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Druze leader Walid Junblatt (left) and Prime Minister Sa'ad Hariri at a rally marking the fifth anniversary of the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri in Beirut’s Martyrs Square Image Credit: Rex Features

On August 2 last year, in front of the General Assembly of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) of Lebanon, Walid Junblatt announced in his own way the death of the March 14 coalition. The Druze leader had already taken the decision to withdraw from the coalition before the parliamentary elections in June last year.

However, according to sources in the PSP, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, Junblatt postponed the announcement until the end of the electoral process, which reportedly cost March 14 forces almost $1 billion.

So March 14 forces, composed of three major players — the Future Movement, PSP and the Christians — spent huge amounts of money on the parliamentary elections to win the majority. Despite that, the president of this majority, Sa'ad Hariri, couldn't form his first government for more than five months after the polls due to conditions imposed on him by the parliamentary minority.

March 14 fought the elections standing against the "illegal" arms of Hezbollah and under the banner of state-building.

But political developments since the elections have resulted in March 14 losing much of its credibility.

Junblatt visited Syria on March 31 to meet with President Bashar Al Assad and declare his re-positioning away from what he calls the "alienation" policy. He said that what he was doing "[was in line with] the historical constants of the party and specifically those relating to the socio-economic issues and the issues of Arabism and Palestine." Thus, since August 2 last year, the March 14 coalition began witnessing the loss of its parliamentary majority.

A "deputy" from the majority said that Prime Minister Sa'ad Hariri was wary, even before Junblatt's visit to Damascus, to put any controversial file on the table for the Council of Ministers to vote.

In terms of numbers, the Democratic Gathering bloc headed by Junblatt has 12 deputies (six belonging to the PSP) in the majority which counted after the last elections 71 deputies out of 128.

Politicians close to Syria joke that the road to Damascus is jammed with visitors from March 14. Five years after the assassination of his father, Hariri visited Damascus and received a special welcome from Al Assad. The two leaders agreed to "open new horizons for the relations between the two countries". Hariri said after the meeting that "his government looks forward to establishing a real strategic relationship with Syria that benefits both peoples and their interests". He added that "the good and special relations between Syria and Lebanon strengthen their position and force and contribute to the protection of Lebanon and [ensure] Arab unity in the face of continued Israeli policies that violate Arab rights".

Through his visit, Hariri opened the door for whoever desires to visit the capital of the Umayyads — and there are many. Junblatt visited it twice, whereas former president Amin Gemayel sent his messengers without getting a positive answer.

But the most important visit to Damascus was that of the head of the Information Branch in the Internal Security Forces, Colonel Wissam Al Hassan, last March 14. As a representative of Hariri, he met officials there and received a long list of Syrian conditions and objections.

Hariri has banned all criticism of Syria in his publications and TV stations. He has told the journalists he employs: "[He] who doesn't want to commit ... let him resign".

After that, Hariri decided to send a delegation that Damascus refused to receive as it was "below level". All this while March 14 remained silent, after years of openly criticising Syria. It was coerced to tone down its criticism of Syria. But this led to many activists, especially the youth, abandoning the coalition. This was best illustrated in the poor showing during its celebrations.

The March 14 coalition didn't get its two principal demands from Syria — demarcation of the border (Hariri has given assurances that the demarcation is not intended to build walls and barricades between the two countries) and the fate of the Palestinian encampments outside the camps and the Lebanese initiative to start a dialogue between the Lebanese government and the Palestinian organisations related to these encampments.

On the other hand, Syria got the following from March 14:

Syria is no longer the enemy accused of the assassination of Rafik Hariri and other prominent figures. Handling Lebanese-Syrian relations is no longer the job of the Arab League or the UN Security Council. These relations are now a direct process, as Syria has become one of the elements of stability in the working of constitutional institutions in Lebanon. The relationship between the two countries is once more a "special" one.

March 14 forces forgot about the resolutions 1559, which calls for Lebanon to establish its sovereignty over all of its land, and 1680, which strongly encourages Syria to respond positively to Lebanon's request to delineate borders and establish diplomatic relations.

They only talk about the resolution 1701 (that was intended to resolve the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict) whenever the Israelis violate it. They are now commending the diplomatic exchange between the two countries without finding a suitable outlet for opposing the Syrian-Lebanese Supreme Council and its agreements, although these forces never spoke about their opposition to its continuity.

Arrest of the four generals is no longer seen as certain proof of Syria's involvement in Hariri's assassination.

Junblatt started destroying the March 14 movement by shaking its entire structure. On August 2 last year. He said that "during the [Cedar] Revolution and [in the heat of the] assassination of Rafik Hariri and other martyrs, we reached for both the reasonable and the irrational. At times our emotions surpassed our rationalism but we did what we ought to do concerning the Court. We ... want it to present the truth and to be a source of stability. We don't want a court of chaos and we don't want countries or even parties undermining its goals. We ask the Court to help stop the political assassinations and to be righteous [while investigating] the crimes. We don't want it to head for extremes or [deviate from the] primary [objective], which is [providing] justice".

Junblatt said that he had attended a celebration of the right-wing Christian Phalange party "where they showed films condemning [former Egyptian president Jamal] Abdul Nasser and we kept silent. There is a big difference between our values and those of the Phalange party and Lebanese Forces. We only came together only because of the assassination of Rafik Hariri."

After the parliamentary elections, one could hear sources close to Phalange leader Sami Gemayel whisper about the necessity of taking political measures to break the stalemate.

When there is stability, the Phalange also talks about opposing some practices, such as "selling Beirut to strangers". They state that their position towards privatisation is not ideological, neither positively nor negatively. "Although we tend towards privatisation, we will deal with every case according to its merits."

Meanwhile, other March 14 Christian partners accuse Sami of regarding the March 14 movement as another version of the March 8 Alliance (the opposition group that includes Hezbollah and Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement). In the past, Sami had formed the "Lebanese Coalition" and his brother, the late Pierre, ran the Phalange. However, sources close to Sami said he never had any misgivings about March 14.

Sami completely left the issue of the relationship with March 14 to his father, Ameen, while he dealt with other issues. He once met officials in Hezbollah (though the meeting was a failure), then reconciled with Sulaiman Franjiyeh. He meets periodically with officials in Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement.

This conflict was illustrated by the refusal of Phalange minister Salim Al Sayegh to take a memorial photo of the government.

The Phalange declared on April 8, 2009, its withdrawal from March 14 forces, for the following reasons:

The Phalange wants the General Secretariat to be for all forces in March 14 and not for a particular group.

The party wants the General Secretariat to abide by the political resolutions that were passed by all the principal leaders of the "Cedar Revolution". If there is any disagreement, the Secretariat should be impartial.

The party, which has as its slogan "God, Country and Family" wants the General Secretariat to inform March 14 parties of all its statements before issuing them as an effort to "avoid any singularity in decision-making ..."

The Phalange wants the structure of the General Secretariat to stay as it was when it was formed and if any update has to take place "it should [be] passed by a decision from the principal leaders of Cedar Revolution and not by an arbitrary measure from the Secretariat itself". A source in the party said: "We have a feeling there are attempts to flood it with people who don't belong to March 14 in an attempt to marginalise parties in it.

More than a week ago, the Phalange's Fares Saeed held a number of meetings to facilitate the return of the party to March 14. Besides, Sami has tried to rebuild his relations with Hariri.

Just before the fifth anniversary of the assassination of his father, Hariri stated in a television interview that "no day passes by without remembering Rafik Hariri ...". He always says that he is Prime Minister because March 14 won the elections, although Arab reconciliation contributed to stability in Lebanon.

Hariri has stressed that he didn't withdraw from March 14 coalition and only death can do them part. He also emphasised that March 14 Christians are present in the government "and we take decisions together". And the reconciliation that took place with Hezbollah was to reduce the tension that existed.

Hariri is still paying the price of this relation with Syria, which seem to be alienating him from the Lebanese Forces and their leader, Samir Geagea.

Observers agree that we can describe the case of March 14 as great Lebanese thinker Muna Al Solh once described the National Leftist Movement in the late Seventies: "It is now like a radio in a broken car, you can listen to it but the car doesn't work ..."

However, no matter what is said about the break-up of this team and the end of the "Cedar Revolution", some still hang on to this coalition, defend its resolutions and policies.

In this context, the coordinator of the General Secretariat of March 14 Fares Saeed talks about its shortcomings and failures by pointing at an internal report the Secretariat distributed to pinpoint the shortcomings. The report which was prepared on October 28, 2008 (after the Doha agreement) emphasises three main points. First: "The rise of factional and sectarian and partisan interests shook at times the picture of national solidarity." Second: "Poor communication with the public, except for the traditional partisan issues." Third: "Poor communication with both the Arab world and the international community."

In addition to these observations filed by the Secretariat, Saeed pointed out that the recent electoral experience was interspersed with many irregularities

As for the post-election phase, Saeed said that "the vision seems blurred in light of the shortcomings and the negligence. The Syrian-Saudi rapprochement and its impact only made it more ambiguous".

Saeed refuses all talk about the decline of March 14. Nevertheless he has not given any explanation about the failures of the majority forces during the most crucial moments in the past. Why didn't they throw out president Emile Lahoud, when they had launched for that reason a campaign with regional and international support and blessings of the Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir? Why didn't they continue with the "half plus one" formula when everyone supported them, including Sfeir? Why were they unable to hold parliamentary sessions headed by the deputy Speaker? Why couldn't they form a majority government as the democratic principle stipulates? Why couldn't they bring back the missing Lebanese from n Syria?

The most important question that none from the majority answered yet is: Why couldn't the March 14 coalition maintain its strength? At least, why couldn't it maintain a unified structure?

 Hussam Kanafani is a freelance journalist based in Beirut.