Arab revolts undermine Iran’s influence

Despite the sheer optimism amongst pro-Iran analysts about the ability of the new Iranian leadership to repair its relations with the US — and hence earn recognition for Iran as a key regional power in the Gulf and the Middle East region — any objective observer must have noticed that Iran may turn out to be the biggest loser of the dramatic events which have taken place in the Arab world over the past three years.

In fact, at the start of the Arab Spring, Iran tried to assume intellectual and geopolitical leadership of the unrest in the Arab world. Iran was well aware that it was in competition with Turkey over leadership for the Middle East and that Ankara was in a far better position than Tehran economically, diplomatically and religiously as a Sunni power to assume that role. However, all this did not deter Iran from trying to position itself as the champion of Arab masses who have risen in opposition to autocratic regimes. The sheer number of Iranian officials who are fluent in Arabic highlights the efforts of Tehran to overcome the ethno-linguistic geopolitical constraints it faces as a Persian Shiite country trying to operate in a region where most Muslim countries are Sunni Arab. While its anti-US and anti-Israeli position has allowed it to circumvent the ethnic factor and attract support in the Arab and Muslim worlds, its Shiite sectarian character has allowed competitors in the region — mainly Turkey — to restrict Iranian regional influence.

Furthermore, while Iranian officials have, from the start, been praising Arab revival and stressing the need to support the Arab masses in their struggle against autocracy, one unmistakable tension was clear. The revolution in Syria has proven embarrassing for Iran. The Iranian regime has been having a hard time trying to reconcile its support for the Arab unrest on one hand and supporting the Syrian regime against its opposition on the other. In fact, Iran tried to present itself as a balanced party in the Syrian crisis, but failed to act likewise. On several occasions, senior Iranian officials have called upon Syrian President Bashar Al Assad to stop violence against peaceful protesters and undertake genuine reforms instead. But these remained mere words. They never represented a major shift in Iran’s original position on the Syrian crisis.

The failure of Tehran to restrain its ally and force him to change his approach to the crisis has highlighted Iran’s obsession with regional politics more than building creditability among Arabs. From an Iranian perspective, relations with Syria are extremely important to further its regional ambitions. Syria is viewed by Tehran as a primary partner in the Arab-Israeli conflict, offering Iran a symbolic political role in the central cause of the region. The occupation of Iraq increased Syria’s importance to Tehran, giving it vital access to most of the region’s problems. Through Syria, Iran could use most of its regional cards as a bargaining chip concerning its nuclear programme and threats by the US military. For all these reasons, Iran failed to adopt a consistent approach in dealing with the Arab revolutions.

Realpolitik, the regional balance of power, threat perceptions and above all, the fear of seeing a Sunni regime in Damascus prevented Iran from considering other political alternatives in dealing with the Syrian crisis. That was particularly obvious at a time when Iran believed that it had become so close to realising its dream — transforming itself into a regional hegemon. In fact, when the Syrian crisis began, Iran was preparing itself to receive its long-awaited moment. The US was evacuating its troops from Iraq and retreating from the region under the pressure of economic crisis, leaving Iran to fill the political vacuum. Losing Syria at that particular juncture would have been of disastrous impact on Iran’s grand regional design. Iran did not surprise many when it decided to stick with its ally in Damascus.

At some point in the future, Iran will discover that it has made the wrong choice. Sooner or later, the Syrian regime will disappear from the scene and Iran will be having no friend whatsoever in new Syria. Most Syrians will not understand Iran’s regional motives for supporting their oppressors. All they know now is that Iran is acting in a sectarian manner and is supporting their tyrant.

Dr Marwan Kabalan is the Dean of the Faculty of International Relations and Diplomacy at the University of Kalamoon, Damascus.