Iran's action is wrong

Lately, the UAE and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have condemned the aggressive, unexpected and unacceptable Iranian action of establishing two administrative offices on the occupied UAE island of Abu Mousa.

This development is a part of the continuing Iranian occupation of the UAE islands - Abu Mousa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb. Iran occupied the islands in two stages: first, in 1971 during the reign of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and second, in April 1992 during the Islamic Republic when Iran's armed forces occupied Abu Mousa which until then was still a part of Sharjah.

This policy was and continues to be motivated by three factors: the geographic and strategic importance of the islands; the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz; and the expansionist foreign policy of Iran which manifests itself in conventional and non-conventional military buildup, interference in the internal affairs of other countries and the occupation by force of the territory of other parties.

Iran claims that Abu Mousa, the Greater and Lesser Tunbs are "Iranian" islands, and it tries to prove its sovereignty over them through many allegations including: the geographic proximity and the strategic importance of the islands to Iran; the official British stance recognising the islands as Iranian islands. This attitude is based on a British military map issued by the British foreign ministry in 1886 in which the islands are given the same colour as the Iranian mainland; the protection of Iranian national security; and confronting the military foreign presence in the Gulf region.

Despite these claims, the UAE rights for regaining sovereignty over these islands are supported by four main points:

1. Historical records show that the three islands have been the property of the Arab Qawasim shaikhs since 1750. In 1835, the ownership of the Gulf islands was distributed among the Qawasim shaikhs with Sirri and Hengaam given to the Qawasim living in Lengah (on the Iranian side) while Abu Mousa, Greater and Lesser Tunb as well as Sir Bu Nair were given to the Qawasim inhabiting the coast of Oman, which refers to the areas of Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah.

2. Before the emergence of the UAE Federation in 1971, the emirates of Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah were the only two parties who practised control and enjoyed national sovereignty over the three islands. This was manifested by the raising of the respective flags over the islands; the application of the rules and laws of the two emirates on the islands; the fact that the inhabitants of the islands held the nationality of Sharjah and Ras Al-Khaimah; and that Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah represented the exclusive power and authority in terms of giving concessions and contracts for oil and mineral exploration and production.

3. Following the formation of the UAE in December 1971, the federation inherited all rights and liabilities of its constituent emirates, including the rights and liabilities of Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah regarding the islands.

4. The UAE possesses numerous documents and legal proofs regarding its ownership, including a British document issued in 1864 representing an official letter sent by the ruler of the coast of Oman, who is of Qawasim ancestry, emphasising his possession of the islands.

Occupied

As a result, the UAE is confronted with a situation whereby its territory is occupied by the military force of another country, a case that relates to Section Four of Article II of the United Nations Charter which states: "It is prohibited to use force or threaten by using force against regional safety and integrity of other countries." However, since the beginning of the crisis, the UAE has put forward a sincere effort to contain the crisis and avert detrimental consequences. This includes calling on the Iranian leadership to adopt self-restraint and accept a just resolution for the settlement of the islands issue by peaceful means; maintaining a privileged trade relationship with Iran; and refraining from issuing any legislation or laws which prohibit Iranian individuals from entering the country or practising economic and commercial activities.

The Iranian community has full freedom to practice such activities and represents one of the largest foreign communities working and residing in the UAE.

Meanwhile, Iranian behaviour can be characterised as seeking to escalate tensions by way of totally rejecting the rights of the UAE to regain its three islands, even rejecting to sit at the negotiation table if the status of the three islands is to be discussed; the refusal to submit the issue to the International Court of Justice; ceaselessly performing military exercises and manoeuvres in the Arabian Gulf, and systematically seeking to change the demographic structure on the three islands with the sole objective of imposing the status quo and enhancing the de facto Iranian occupation.

The recent Iranian action on Abu Mousa is the latest example of such Iranian policy.

Therefore, we are facing one of the following scenarios in terms of future perspectives: the continuation of status quo; Iran accepts bilateral negotiations with the UAE; or Iran accepting to submit the issue of the islands to the International Court of Justice.

What I really hope is that Iran stops its aggressive actions in the Arabian Gulf and starts to send positive messages to its neighbours, particularly towards the UAE. I also hope that Iran takes constructive measures to end its occupation of the three UAE islands, either by direct negotiations or through the ICJ. The ultimate objective of Iranian foreign policy should be aimed at creating a peaceful environment in the Arabian Gulf, and not playing a major role in causing tension and crises.

Abdullah Al Shaiba is a UAE national academic and thinker.