Beirut> Once a beacon of Arab power, knowledge and culture, Baghdad has succumbed to local, regional and international dictatorships. It now confronts a fresh conumdrum, the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isil) which threatens to reconquer vast swathes of land with a few thousand fighters. Presumed to command between 10,000 and 20,000 militiamen and alledgedly well financed, Isil endangers both Iraq as well as the putative State of Kurdistan, if and when one emerges.
It is, according to expert opinion, the successor to the so-called Al Qaida terrorist organisation that mesmerised millions and confused gullible decision-makers. It is, to say the least, the author of a new narrative that frightens many and bewilders others.
On Thursday, the Carnegie Middle East Centre in Beirut convened a panel discussion to elucidate on what would presumably occur next in Kurdistan and Iraq, when three erudite researchers addressed a variety of concerns. Centre Director Lina Khatib was joined by Maria Fantappie, an analyst on Iraq with the International Crisis Group, and Kawa Hassan, a visiting scholar who specialises in Kurdish and Iraqi politics. All three agreed that Iraq faced chronic problems that have eroded existing state institutions and that, as a society, Iraqis defied intractable dilemmas that were likely to weaken it further.
According to Fantappie, “Iraq has structural problems that, left unattended, will lead to a natural division or federation of the country”. She lamented that Iraqi leaders personalised politics, which meant that political parties were not allowed to evolve. Rather, she confirmed, individuals stole the limelight that, in turn, prevented the natural development of citizenship that emphasized the value of supra-national institutions. “Even the army,” declared Fantappie, “is now associated with Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki — it is Al Maliki’s army instead of being the Iraqi Army.” Inasmuch as such an analysis justified the instrumental use of the constitution in the hands of wily politicians who referred to the charter only when it suited them, the analyst’s conclusions were spot on.
Fantappie went even further when she bemoaned how ordinary political discourse was now conducted through the security prism. “There is,” she claimed, “a conduct of repression against specific individuals or parties, as the military are called in to settle every sundry dispute. Even the role of the Sunni community is discussed through the security angl, not the political, presumably because Sunnis tacitly support the Islamic State [Isil].” Such a pattern inevitably embedded conflict in the country’s political life, which meant that all serious conversations created enemies. In other words, it became convenient for politicians to assert that Kurds confronted Arabs, or that Sunnis challenged Shiites. It became the Kurdish Peshmergas vs Al Maliki’s army or the Sunni Isil vs Al Maliki’s army.
Over time, the researcher concluded, leaders who engaged in such manipulation introduced more or less permanent disconnects between them and society at large. The best illustration of this situation was the concentration of power in the “Green Zone”, established by the United States during its occupation of Iraq, and which was and still is totally isolated from Baghdad and its people. It is a fact that what goes on inside the “Green Zone” is divorced from the city and the country where it is located.
For his part, Kawa Hassan stressed that while Kurdish independence appeared closer to reality than ever before, sharp disagreements existed over its timing, with many arguing that the process needed genuine economic self-sufficiency, effective state institutions, and the backing of both regional and international actors. Hassan believes that these conditions were not available and while there might be an agreement to hold a referendum, Kurdish Islamist parties were not on board. Moreover, he identified the lack of coordination between Arbil and regional governors, as the “Peshmergas occupied oil fields in Kirkuk and its nearby refineries without bothering to notify the governor”. The analyst noted that Iraqi Kurds were still dependent on imports (80 per cent), and that the local budget was largely spent on salaries. To be sure, there was an economic boom, though it benefited few since consumerism led to widespread social inequality, because of institutionalised patronage and corruption. “There are now two Kurdistans,” asserted Hassan, “one for the wealthy and another for the poor” that, left unattended was little more than a “social time bomb waiting to explode”.
Hassan’s comments on regional and international opposition to the formal declaration of Kurdish independence drew sharp remarks from audience members, with several blaming Iran and Turkey for Iraq’s woes. Even Isil’s rapid expansion was perceived by some as largely facilitated by outside powers, especially Turkey, allegedly because Ankara wished to help the Syrian opposition fighting to topple the Bashar Al Assad regime in Damascus. In the event, Hassan concluded, Arbil and Baghdad needed each other for now, and recommended that Kurds build state institutions, improve the economy, and encourage democratisation for their eventual independence.
Lina Khatib provided useful insights on Isil. Though it lacked cohesion, she stressed, Isil was a wealthy terrorist organisation, perhaps standing as the new model for such groups, even if the Financial Times reported that the alleged heist of several banks in Mosul — from where more than $400 million (Dh1.46 billion) were reportedly stolen — never occurred. What made it different, Khatib affirmed, was that Isil leaders were willing to negotiate while using violence to achieve putative goals. Because Isil was very centralised and secretive, she believed that Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi’s Mosul appearance a few weeks ago was little more than a public relations ploy to attract new recruits, which begged the question whether the self-declared Caliph was at the end of his rope.
Far from finding its glory days, Baghdad is poised to struggle for months and years to come, as its peoples preserve and protect intrinsic interests without upsetting regional and international parties. There is little doubt that Sunnis are caught in an existential dilemma in Iraq because Isil prevented the rise of alternative options while Shiites are caught in a similar quandary: Al Maliki or chaos.
