The battle behind the frontline

The Afghan campaign has just suffered its most calamitous casualty. US President Barack Obama's decision to sack General Stanley McChrystal, the architect of America's highly controversial surge strategy for winning the war in Afghanistan, has, at a stroke, deprived the campaign of its highly respected and iconic leader. It has also plunged the western alliance into chaos and raised serious questions about whether this bitter conflict can be brought to a successful resolution.

In appointing General David Petraeus as his replacement, Obama insists there will be no change in the strategy that was personally devised by McChrystal to bring the bloody war in Afghanistan to a successful conclusion. "I want to tell the American people that this is a change in personnel but not a change in policy," Obama said, after confirming that he had accepted McChrystal's resignation as the US commander of Nato forces in Afghanistan. He will also need to reassure Washington's key allies in Europe, particularly Britain, who have invested much in blood and treasure in supporting the McChrystal strategy.

However Obama tries to explain McChrystal's dismissal — on Monday he said the general's unfortunate interview in Rolling Stone magazine "does not meet the standard that should be set by a commanding general" — the fact cannot be concealed that one of America's most accomplished soldiers has been required to fall on his sword for an undistinguished piece of gonzo journalism in a rock and roll magazine.

Only McChrystal can explain precisely why he allowed a freelance journalist working for a title renowned for its anti-establishment attitude unfettered access to his inner sanctum for six weeks. What is beyond doubt, and the reason the Obama administration has responded with unconfined fury, is that the magazine has succeeded in producing a damning critique not only of Obama, but of his entire administration.

While Obama is accused of appearing "uncomfortable and intimidated" when in the company of his senior military officers, General Jim Jones, Obama's National Security Adviser and a former Vietnam war hero, is derided as a "clown" who is "stuck in 1985". Vice-President Joe Biden, who opposed McChrystal's surge strategy when it was first mooted last year, is lampooned as a nonentity, while Richard Holbrooke, the US special envoy for Afghanistan, is portrayed as a man obsessed that he is about to be sacked at any moment. Significantly, one of the few senior members of Obama's national security team not to come in for biting criticism is Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State.

McChrystal might claim that none of these criticisms can be attributed to him directly, and that most of the remarks were made by aides who had no authority to speak on his behalf. Indeed, the aide who organised the Rolling Stone interview, and who described the "wimps in the White House" as the main threat to the success of the Afghan mission, has himself been dismissed by McChrystal.

But the damage has been done, not least because the article, for the first time since Obama took office 18 months ago, lifts the lid on the fierce policy battles taking place at the heart of the Obama administration over the vexed issue of Afghanistan.

Pivotal figure

In a military campaign dogged by political indecision and the absence of a clear strategy, the appointment of McChrystal to command Nato forces in Afghanistan was a defining moment. Until he took on the job last summer, the prospects of Nato defeating the Taliban and stabilising a country ravaged by almost three decades of incessant conflict appeared remote. Despite the heroic efforts — and sacrifices — made by British troops and their Nato allies, the threat posed by the Taliban remained as strong as ever, while progress on the reconstruction programme was virtually non-existent.

But the man known by his special forces colleagues as "the Pope" because of his spartan lifestyle — he eats one square meal, sleeps four hours and jogs 13 kilometres a day — has almost single-handedly succeeded in transforming the campaign's prospects from deep pessimism to guarded optimism.

The "McChrystal effect", as it is known within Nato circles, has resulted in a massive influx of US troops in support of a military surge that is aimed at inflicting a decisive defeat on the Taliban, in much the same way that Al Qaida was eradicated in Iraq. But the military effort is just one component of the broader counter-insurgency effort that was devised by McChrystal in conjunction with General David Petraeus, the head of US Central Command and McChrystal's immediate superior. While reducing the ability of the Taliban to terrorise the country's civilian population is central to the mission's success, the McChrystal doctrine stipulates that equal effort is invested in establishing political stability and rebuilding the country's infrastructure.

As in Washington, there are also serious policy differences within the coalition over how long British troops must remain in Afghanistan. How much longer Britain will continue to support a war that is increasingly unpopular with the general public will, to an extent, depend on whether McChrystal's well-constructed strategy survives the political firestorm that is now engulfing Washington. On Monday the Taliban issued a statement claiming that the McChrystal fiasco was the start of Washington's political defeat in Afghanistan. For once, they could be proved right.