Occupier's oppression cannot continue forever

Occupied Jerusalem: The traditional Passover retelling of Exodus was barely under way in 2002 when Defence Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer got a note with news of the latest in a string of Palestinian suicide attacks that had struck Israel for two years.

He dashed to an emergency meeting of military commanders, all dressed in civilian clothes because they'd left their own Seder dinner tables upon hearing that 30 Israelis had been killed in the attack on the Park Hotel. After an all-night session, they made a decision that would change the face of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Ben-Eliezer persuaded Israel's Cabinet to reoccupy the entire West Bank, even though it meant brushing aside the 1993 Oslo agreements that gave Palestinians control over many cities and their own security force.

Ten years later, many see that move as the start of a strategic shift that put Israel on a go-it-alone course that continues to shape its security policy, whether dealing with Palestinian statehood or responding to Iran's purported nuclear arms programme.

With the military operation in 2002, Israel took a step away from the internationally brokered peace deals that dominated the 1990s and the idea that its security could be achieved through compromise with Palestinians.

The doctrine that evolved in its place has relied instead on military strength and a willingness to take unilateral measures, even though Palestinians say the approach is threatening to kill any hope for a two-state solution and could backfire on Israel in a region where "Arab Spring" uprising memories are fresh.

Soon after the reoccupation of the West Bank came the construction of a massive wall, ruled illegal by the International Court of Justice, which cut off Palestinians from Israel. Next was the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, which Israel initiated on its own terms outside the formal peace process.

Suicide attacks

To many Israelis, this get-tough campaign is working and they see no reason to change it. Suicide attacks have stopped. Palestinian leaders are weaker and more moderate than before. International isolation is seen as manageable and Palestinian statehood is no longer at the top of the global agenda.

"Ten years ago, the actions taken by Israel changed the nature and the history of the behaviour of the people in the West Bank," said Ben-Eliezer, now a Labour Party lawmaker. "We showed that nothing is taboo when it comes to our security. We will cross every line. We will go in and we will hit. It's a strategy that has kept until today and the results are clear: Quietness until now."

Some see the success Israel believes it has enjoyed with the Palestinian issues as spreading to other areas of its foreign policy, giving it the confidence to resist the Obama administration's pressure to freeze colonies, rejecting attempts to mend ties with onetime ally Turkey and openly threatening to launch a military strike on Iran, which many believe is working to join Israel to become the second nuclear power in the region.

Palestinians characterise Israelis as intransigent and arrogant, and worry about an increasingly vocal right-wing faction that advocates "managing" the conflict rather than resolving it. "The Israelis abandoned the peace process a long time ago," said Nabeel Shaath, a top adviser to Palestinian National Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. He said the change began with the collapse of the 2000 Camp David talks, when Israelis realised the gaps with Palestinians were still wide.

"They decided that Palestinian expectations were too high and had to be brought down," Shaath said. "That meant a more diligent, militant Israeli government to put down the Palestinians' aspirations." Shaath added: "Israelis are intoxicated with power now. It makes you feel you don't have to give up anything."

You can have it all. Colonies. De-Arabisation of occupied Jerusalem. Control over movement from Gaza to the West Bank. They think they've won and can just walk over us." But he predicted that Israel's overconfidence would eventually backfire, particularly with Palestinians.

He noted that similar misguided thinking once led Arab rulers in the region to believe that they would never be toppled by their people as they have been in the Arab Spring.

Bargaining position

Israeli Deputy Vice Prime Minister Moshe Yaalon, who served as the army's chief of staff during much of the second intifada credits the strategy over the last ten years with strengthening the confidence of the Israeli public and putting the government in a stronger bargaining position. Yet some warn that Israel's dominance could boomerang on the country.

"Negotiations between asymmetrical sides are more difficult because the weaker side has greater difficulty making concessions," said researcher Shlomo Brom of the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv.

"The weaker party fears any concession will lead down a slippery slope, and is very apprehensive of public opinion. Concessions require strength. The other side's weakness should not make us happy." Ben-Eliezer, a former Labour Party leader, said he believes Israel's get-tough approach should have included a carrot-and-stick approach, also offering Palestinians a genuine peace deal.

In recent years, he said, Israel's right-wing parties have failed to do enough to convince Palestinians that Israel is serious about their statehood bid. "So far Palestinians have kept quiet, but one day they will awake and the explosion will happen. People don't accept [being] under military rule for 50 years. Maybe the explosion will bring about negotiations. But then negotiations will occur under pressure, and that is what I don't want to see happen."

— Los Angeles Times