Obama’s Iran and Syria muddle

From one point of view, the connection between our troubles with Syria and Iran is pretty straightforward. The Syrian regime of Bashar Al Assad is Iran’s closest ally. Syria has provided the land bridge for the transport of Iranian weapons and militants to Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. Without Syria, Iran’s pretensions to regional hegemony and its ability to challenge Israel will be crippled.

It follows that as US Central Command Chief, General. James N. Mattis, testified to Congress in March, the downfall of Al Assad would be “the biggest strategic setback for Iran in 25 years.” Making it happen is not just a humanitarian imperative after the slaughter of more than 10,000 civilians, but a prime strategic interest of Israel and the US. So why are both the Obama administration and the government of Benjamin Netanyahu unenthusiastic — to say the least — about even indirect military intervention to topple Al Assad?

In part, it is because of a worry about what will follow the dictator.

In Obama’s case, the US presidential campaign and his claim that “the tide of war is receding” in the Middle East are big factors. But the calculus about Syria and Iran is also more complicated than it looks at first. The two are not just linked by their alliance, but also by the fact that the US and its allies have defined a distinct and urgent goal for each of them.

In Syria, it is to remove Al Assad and replace him with democracy. In Iran, it is to prevent a nuclear weapon. It turns out that the steps that might achieve success in one theatre can only complicate western strategy in the other.

Take military action for instance — a prime concern of Israel. Syria interventionists have been arguing that the US and its allies like Turkey should join in setting up safe zones for civilians and anti-Al Assad forces along Syria’s borders, which would require air cover and maybe some (Turkish) troops. But if the US gets involved in a military operation in Syria, will it still be feasible to carry out an air attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities? What if Israel were to launch one while a Syria operation was still ongoing? The obvious answer is that the result could be an unmanageable mess — which is why, when I recently asked a senior Israeli official about a western intervention in Syria, I got this answer: “We are concentrated on Iran. Anything that can create a distraction from Iran is not for the best.”

Obama, of course, is eager to avoid military action in Iran in any case. But his strategy — striking a diplomatic bargain to stop the nuclear programme — also narrows his options in Syria. A deal with Tehran will require the support of Russia, which happens to be hosting the next round of negotiations. Russia, in turn, is opposed to forcing Al Assad, a longtime client, out of power by any means. If Obama wants the support of Vladimir Putin on Iran, he may have to stick to Putin-approved measures on Syria. That leaves the administration at the mercy of Moscow. Obama is reduced to pleading with a stone-faced Putin to support a Syrian democracy or angrily warning a cynically smirking Putin that Moscow is paving the way for a catastrophic sectarian war.

At the root of this trouble are confused and conflicting US aims in the Middle East. Does Washington want to overthrow the brutal, hostile and closely allied dictatorships in Syria and Iran, or strike bargains that contain the threats they pose? The answer is neither, and both. The Obama administration says it is seeking regime change in Syria, but in Iran it has defined the goal as rapprochement with the mullahs in exchange for nuclear arms control. Obama tries to square this circle by pursuing a multilateral diplomatic approach with both countries. But if regime change in Syria is the goal, UN Security Council resolutions and six-point plans from the likes of Kofi Annan are doomed to fail. Only a combination of economic and military pressure, by Al Assad’s opposition or outsiders, will cause his regime to fold. A collapse, in turn, could undermine the same Iranian regime with which Obama is seeking a bargain. So it’s no wonder Tehran sought to add Syria to the topics for discussion at the last session of negotiations — or that Annan wants to include Iran in a new “contact group” to broker a settlement in Syria. The Obama administration rejected both proposals because they are at odds with a regime change in Syria. This muddle may delight Putin, but it’s not likely to achieve much else.

– Washington Post