Saddam's disastrous legacy

Taking stock of the consequences two decades after Saddam Hussain's fatal decision to occupy Kuwait is a sobering and revealing experience for all concerned - Iraqis, Kuwaitis, Arabs, Americans, Iranians and many others besides.

Saddam, as he stated during his interrogation by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, was alone responsible for the decision to invade and occupy Kuwait on August 2, 1990 - supposedly because of Kuwait's "malicious" behaviour against Iraq. To this day, Kuwaitis remain ill at ease because of what they hear from officials, members of parliament and columnists in Iraq - some of whom call for Kuwait to pay compensation to Iraq for allowing the occupying American and other coalition forces to invade their country from Kuwait.

The consequences of Saddam's actions are incalculable. For himself personally, his decision to invade Kuwait ultimately led to him losing power and even his life, as well as the withering of his Baathist regime. It also upset the fragile balance of power in this most valuable strategic region in the world and pushed Iran to become the hegemon of the region.

Saddam's miscalculation has forced the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to scramble for security and to rely on the US as the guarantor of an outsourcing of 'imported security', creating an asymmetrical relationship between the protected and the protector. Relying on the Americans comes with a price, not least the pre-emptive wars of former US president George W. Bush's neo-conservatives, which resulted in more instability and chaos. Other problems include the continued showdown between the Americans and the Iranians, the lack of resolve to push the Israelis towards a two- state solution, the awkward relations between the rulers and the US and the division of the region into two camps - the pro-West moderates and anti-West radicals of state and non-state actors.

Saddam's twisted logic has awakened a lot of demons in the region. His brutal invasion haunts Kuwaitis and the GCC states, who stood stunned as he sought to make Kuwait a province of Iraq. Although Kuwait was liberated and rose from the ashes seven months later, it is a shame that Iraq's aggression did not provide the impetus for a lasting GCC defensive alliance that could have deterred potential enemies. This failure is ours alone, and the over-reliance on outsourcing security remains.

I say this with regret: The GCC states have collectively failed to forge a strategic military alliance. Thus the GCC states have no indigenous collective power to balance the threat posed by an emboldened Iran, which is the beneficiary of the toppling of the Iraqi regime. As a result, we are powerless in the face of Tehran's menacing and threatening posture and grandiose plans - one component of which is its nuclear programme. We can only watch the sabre rattling between the Iranians, the Americans and the Israelis. Or the voices from the re-emerging Iraq, which the US seems bent on empowering to counter Iran as Washington prepares to draw down its military presence in that beleaguered country. But for now Iraq is still a failed state and a country under construction with ethnic, sectarian, regional and political fault lines and the concomitant consequences for itself and the region.

The US has approved an Iraqi arms deal worth billions of dollars, including the sale of F-16 Fighting Falcon jet fighters and M1 Abrams tanks. This is a worrying sign for Kuwait and the region, considering the uptick in bellicose statements from Iraqi officials and the lack of real political and social reconciliation among the country's warring factions. All of this begs the question for worried and dazed Kuwaitis and the people of the region: How powerful must Iraq become in order to counter the threat posed by Iran? And will a powerful Iraq emerge in the future to menace Kuwait and the region, as was the case under Saddam? Considering the level of animosity and distrust which still dominates the relationship between the two states, this possibility cannot be ruled out.

The recriminations, the fears and the view of hard-line Iraqis that there was a Kuwaiti conspiracy against them to rob them of their access to the Gulf beggars belief. Some Iraqis still maintain that in the final analysis Kuwait is an Iraqi province that ultimately has to be reunited with the motherland. This does not promote a 'forgive and forget' attitude among Kuwaitis, who are still suspicious of Iraqi intentions in the region.

As a result of this deep, lingering, mutual distrust, the hatchet has never been buried. Iraqis and Kuwaitis should start looking beyond the past and towards forging a strategic partnership and trade alliance. But Saddam's legacy endures and it is difficult to imagine that it would be otherwise in a region where old habits die hard.

Dr Abdullah Al Shayji is a professor of International Relations and the head of the American Studies Unit at Kuwait University.