reducing the threat from India, and the US does not. But perhaps it should.

The reason the Pakistani military might have continued to back extremist groups, jointly set up with the CIA in the 1980s, after the Soviet Union was defeated in Afghanistan was that it believed the same tactics could be used in Kashmir against India. And the reason the Pakistani military remains obsessed with shaping events in Afghanistan is because that country is the site of a power struggle between Pakistan and India.

Fighting terrorists or fighting the Taliban addresses symptoms rather than the disease in South Asia: the horrific, wasteful, tragic and dangerous six-decade confrontation between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.

Ignore Kashmir, as the US does, and the conflict seems incomprehensible. Include Kashmir in the picture, and it all makes sense. The US still sets much of the global agenda. If it hopes to salvage any positive outcome from its war in Afghanistan, then it should move a resolution over Kashmir up on its list of priorities. AfPak is failing because the term itself is a wilful illusion. Peace in AfPInd will not be easy, but the term rings true, and that at least offers a start.

- Mohsin Hamid is a writer based in Pakistan.