Vice President Sara Duterte: Why popularity survives the allegations

Why Sara Duterte's runaway popularity defies allegations and regional disparities

Last updated:
Jay Hilotin, Senior Assistant Editor
Philippine Vice President Sara Duterte arrives to file her counter-affidavit in response to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) complaint over her alleged threat to Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, at the Department of Justice in Manila. File photo taken on May 9, 2025.
Philippine Vice President Sara Duterte arrives to file her counter-affidavit in response to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) complaint over her alleged threat to Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, at the Department of Justice in Manila. File photo taken on May 9, 2025.
AFP

MANILA – In the Philippines, a mountain of evidence of unexplained wealth would not be enough to resist the Sara Duterte "wave" now, especially in Mindanao.

The country’s second-biggest island, Mindanao is home to about 27 million people. It’s mineral-rich and is the nation’s food basket, with a land area enough to fit 3.5 Belgiums.

To most of Mindanao’s people, especially those in the Davao region (Region XI, with 5.4 million people), exposing multi-million-peso financial records allegedly linked to Sara Duterte that's beyond her known means would be seen as wrongful prosecution, even “persecution”.

It's never a question of trust in public service.

To them, the House prosecution panel's claim that Sara Duterte’s lawyers failed to challenge the authenticity of key financial records during the impeachment trial has become irrelevant, or a non-issue.

And for many in Mindanao, Sara’s impeachment is not simply a political or constitutional proceeding. 

It's seen as another manifestation of ‘Manila imperialism’ — an exercise of elite capture by the capital’s political class over a region that has long felt marginalised.

In their mind, it’s the root of everything wrong with the Philippines. And it’s not far from the truth.

A key example: The ambitious Mindanao Railway Project (MRP) has been canned.

It is unfunded in the proposed 2027 National Budget (General Appropriations Bill). Meanwhile, billions had been "inserted" for districts belonging to Marcos supporters, including ₱4.74 billion for his son Sandro's Ilocos Norte 1st District.

Local media reported that represents the largest single-district infrastructure addition, a ₱4.37 billion jump, from a ₱369 million National Expenditure Program proposal, per Rappler.

In 2023, work for MRP stopped as Manila officially withdrew its request for Official Development Assistance (ODA) loans from China for the ₱83 billion ($667.5 million) Phase 1 covering Tagum–Davao–Digos due to a "lack of progress" from Beijing.

This has caused deep resentments in Mindanao.

In contrast, the under-construction North South Commuter Rail (cost: ₱873.62 billion, or about $15.42 billion), and the $14-billion Manila Subway, are seen getting budget backing.

Not a homogenous society

The Philippines was never, and still is not, a homogeneous society. 

Up to 195 total languages are spoken across the archipelago of more than 7,600 islands, though Tagalog and Cebuano are the most commonly spoken native languages.

Before it became a republic, internecine wars took place, for example, between the “Kingdom” of Tondo and the Rajahnate of Maynila.

Kingdoms and tribes in Mindanao and the Visayas fought each other, through centuries of maritime conflict (triggered – and escalated – during the Spanish colonial era).

And while Manila concentrates power and wealth, it remains deeply divided, too: communities with some of the country’s highest tuberculosis (TB) rates live alongside billionaires’ enclaves.

CDC estimates TB infection rates around 5% of the population. That's roughly five times higher in Manila than the national average – and that due to high density and overcrowding in certain areas and close-quarter dwellings in Tondo or Quezon City. 

The Department of Health (DOH) Epidemiology Bureau logged over 101,807 tuberculosis cases in Metro Manila in the first 2 weeks of 2026. 

Regional disparity

Now, opinion polls show striking regional disparity: Sara, former Mayor of Davao like her rather Rodrigo, is overwhelmingly popular in Mindanao. In the Visayas, she’s quite a force to reckon with.

Pulse Asia’s September 2026 survey found Sara’s trust rating at 94% in Mindanao and 57% in the Visayas, compared with 43% in Metro Manila and 37% elsewhere in Luzon. 

National trust stood at 55%: these are Sara’s ratings — not a measurement of every Duterte family member. 

More recently, OCTA Research Survey (conducted September 28 – October 4, 2026; and published November 4–9, 2026) showed Sara leads a hypothetical 2028 presidential race with 40%, while former Vice President and Naga City Mayor Leni Robredo follows with 33%.

The 7-percentage-point Sara-Leni gap is the narrowest recorded between the two, and reflects a 6-point drop in Duterte's numbers rather than a rise for Robredo (whose share remained steady at 33%–35%), alongside an increase in undecided voters.

Another survey, this time conducted by WR Numero (October 7 – 13, 2026; Published November 4, 2026) showed Sara in pole position with 42% (up from 33% in March), while Leni is second at 16%, a massive 26% gap.

WR Numero reported that Sara's ongoing impeachment trial has not significantly dented voter preference ratings. Turns out a majority of respondents only follow the hearings "termittently", like they do with weather reports.

The survey establishes where support is concentrated. Yet, it does not establish why. So why do poll numbers turn out the way they do for Sara? 

There are a number of explanations: 

  • Tribalism (i.e. regional identification, resentments against Manila) 

  • Perceptions of performance 

  • Family loyalty 

  • Local political networks and 

  • Resistance to perceived “elite persecution”

These are all plausible explanations. The polls confirm them. 

Still, it would be condescending to assume supporters are simply uninformed — or uniformly indifferent to corruption.

It would be equally mistaken to treat popularity as a legal defence.

Public trust and evidentiary proof answer different questions.

Is 'Imperial Manila' part of the explanation?

It is a plausible political interpretation, and it’s certainly an aggravating cause.

And it makes a difference today.

The impeachment trials of ex-President Joseph Estrada in 2000, ex-Supreme Court Chief Justice Renato Corona in 2011 over unexplained wealth, are now the distant memories.

So is the removal of ex-Supreme Court Chief Justice Marilou Sereno in 2018 via a quo warranto petition over her Statement of Assets Liabilities and Networth (SALN).

The regional pattern has been there all along: A national politician here is viewed more as a representative of communities outside the capital, expected to bring goodies to home district.

The Marcoses themselves are backed by the so-called “Solid North”, for the national gravy they bring to that region. 

But polling by geography cannot, by itself, prove that resentment of Manila produces support for the Dutertes – or that federalism would diminish the friction it creates.

The constitutional argument needs a deeper look. 

The Philippines has a unitary framework: the 1987 Constitution also expressly guarantees local autonomy, provides for local revenue powers and recognises autonomous regions, such as the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), now considered a “sub-state”. 

The 1987 Charter does not mandate that every meaningful decision be made in Manila. 

But to many, it does feel that way.

For example, the Philippines has six primary legislated freeport zones (Subic Bay, Clark, Bataan, Poro Point, Aurora, and Cagayan), alongside one in Zamboanga City in Mindanao.

Major freeports operate as separate Customs territories with broad fiscal and Customs privileges. They are jobs creation drivers.

It’s glaring evidence: such legislated economic activity heavily favours Luzon.

Smaller-scale “economic zones” and “IT parks” administered by the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) are, in theory, distributed nationwide – but Luzon still hosts the majority of total PEZA sites.

Interestingly, the Zamboanga “freeport” (about 1,354km south of Manila), established more than 30 years ago (in 1995) and is the only one outside Luzon itself, still doesn’t have its own stand-alone port.

Locators currently rely on the downtown Port of Zamboanga managed by the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA). The under-construction San Ramon Newport project in Talisayan, Zamboanga City is not due till 2030.

Bicol, home to more than 6 million inhabitants about 500km south of Manila on the same Luzon island, is virtually cut off from Manila, thanks to the perennially rundown "Maharlika Highway" in the Quezon Province segment.

With a 18,155 km2 land area (4x bigger than Dubai), the mineral-rich region doesn’t have its own freeport zone, though a token “economic zone” has started in Naga City.

Its airport is stuck: the ₱4.8-billion Bicol International has no international flights – reportedly due to a runway obstruction by high-tension wires operated by the national grid operator NGCP. 

No timeline exists for when it will be sorted. Local officials, warry of the Manila-based Ombudsman, are reluctant to make a move, even if they have resources to sort it.

The Constitutional promise of “decentralisation” given in 1987 has been inadequate at best, or poorly implemented at worst. 

Is that Manila’s fault alone?

Not really, but many people are convinced it is so. 

This is not to say that regional autonomy was absent from the constitutional design.

True: Federalism is not an automatic cure for political dynasties or an alternative to scrutinising officials’ wealth, declared and undeclared.

In Sara’s impeachment trial, the prosecution has driven an intelligible presentation of her alleged wealth gap. 

Prosecutors cited the findings of forensic financial analyst Alexander Cabrera, who estimated that Sara and her husband Mans Carpio may have at least ₱817.87 million in unexplained assets, with broader projections reaching more than ₱1.5 billion.

The defence should answer the disputed entries with records and qualified testimony wherever it contends the analysis is deficient.

Neither side should turn “I don’t know” into a magic cop-out: it is not automatic exoneration or a confession. Ignorance of the law excuses no one.

A false choice

So, is VP Sara's impeachment a choice between respecting Mindanao and demanding accountability?

It’s a false choice.

The country needs to respect Mindanao, and really, every nook and cranny of the archipelago needs to be respected first and last.

But that should not come at the expense of transparency and equality before the law.

Regional dignity and the pushback against a century of Manila centralism do not require accepting unexplained finances by politicians regardless of address.

The country is blessed. But it’s been only for the select few, and especially those in Manila.

If the regions continue to be neglected, considered as nothing more than suppliers of raw materials (like nickel, copper, silver gold, oil/gas) and cheap labour and "kasambahay" (domestic workers), there’s a danger the country would go on the same trajectory as in the decades past.

Due process does not require abandoning scrutiny of the well-heeled, including the Dutertes, Marcoses, Aquinos, Villars and the rest of the lot. 

A fair trial must protect both due process and scrutiny.

But without addressing fundamental gaps in the regions and in governance, the next generation – absent a fresh vision and drive – would produce more of the same for millions of Filipinos.

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