Nuclear restraint at risk: Why the arms race is quietly accelerating

The world is now burdened by major and complex conflicts across multiple crises and regions. The fundamental question is no longer when a “Third World War” might occur, but rather which of the ongoing international crises could ignite it. Amid all this, the threat of nuclear weapons periodically resurfaces. While some states seek to join the nuclear weapons club, others are secretly expanding their military arsenals — either by enhancing their nuclear capabilities or by acquiring conventional and unconventional military capacities with greater deterrent and destructive power.

Despite the ongoing nuclear arms race, international efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament and protect the planet have made no meaningful progress, notwithstanding the legitimacy of international resolutions under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The treaty obliges nuclear-armed states to disclose the progress they have made in fulfilling their commitments. In reality, however, many undeclared nuclear powers neither reveal their capabilities nor are they members of the treaty.

As international commitment to restraining nuclear powers declines, major states continue to modernise and expand their arsenals amid the fragility of international structures tasked with protecting the world from nuclear threats. Even while discussions about arms control persist, spending on nuclear weapons and destructive capabilities continues to rise. Each party has its own justifications rooted in national security considerations, which obstruct efforts to reach a new nuclear arms limitation treaty and increase the desire to possess nuclear weapons as a deterrent — one that could slide into catastrophic destruction due to advances in destructive capacity and the expanding map of states that possess these weapons, whether openly or secretly.

On April 8, 2010, the United States under Barack Obama and Russia under Dmitry Medvedev signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, known as New START. The treaty entered into force in February 2011 and was extended for an additional five years in 2021. It aimed to limit strategic (intercontinental) nuclear weapons systems by setting a ceiling of 1,550 strategic nuclear warheads for both the United States and Russia. Of these, 700 could be deployed on delivery systems such as aircraft, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarines, and 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers are capable of carrying nuclear weapons. However, the treaty did not restrict tactical arsenals with limited destructive capabilities and short- to medium-range delivery systems.

Under New START, regular on-site inspections were conducted, and the two sides exchanged data twice annually. Both parties remained committed to the treaty’s limits. However, since 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, mutual on-site inspections have been suspended. With rising tensions linked to developments in the Russia-Ukraine war, Russia ceased compliance with the treaty. In February 2023, Moscow suspended its participation, refusing inspections and data exchange with the United States. Washington responded by halting information sharing with Moscow. Effectively, most provisions of the treaty — which formally expires in 2026 — have not been implemented.

While Washington seeks to involve Beijing in any future treaty, Moscow insists that Paris and London be included in any multilateral negotiations on nuclear armament. China, which possesses around 600 nuclear warheads, refuses to join a new arms limitation treaty.

China has increased its production of nuclear warheads and could reach 1,000 by 2030 and perhaps 1,500 by 2035, according to US estimates. This raises concerns among American observers, especially given the difficulty of accurately assessing China’s true nuclear capabilities, despite Beijing’s assurances that these remain at the minimum level required for national security. Nevertheless, China remains far behind the two largest nuclear powers — the United States and Russia — which together deploy approximately 1,700 nuclear warheads.

Russia, for its part, insists on including the United Kingdom and France — both of which possess fewer than 500 nuclear warheads — as Western powers allied with the United States. This appears to be a bargaining tactic between the primary nuclear powers, Washington and Moscow. It may also be an attempt to assess risks and ensure that neither side advances alone in this domain without others catching up in the near or medium term.

Controlling nuclear weapons is essential amid rising tensions and conflicts. Rather than retreating from commitments, efforts should focus on measures that reduce potential nuclear threats. Although New START is not a perfect solution, an agreement to continue implementing it even for a short period — such as one year — during which negotiations begin on a new agreement including all states possessing strategic nuclear power, would be beneficial. At the same time, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons should be activated for all, without political bias. There is also a need to search for international mechanisms that compel nuclear powers to adhere to global standards regarding nuclear capabilities and weapons of mass destruction. Otherwise, threats and risks will continue to grow, remaining subject to the whims of political leaders without international cooperation to safeguard the world from destruction.

Russia has proposed an agreement to adhere to the treaty’s ceilings for an additional year, and there is American interest in negotiating a new agreement that includes China in strategic arms reduction efforts. However, negotiations may take months or even years. In the meantime, the existing vacuum could lead to dangerous consequences, especially given the weakening of international institutions. This raises the spectre of the worst-case scenario: a slide into escalating nuclear conflict amid uncertainty over the future of nuclear capabilities, particularly as some states may expand or strengthen their arsenals in response to any potential attack.

In conclusion, New START alone is insufficient to control global nuclear proliferation or address potential nuclear threats. We now face a reality in which old agreements are being overlooked, while attempts are being made to address threats through new and different rules. International cooperation is declining amid geopolitical tensions and economic and trade obstacles, while nuclear power continues to impose a negotiating reality that may yield only partial results in halting the arms race. What is needed is adherence to existing limits until a new phase begins — one involving broader rules, more states, and stricter controls on global nuclear proliferation.

Reem Mohsin AlKindi is Deputy Head of TRENDS International Training Institute and Director of International Training Department