Region | Iran
US-Iran rapprochement prospects dimming
US-Iran rapprochement prospects dimming
- Gulf News
- Published: 23:21 March 18, 2009
Event: Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said last week that the administration of US President Barack Obama was not trying to "make up for the mistakes" of its predecessor.
Significance: As the administration continues its policy review on how to engage with Tehran, the Iranian leadership is carefully examining its signals for signs of meaningful change from the policies of the Bush administration.
Last month, the IAEA reported that from November Iran had dramatically slowed the installation of centrifuges at its enrichment facility in Natanz.
Obama has indicated that Russian cooperation on curbing Iran's military programmes could obviate the need for the US missile defence system.
Not surprisingly, during her March visit to Israel, Clinton was presented with Israel's "red lines" on the proposed US-Iran talks.
Analysis:
Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is still expecting a response to the congratulatory letter he wrote to President Barack Obama in November. Iran feels it has made conciliatory gestures in Iraq and on the nuclear issue which have been overlooked in Washington in the midst of the economic crisis:
In December, the US military reported that the supply of Iranian "explosively formed penetrators" to Iraqi insurgents had dramatically declined in the last month.
Last month, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that from November Iran had dramatically slowed the installation of centrifuges at its enrichment facility in Natanz, despite the absence of any technical obstacles.
Relations:
Iran's position on bilateral talks remains unchanged since Khamenei said in January 2008 that he would "be the first to restore relations if it served Iran's interests". Despite Iran's fiery condemnation of US support for Israel's incursion into Gaza, Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki last month reiterated Iran's willingness to talk with the administration of Obama.
There is little opposition within the leadership to relations with Washington, as long as the United States abandons its policy of "regime change" and accommodates Iran's interests in its region. Discussions within the establishment draw on two narratives on how to deal with Washington; although one is driven by strength and the other by fear, both favour cautious diplomacy with Washington:
Strength narrative:
Iran is more powerful today than at any point in the last 500 years. It has projected its power into the Gulf, the Mediterranean, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. After the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Saddam Hussain regime in Iraq, the balance of power in the region has shifted from Israel and Arab states to Iran and its Shiite allies. The US relationship with Iran and the region does not reflect this change. The challenge for Iranian diplomacy is to manage this shift peacefully, which in practice means negotiating US acknowledgement of the new reality.
Fear narrative:
This holds that the social justice slogan that characterised the revolution rings hollow, and the sole remaining pillar of the regime's legitimacy is Iran's independence from foreign powers, which has been achieved at the terrible cost of eight years of war with Iraq and 30 years of sanctions and isolation.
Washington recognises this illegitimacy as the regime's Achilles heel and is plotting a velvet revolution in Iran. The challenge for Iranian diplomacy is to convince Washington to abandon regime change, without Iran abandoning the revolution.
Obama doubts:
Obama has trod carefully since assuming office. Despite his initial rhetoric that he would break with his predecessor's policies and seek "engagement" based on "mutual respect", his administration has shown an unwillingness to pursue talks before Iran's June 2009 presidential elections, fearing that he may strengthen Ahmadinejad's hand at the polls.
In Tehran, this is perceived as interference in internal affairs and an unwillingness to treat Iran's leadership as legitimate. Furthermore, recent references to the "carrot and stick" approach by both Vice-President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have reinforced the perception that Obama will not break with the past.
Clinton legacy:
The real legacy that haunts the Obama administration is not that of the Bush era but the Clinton era, thanks largely to the number of officials who served under former President Bill Clinton that have joined the Obama team. Bitter memories of the failed detente of the Clinton-Khatami epoch, combined with close ties to the "Israel lobby" in Washington, make these officials pessimistic about any breakthrough with Iran:
During Hillary Clinton's March regional tour, officials leaked her comments in Sharm Al Shaikh doubting Iran would respond positively to the US offer of engagement and maintaining her "eyes are wide open" when dealing with Tehran.
Dennis Ross, her adviser for "The Gulf and Southwest Asia", a euphemism for Iran, has ties to the Israel lobby, and is an unpalatable choice for Iran.
His public position on negotiating with Iran attaches so many limitations on talks as to make failure a near certainty. Instead, Ross seems focused on how to punish Iran once negotiations fail.
The State Department has thus been at pains to emph asise that Ross is merely an "adviser", and that negotiations will be left to Undersecretary of State William Burns.
Multilateral strategy:
Obama intends to take a multilateral approach to dealing with Iran, which again does not represent much of change:
The Bush administration, particularly in its second term, worked quite closely with the EU3 and, later, the five permanent United Nations Security Council members plus Germany (P5+1) to pass UN nuclear sanctions. Burns attended the P5+1 talks with Iran in July 2008.
As the Bush administration sought an opening to Tehran through discussions on Iraq, Obama is now indicating his desire to engage Tehran on Afghanistan.
Clinton has invited Iran to attend an international conference on Afghanistan in late April. While Iran will be disappointed by it, the multilateral strategy has been effective in bringing the P5+1 closer together:
The EU3 have leaked to the media a list of 34 Iranian entities and 10 individuals who would be sanctioned by them if Iran continued to defy the UN.
Obama has indicated that Russian cooperation on curbing Iran's military programmes could obviate the need for the US missile defence system.
While the Russians have rejected linking the two issues, they have responded positively to the Obama administration's desire to "reset" their relationship.
When Obama makes his first trip to Europe this month, this multilateral approach will ensure him a warm welcome, but will not result in any major breakthrough with Tehran.
Israel factor:
The principal obstacle to any US-Iran detente is not the nuclear issue but Israel's deep fear that rapprochement will come at the expense of its military primacy in the Middle East and "special relationship" with Washington.
If Obama were to acknowledge Iran's rising regional power and accommodate its interests, this would transform the balance of power in the region at Israel's expense.
Since the 1991 Gulf War, when the administration of former President George Herbert Walker Bush began to question Israel's value as an ally in the post-Cold War world, the Israelis have emphasised the Iranian threat as the common enemy that confronts them.
Not surprisingly, during her March visit to Israel, Clinton was presented with Israel's "red lines" on the proposed US-Iran talks, which if adopted, would not only make success in the negotiations impossible, but would impose severe punitive measure on Iran once the talks inevitably fail.
Conclusion:
The prospects for a breakthrough in US-Iran relations are dimming, as Obama backs away from abandoning the "carrot and stick" approach of his predecessors.
The chance for detente, created by Obama's election, is slipping away as policy inertia prevents a breakthrough in US policy towards Iran.
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