Obama’s Asia trip is all about China

US President Barack Obama is in Asia, ostensibly to reassure US allies that he really does mean it when he says we’re “pivoting” to Asia (or “rebalancing,” or whatever). Yet, even as he attempts to put the focus on Asia, events elsewhere are raising precisely the sort of doubts that he would like to dispel. And that makes me worry that he will spend all his time on this trip making promises and flowery speeches, instead of getting some commitments from his hosts.

This trip, like so many others, takes place amid doubts about US credibility. If the US and Nato do not do more to help Ukraine, what does that say about America’s commitment to uphold current territorial arrangements in the South or East China Seas? (Answer: Not much, but many people seem to think it does.) But if the US does do more regarding Ukraine (or Syria), what does that tell US allies about its ability to make Asia a bigger priority and to stick to those priorities when crises emerge elsewhere? No matter what the US does, its Asian partners are going to raise questions about Washington’s staying power and strategic judgement.

Frankly, this recurring discussion about US credibility — including the sincerity of the “pivot” and the subsequent rebalance — strikes me as silly. For starters, the US is still the most powerful military actor in the world — including Asia — and it will be for some time to come. One can wonder about the regional balance of power at some point in the future, but not right now. And if China’s increased military power is really so alarming, why are countries like Japan, South Korea and Australia doing so little to bolster their own military capabilities? Either they are not as worried as they pretend, or they have become accustomed to assuming Uncle Sam will take care of them no matter what. It seems to be easier to complain about US credibility than to dig deep and buy some genuine military capacity.

And there should not be any doubt about the sincerity of the pivot/rebalancing strategy, because US national interests dictate a greater focus on Asia in the years ahead. As former Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and Ely Ratner make clear in a recent article, Asia’s growing economic clout and China’s emergence mandate an American response. The credibility of the US commitment in Asia does not depend on what presidents say or how often they visit, but ultimately rests on whether other states believe that it is in the US interest to be engaged there. If it were truly not in America’s interest to be a major strategic actor in Asia, no amount of presidential speechifying or handholding would convince Washington’s Asian partners otherwise.

More than anything else, Obama needs to spend his time in Asia explaining to officials there why it is in the US interest to maintain its security position in the continent. This policy is not an act of strategic philanthropy; it is rooted in US self-interest, geopolitics and America’s longstanding desire to be the only regional hegemon in the world. If China continues to rise and develop its military power, it may one day be in a position to strive for regional hegemony in Asia. The US will like to prevent this, because a balance of power in Asia forces Beijing to focus a lot of attention on regional affairs and prevents it from meddling in other parts of the world (including the western hemisphere). It is impolitic to say this out loud, but the long-term purpose of the “rebalancing” policy in Asia is to contain the more powerful China that seems likely to emerge in the decades to come. That is what Chinese leaders think and they are right.

Moreover, the US also has an interest in discouraging nuclear proliferation in Asia. China already has four nuclear-armed powers on its borders (Russia, Pakistan, India and North Korea) and several other states may go nuclear if they decide they can no longer count on American security guarantees. As long as nuclear non-proliferation remains a core objective of US foreign policy, it will have a strategic interest in remaining in Asia.

For all of these reasons, America’s Asian partners should not question the US commitment to maintain its military presence in Asia and its security commitments to its various Asian partners. This policy is rooted in geopolitics and America’s own strategic interests. Obama could do everyone a favour if he explained this to his hosts in simple, clear and forceful terms and reminded them that the US security presence had been a powerful bulwark of regional stability for decades.

But I wonder if it is time for a slightly different conversation. Maybe, he could find a way to remind them that while the US cares about the Asian balance of power and about its allies’ security, it cannot and should not care more about this than these countries do themselves. He may gently suggest to his hosts that although the US prefers to lead a network of strong and reliable Asian allies, it can do without those allies if it absolutely has to.

In other words, the credibility of America’s Asian alliances is more its allies’ problem than America’s. Helping maintain a balance of power in Asia may be in America’s interest, but it will not be cheap and providing the necessary level of assistance ought to be worth a lot to America’s Asian partners. Instead of flying off to Asia just to hold their hands, I hope Obama will also remember to ask them what they are going to do for the US — and for themselves.

— Washington Post

Stephen Walt is a professor of International Relations at Harvard University.