Lebanon closer to the abyss

The shocking thing about violence in Lebanon — bombings, shootings, assassinations and so on — is that it has ceased to be shocking, such is its increasing frequency and scale. The Lebanese have long been accustomed to viewing such incidents as a matter of when, not if, amid constant speculation over who will be the next target and perpetrator. The latest high-profile victim is Mohammad Chatah — a former finance minister and aide to former prime minister Saad Hariri — who was killed by a car bomb last Friday in central Beirut, along with several others. No person or group has yet claimed responsibility and for once Hezbollah and the regime of Syrian President Bashar Al Assad have not blamed Israel. Though the allies deny accusations that they were behind the assassination, the fact that Chatah was a strident and frequent critic of both certainly casts credible suspicion on them. Indeed, he joins a growing list of their prominent opponents who have been assassinated since 2005, when Rafik Hariri — a former prime minister and Saad’s father — was killed. It cannot be a coincidence that they all shared similar views on Hezbollah and Al Assad.

It would also beggar belief that all these murders would take place without their knowledge, approval or participation, given the influence and power they wield in Lebanon. Indeed, an international tribunal investigating Rafik’s murder has indicted several Hezbollah members and implicated Syria. Chatah had recently tweeted that Hezbollah “undercuts the foundations of a single/united Lebanon,” and just half an hour before his death, he tweeted that the group “is pressing hard to be granted similar powers in security and foreign policy matters that Syria exercised in Lebanon for 15 years.” The goal of his murder “appears to have been [to] cow his allies and deprive them of a potential leader at a time when Lebanon is deeply divided about the war raging next door in Syria,” wrote the BBC’s Lebanese correspondent Kim Ghattas. She described Chatah as “clearly the brain of the Sunni opposition,” and a “key strategist” who was “quietly preparing for a possible bigger role” in his country. It “sends a powerful, bloody message to Mr Hariri and the anti-Assad camp in Lebanon,” Ghattas added.

Timing

It is not just Chatah’s political opinions that cast suspicion on Hezbollah and Al Assad — timing is also the key. His murder took place just weeks before the anticipated Geneva II conference on Syria. Chatah had been proposing to hold a separate meeting on Lebanon with the aim of securing Hezbollah’s withdrawal from Syria. Just before his assassination, the Wall Street Journal published an open letter by Chatah to Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani, in which he wrote that Hezbollah’s status as “an independent and heavily armed military force outside the authority of the state” is “happening with the direct support and sponsorship of your country.” The letter called for “ending all armed participation by Lebanese groups and parties, including Hezbollah, in the Syrian conflict,” and “establishing effective control by the Lebanese army and security forces over the border with Syria, supported by the United Nations if needed”.

As such, Chatah’s aim was not partisanship over Syria, but maintaining Lebanon’s official stance of neutrality. His murder deprived him of the chance to gather signatures for the letter from Lebanese MPs. Neutrality, it seems, was too dangerous a concept, as was the idea of Chatah as prime minister, a role for which his name had reportedly been floated in the absence of a cabinet and elected government for some nine months now.

Repercussions

Though this latest assassination is a great loss to the March 14 alliance, it would be short-sighted to interpret this as a boost for its March 8 opponents. In fact, no one in Lebanon benefits from these or other acts of violence, for the very obvious and basic reason that it pushes the country ever closer to the dark period of civil war that destroyed the country and which all Lebanese would rather avoid.

That does not mean that Hezbollah or its allies were not behind Chatah’s murder. Its leader Hassan Nasrallah, who used to be widely acknowledged — and admired — as a cunning strategist, has displayed stark short-sightedness in his decision to send his fighters to prop up Assad against Syrian rebels, and in his actions since. This has cost his organisation dearly in terms of domestic popularity, with a negative view among 59 per cent of Lebanese, according to a survey by the Pew Research Centre that was published in June 2013. This is a far cry from the widespread domestic and regional support it enjoyed prior to its decision to kill fellow Arabs in support of a dictator in Damascus. Chatah’s murder will do it no favours in this regard.

Hezbollah said this latest assassination was an attempt to destroy “national unity”. One wonders whether it knows, or cares, how much its direct involvement in Syria has decimated the chances of national unity in a country where division has been historically predominant. Leaving aside the national interest — though this should be of the utmost importance to all Lebanese factions — Chatah’s murder does not serve Hezbollah’s interests either, whether Nasrallah realises this or not.

The assassination has galvanised calls for Lebanon’s military to be the only armed institution in the country. Former prime minister Fouad Siniora said at Chatah’s funeral that the March 14 coalition has “decided to liberate the country of the occupation of illegitimate weapons to preserve its independence, its sovereignty and its civil peace. We have decided to engage with the Lebanese people in peaceful, civil and democratic resistance.”

Siniora added that the “peaceful battle” would begin soon, without elaborating. “We call for liberty and justice. We won’t surrender, we won’t back down, we won’t be afraid,” he said. Two days after the assassination, Lebanese President Michel Sulaiman announced that Saudi Arabia was giving the army $3 billion (Dh11 billion) in aid, describing it as the largest grant given to the military in Lebanon’s history. This has led to speculation that the move by Riyadh — a long-time critic of Hezbollah and a leading backer of Syrian rebels — is designed to shift the balance of power away from a group that is by far the most powerful military force in Lebanon, towards a national institution that does not face the same accusations of partisanship and polarisation.

However, Lebanese opponents of Nasrallah, who have little faith in the ability or will of the army, are increasingly arming themselves, in the belief that this is the only way to stand up to Hezbollah.

This stems from its continued refusal to give up its own weapons and its willingness to turn its guns on other Lebanese as well as Syrians, diminishing the credibility of its long-held and once-valid argument that its weapons are meant to deter Israel. The general militarisation of factions on both sides of the divide poses the biggest threat to national stability and peace.

In light of Chatah’s murder, the March 14 alliance has responded to Nasrallah’s call for a national unity government by demanding Hezbollah’s exclusion from any future administration. As long as the alliance maintains this position, Lebanon is guaranteed to be without an elected government, to the detriment of the entire population — not that the Lebanese had much faith in previous administrations, regardless of which factions comprised them.

The March 14 alliance is calling for Chatah’s assassination to be investigated by the international tribunal that will open hearings into the death of Rafik Hariri on January 14 in The Hague, with five Hezbollah members on trial. This call, and the trial itself, will not only turn a spotlight on Hezbollah’s possible culpability in the murder of Hariri and other figures, but also intensify debate about the group’s national hegemony.

This will be a time of great discomfort for Hezbollah and of further national turbulence for Lebanon. The country is no stranger to this, but with the raging conflict in Syria spilling over, every violent incident leaves people wondering how close Lebanon is to breaking point. This will be to no one’s benefit. Given that the two countries are inextricably linked, many are surprised that Lebanon has not already crossed that point. Some seem to be tempting fate.

Sharif Nashashibi is an award-winning journalist and analyst on Arab affairs.