Beirut: There is a rush to portray the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, now purposefully referred to by its Arabic acronym, Daesh, as a multi-pronged hydra when, when in reality, it is little more than a collection of Internet-savvy misfits that rely on technology and rudimentary weapons to earn attention. Confronted by formidable opposition from Western and Arab countries, and soon to face ground forces from among indigenous soldiers trained by the US and other states, the few thousand Daesh fighters will not be long allowed to assassinate, behead, starve, rape, destroy, exile, and otherwise stand as vulgar barbarians who pretend that their acts are divine will. Although these modern Hashashin are their own worse enemies, why are sophisticated analysts mesmerized by their prowess and, even worse, why are they gullible enough to think that thirty or fifty thousand hooligans can destroy relatively powerful nation-states?

Naturally, any long-term military commitments are worrisome because of casualties, and must only become last resort options though few appreciate the consequences of such deployments. Moreover, and while it would be wise to secure United Nations backing, perhaps with a Security Council resolution that will authorize the use of force—subject to Russian and Chinese vetoes that are nearly guaranteed if for no other reason than to spite the three Western permanent members—analysts may need to recalibrate assessments and, more important, refrain from clouding already confused minds with such warnings as fear of mission creep or the biting assessment that leading powers—meaning the United States—lack effective strategies.

This was the gist of carefully tailored and mature assessments delivered on Wednesday by Lina Khatib, the Director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, and Sarkis Naoum, Al Nahar’s Senior Columnist, both of whom analyzed the direction of American foreign policy and the creation of an international coalition to tackle the Syrian-Iraqi crisis.

In her erudite evaluation, Khatib identified six weak points in Barack Obama’s strategy, which she affirmed was not one. These included (1) the desire confront a “network of death” but not to destroy Daesh; (2) a reliance on the challenged Iraqi government that lacked legitimacy at home with serious doubts that its army can win; (3) potential clashes between the proposed National Guard force with the Iraqi Army; (4) dangerous asymmetric concerns that will pit regular militaries against popularly supported guerrillas [although the similarity with Vietnam was not discussed, this was clearly the parallel]; (5) to grant Daesh what it craved, namely Western attacks, ostensibly to rally Arab and Muslim public opinion and benefit from the aversion to everything “foreign”; and (6) unclear day-after-vision as to what would replace Daesh once it is presumably defeated in Iraq and Syria.

Khatib feared that the Ba‘ath Government in Damascus stood to gain most from the current military because she correctly assumed that the Syrian opposition neglected its responsibilities and failed to create a government-in-exile that could replace the regime. Moreover, she wondered whether Western assaults against the Jabhat Al Nusra was a tactical error, although she understood that Washington could not justify any putative cooperation with an organization affiliated with Al Qaida. Because some Nusra elements worked with the Free Syrian Army (FSA), one wondered whether the FSA could even win battles, which was required if an effective regime change were to occur in Syria.

Sarkis Naoum was equally pessimistic. He asserted that the Arab World was largely incoherent and moving towards the unknown. The well-informed journalist stressed that Iran was the key state to watch and it remained to be determined whether Washington and Riyadh were ready to cooperate with Tehran to lower regional tensions. Still, Naoum acknowledged that Arab demands were utterly confused, as many pestered Obama to get involved in Syria during the past three years, while it did not take long for anti-American voices to rise against the latest attacks.

He lamented that Arabs did not assume their responsibilities and bickered among themselves as to whether they ought to back the FSA. Unity, he hammered, was often discussed but seldom applied and while he did not reject the efforts of the coalition, Naoum recognized that its task was painfully long. Still, he perceived Daesh as a momentary mirage, which could easily be replaced by another group, following in the footsteps of the moribund Al Qaida and the significantly weakened Nusra, among others. What he dreaded were sectarian situations that could see Daesh used against Iran, which would fuel Sunni vs. Shiite clashes, as he cautioned Iranian leaders to draw careful lessons from their mistakes in Syria, as well as with the Hezbollah and the Hamas militias.

Inasmuch as the strategy to fight Daesh now included several countries, including Jordan and especially Arab Gulf States, the mere fact that most shed their reticence to use force indicated an awareness of existential threats to their very being. Even Turkey and Iran were, to a certain extent, conscious that their very identities were on the line as nation-states. For at the heart of the anti-Daesh efforts is a simple truism. In the post-1648 Treaty of Westphalia era, there is no room for Caliphates, something that must be hammered into gullible minds. Despite all of its shortcomings, the nation-state system triumphed, notwithstanding more recent economic regionalisms that challenged nationalism. Of course, Arab states struggled throughout the 20th century to further acquire the wherewithal that was part and parcel of independent nations, though there never were doubts that leaders were ready to abdicate their quests to uphold patriotism. That was what Arab States fought for and nothing less.