Civil war unlikely in Iran

Is history repeating itself in Iran? Is the country replaying its 1979 revolution that ended 25 centuries of monarchy? With the current crisis showing no signs of abatement, these questions haunt many of those interested in Iran's future.

At first glance, there are many similarities between the current revolt and the 1979 one.

The first of these is the fact that the streets of Tehran and other major cities have become the principal arena for the power struggle.

In 1979, a substantial segment of Iranian society had lost all faith in institutional politics. The parliament was discredited because it was composed of the members of a single party - Rastakhiz (Renaissance), set up by the Shah.

The Council of Ministers, headed by the prime minister, was dismissed as irrelevant if only because all power rested with the monarch.

Because there were no parties to act as an interface between the elite and the broader society, small groups of militants, often operating in the streets, acted as vehicles for political expression.

Today, we have a similar situation. Within just a few days, all institutions of the state have ceased to function properly.

Communication within the political elite is no longer conducted through those institutions but via street rallies and counter demonstrations.

Another important similarity is that both movements started as efforts to enforce the constitution of the day.

In 1979, the Shah was criticised for having violated the 1906 Constitution, most notably by preventing political pluralism and imposing a one-party system.

Today's movement started as a protest against the alleged rigging of the June 12 presidential election, in violation of the 1979 Constitution.

In 1979, however, the movement quickly went beyond its initial aim and became a revolution that ultimately brought down the regime.

Today, too, we are witnessing the rapid transformation of what started as a protest against electoral fraud into a bid for regime change. Mir Hussain Mousavi, the leading candidate opposing President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, put it clearly in a statement: "This is no longer just about an election. It is about the nature of the system as a whole".

The 1979 uprising represented an unusually broad coalition. It included at least a dozen leftist groups of all descriptions, almost as many Islamist factions, and nationalist, social democratic and liberal outfits.

The same is true today. As if by magic, dozens of different opposition groups - ranging from moderate Khomeinists to monarchists and leftists - have come together to challenge the regime under a single umbrella.

However, there are more differences between the events of 1979 and those of today than there are similarities.

To start with, the ruling establishment under the Shah remained reasonably united until the very end. Even after the Shah had left the country, none of the key figures of the regime switched sides.

Today, however, the ruling elite is split down the middle. Almost as many members of the regime have sided with Mousavi as have backed Ahmadinejad.

In 1979, the people looked to the Shiite clergy for leadership. This time the clergy is being pushed into the background. The 'moral references' of Iranian society are no longer clerics. They are intellectuals, academics, lawyers and leaders of independent trade unions.

Another difference is that in 1979 the ruling elite had little stomach for a fight. Many of its members had homes and investments abroad and thus were not forced to fight with their backs to the wall. Thousands of them just packed up and left.

Now, however, the overwhelming majority of the ruling elite has no fallback position.

There is yet another difference. In 1979, a majority of Iranians would probably have voted for the Shah had there been elections. However, few of them were prepared to fight for him in the streets. This time, the regime may well lose a free and fair election, but is still capable of fielding large numbers of supporters who are ready to kill and die for it.

The perception that the Shah was weak and unwilling to hit back played a crucial role in disheartening his supporters and encouraging his opponents. That perception was one reason so many of the Shah's closest aides simply fled the country at the first opportunity.

Is Iran heading for a civil war? My answer is a cautious no.

Iran's long history, spanning more than 2,500 years, contains only three events that could be described as civil wars: in the fifth century BC, in the sixth century AD and in 1911.

The reason for this is that as a power struggle develops, Iranians are adept at distinguishing which side is going to win. Once they have identified the winner, they all rally to his side. No one is left on the other side to provoke a civil war.

Call it opportunism if you like, but this is a part of the template of Iranian politics.

I only hope that the side that realises it is losing does not go into denial, but rather bows out without provoking a prolonged and bloody conflict.

Amir Taheri is an Iranian writer based in Europe.