Dubai: What if all of the rhetoric between North and South Korea actually turned from the last front in the Cold War to a hot conflict zone.

In the past week, Pyongyang has pulled the plug on the red line telephone across the demilitarised zone (DMZ) in Seoul. And the isolated neo-Stalinist state has threatened a nuclear attack on the United States as a result of tougher international sanctions imposed on the regime by the UN Security Council for two nuclear tests conducted over the past month.

This is how both North and South Korea stack up in conventional terms across the 38th parallel, the ceasefire line drawn on a map to create an armistice ending the 1950-53 Korean War.

Technically, both countries are still in a state of war, with North Korea announcing last week that it was ripping up the armistice agreement.

Subsequent to the end of the conflict and with the support of its Communist partners then squaring off against the West, North Korea amassed large and formidable conventional military forces. These were mainly deployed near the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ), a four-kilometre wide belt that stretches across the entire peninsula.

Over the past two decades, due largely to economic decline and lack of financial resources, the realignment of China from Stalinism to market-Leninism, the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union, as well as force improvements in South Korea and the US, North Korea’s conventional forces have become relatively weaker.

According to a recent report prepared by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), any North Korean option to invade South Korea is becoming less credible.

“While causing tremendous damage, a North Korean attack on South Korea would most likely be defeated by a US–South Korean counterattack,” the IISS says. “Nonetheless, the credibility of North Korea’s conventional military forces remains largely intact in terms of their potential to defend the state and to inflict damage on South Korea – especially Seoul – which remains hostage to North Korea’s artillery massed along the DMZ.”

The IISS believes that options for the US and allied forces to launch pre-emptive strikes against selected military targets in North Korea are fraught with steep risks, even more for any plan for an invasion to overthrow the North Korean regime.

“The US could probably destroy known nuclear and missile facilities in a pre-emptive strike, but not hidden facilities and weapons that would survive such a pre-emptive attack,” the IISS reports.

“In any event, Pyongyang would regard an attack on its strategic assets as a dire threat to its vital interests, and could retaliate in ways that could quickly escalate to a wider conflict. The US and South Korea would likely prevail in a full-scale war, but the human and material costs would be very high – even if unconventional weapons were not employed,” the institute report says. “In essence, the military stand-off that marked the end of the Korean War prevails 50 years on.

The battleground

The Korean Peninsula is compact, approximately 250km wide at its narrowest point and about 1,000km long. Moreover, the peninsula is characterised by mountainous topography; much of the flat land that exists comprises either marshland or rice fields. Therefore, rapid movement by heavy armoured forces would be difficult.

The Demilitarised Zone

The DMZ is approximately 4km wide and 250km long, stretching from the Yellow Sea in the west to the Sea of Japan in the east. Contrary to its name, this zone is located within one of the world’s most heavily militarised areas. More than one million troops and 20,000 armoured vehicles and artillery pieces — plus more than one million land mines and numerous fortified defensive positions — are packed into a small area surrounding the DMZ.

The capitals

There is little ‘strategic depth’ between the DMZ and the capital cities of Pyongyang (about 125km north of the DMZ) and Seoul (approximately 40km south of the DMZ). Forces on either side of the DMZ are more densely concentrated than were those of the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in Central Europe during the Cold War.

The armoured avenues

The topography offers heavy armoured forces three main avenues of approach for any potential land offensive. Two are in the relatively flat western part of the peninsula, known as the Chorwon and Kaesong Munsan corridors, and provide the most direct approaches to Seoul and Pyongyang, although much of the flat terrain is marsh land and rice fields. The third route runs along the east coast through the Taedong Mountains and is the most amenable to vehicle passage.

North Korea Military Capabilities

Although it is difficult to know North Korea’s precise intentions or aspirations, its forces are deployed along the DMZ in such a manner that they could support an invasion of South Korea. Currently, North Korea deploys approximately 65 per cent of its military units, and up to 80 per cent of its estimated aggregate firepower, within 100km of the DMZ. This inventory includes 700,000 troops, 8,000 artillery pieces and 2,000 tanks. Because of these forward deployments, North Korea could theoretically invade the South without further deployments in relatively little warning time.

South Korea Military Capabilities

South Korea’s armed forces comprise approximately 686,000 active-duty troops and 4.5 million reservists. Its active ground forces are about half the size of North Korea’s in terms of personnel, major equipment holdings and force structure, but its equipment is superior. South Korea’s air and naval forces are comparable in size to North Korea’s, and they possess much more modern and sophisticated equipment. Overall, South Korea’s armed forces have become one of the world’s more capable militaries and present a formidable forward defence against any possible attack by North Korea.

The North’s first strike

North Korea, having adopted generic Soviet military doctrine, would probably begin any war with a massive artillery assault on South Korean and US positions south of the DMZ and on Seoul itself. Chemical weapons might also be employed against military and civilian targets. Infantry and mechanised forces would then try to take advantage of the ensuing chaos to penetrate South Korean–US defences with the aim of quickly capturing Seoul. These advancing forces could be preceded by Special Forces, pre-deployed in South Korea through tunnels or inserted by mini-­submarines or airdrops.

Presumably, North Korea would try to catch US and South Korean forces off-­guard, attempting to seize Seoul before reinforcements could be deployed.. In any event, mass artillery and armoured forces, supported by Special Forces and airborne missions, would be the central components of any offensive operation.

The South’s first strike

Any pre-emptive use of force would appear very risky. Even though US and South Korean forces enjoy qualitative superiority, and, via a US military build-up, could increase this superiority rapidly, they could not be confident of winning an offensive war against North Korea without sustaining heavy military and collateral casualties. An all-out invasion, along the lines of the March–April 2003 campaign in Iraq, is not an appealing option. Even with the US military’s prowess and ability to execute ‘effects-based operations’ — which aim to disrupt the decision-making ability of an adversary — an invasion of North Korea would likely prove much more costly than the 2003 Iraq War.

The North’s spending

North Korea’s armed forces are composed of 1.1 million active-duty personnel and some 4.7 million reserves, making them the world’s fifth largest active military force. North Korea officially maintains an annual defence budget of about $1.5 billion to support these forces, but some estimates of actual expenditure are more than three times as high, at around $5 billion, which would translate to about 25 per cent of North Korea’s GDP, estimated to be currently $20 billion.

The tunnel war

North Korean forces are heavily dug-in with more than 4,000 underground facilities and bunkers near the DMZ and an estimated 20 tunnels dug under the DMZ, of which four have been found. There are also more than 20 Special Forces brigades, totalling about 88,000 troops, which could be deployed by air, sea and land to disrupt US and South Korean combat operations and attack civilian targets.

The North’s armour

North Korea’s armoured forces are estimated to include 3,500 main battle tanks, 3,000 armoured personnel carriers and light tanks, and more than 10,000 heavy-calibre artillery pieces, many of which are self-propelled. The MBT force primarily comprises older T-54/55/59 models, but includes some 800 indigenously produced T-62s.

The North’s artillery

Of the estimated 10,000 or so artillery pieces in the North Korean inventory, a considerable number are pre-deployed, in range of Seoul; additional artillery could be moved forward to fortified firing positions at short notice. Of particular concern to Seoul are Pyongyang’s 240mm multiple rocket launchers capable of simultaneously firing 16–18 rockets, its 152mm and 170mm towed and self-propelled artillery pieces, and its mobile FROG systems – all of which are capable of delivering chemical and biological agents as well as conventional high-explosives. In addition, the ground forces have about 7,500 mortars, several hundred surface-to-surface missiles, 11,000 air defence guns, 10,000 surface-to-air missiles, and numerous anti-tank guided weapons.

The North’s air power

The North Korean air force possess some 605 combat aircraft and is organised into 33 regiments: 11 fighter/ ground attack; two bomber; seven helicopter; seven transport; and six training regiments. The air force mostly comprises older MiG aircraft (of the MiG-15/17/19/21 types), but includes small numbers of more modern MiG-23, MiG-29 and Su-25 aircraft. Like North Korea’s ground forces, a relatively large percentage of the air force is deployed near the DMZ – at military air bases only minutes flying time from Seoul.

The North’s naval power

The North Korean navy can be divided into six main groups: 43 missile craft; about 100 torpedo craft; 158 patrol craft (of which 133 are inshore vessels); about 26 diesel submarines of Soviet design; 10 amphibious ships; and 23 mine countermeasures ships. There are also some 65 miniature submarines for the insertion and extraction of Special Forces. Around 60 per cent of the North Korean navy is deployed in forward bases, and North Korea has strengthened its coastal defences in forward areas by deploying more modern anti-ship cruise missiles.

The North’s achille’s heel

On paper, North Korea’s armed forces are formidable, but their actual capabilities are less than the raw data suggest, given the obsolescence of most North Korean equipment. Around one-half of North Korea’s major weapons were designed in the 1960s; the other half are even older.

Also, it is certain that due to shortages of spare parts, fuel, and poor maintenance, some weaponry will not be functional. The US Army’s Cold War system for comparing hardware capabilities suggests that ground combat units equipped with modern Western weaponry are about 20–40 per cent more combat effective than units of comparable size with out-of-date equipment. After the 1991 Gulf War, the US developed a more up-to-date and realistic model for comparing forces. According to this model, modern Western weaponry is generally two to four times more capable than Soviet systems.

The North’s training

North Korean doctrine, military readiness and morale are also key factors in determining actual military performance. Employing highly inflexible Soviet-style military doctrine, North Korea emphasises high-ranking decision-makers and scripted war plans – neither of which encourage operational flexibility nor initiative. It is doubtful, therefore, that North Korea possesses a strong mid-level officer corps. Pyongyang has attempted to raise training levels and readiness in recent years, but fuel and other shortages have significantly limited its ability to conduct large-scale combined-arms training exercises, such as those practised by US and South Korean forces. Fuel shortages have especially limited air force training: pilot training – according to anecdotal evidence – is limited to a handful of flying hours every year, because available aviation fuel needs to be conserved for actual military contingencies.

The North’s threat

Despite shortages of spare parts, fuel and training time, North Korea’s conventional capabilities pose a significant threat to allied forces and South Korea’s population. Its artillery does not require sophisticated tactics nor modes of operation to pose a threat to Seoul. In any conflict, North Korean artillery could initially deliver a heavy bombardment on the South Korean capital. Allied counter-battery fire and air strikes would eventually reduce North Korea’s artillery capability, but not before significant damage and high casualties had been inflicted on Seoul. Similarly, the North Korean air force could launch surprise attacks against military and civilian targets throughout South Korea before allied air superiority was established. The potential delivery of chemical or biological weapons by artillery, short-range missiles and aerial bombs is an additional threat – especially to unprotected civilians.