Far from an overhaul

Joshua Stacher, an assistant professor of Political Science at Kent State University, Ohio, concludes his original work with the following: “Though examining the process of renewal, inclusion, and maintenance of elites and non-elites vis-à-vis institutional considerations and executive authority, co-optation explains why such systems can adapt. It also explains why this form of governance continues to be relevant even in the age of popular mobilization, uprisings and potential revolutions. Rather than viewing such a process as reform, autocratic adaptation will remain a better framework for studying governance in the Arab world during the twenty-first century.” (page 175).

This is a devastating conclusion, even if it contains undeniable truths. It is distressing because the author documents how two key Arab countries, Egypt and Syria, were ruled by regimes that enjoyed absolute power, which refused the creation and development of civil societies that would have added value where significant additions were needed. It is also correct because neither Cairo nor Damascus anticipated the 2011 uprisings. In fact, both Hosni Mubarak and Bashar Al Assad failed to quickly draw the right lessons from the rapid change of leadership in Tunisia, a revolution that stood as a rare beacon of hope for young men and women in the countries they ruled, Egypt and Syria, along with Libya and Yemen. To their detriment, Arab autocrats held firm to the controls, which nearly guaranteed confrontations. In fact, because of the protracted stalemates in Yemen, Bahrain and several other Arab countries, few now have the courage to remain positive. Even fewer believe that democratic breakthroughs are possible, which means that “autocratic continuity — not wide-ranging political change” — will remain the hallmark of the so-called Arab Spring.

To his credit, Stacher contrasts Egypt and Syria by focusing on executive power in both countries and concludes that “pre-existing power configurations shaped the uprisings and, in turn, the outcomes”. The author documents how the Egyptian system was more centralised around the executive, while the character of the Syrian system — even under Hafiz Al Assad — was oligarchic. Consequently, Stacher was not surprised that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) could so easily assume executive powers to replace President Mubarak.

Such a transition would be far more difficult in Syria, he concludes: A felicitous replacement of the Baath Party is difficult to foresee. What prevents such a development, the author asserts, is the regime’s careful decentralisation. Still, as Damascus rallied various political and the military forces around the persona of the besieged president, one wondered how effective the protracted state-sponsored violence was, especially in the face of persistent opposition. In other words, while it is accurate to opine that Syria’s unified autocratic regime is in the process of collapsing partly because of its low adaptability skills, it is critical to recognise the role played by millions who simply refused to submit. To be sure, a centralised — as opposed to a decentralised — executive makes all the difference in the world for some autocrats, though it is equally valuable to assess whether executive centralisation almost always favours the authoritarian’s ability to adapt.

Of course, Hosni Mubarak relinquished the presidency while officers from his military — meaning generals he appointed, not that the military was his — were entrusted with the transition. It remains to be seen what now happens to the Egyptian military after the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood candidate. Likewise, and although impossible to determine, Syria might well take a similar course the moment Bashar Al Assad’s officers conclude that the country’s interests require a change at the top. Short of a coup d’état, and after a prolonged civil war that is all but guaranteed for Syria, a post-Baath-Party rule might well come under the authority of the Muslim Brotherhood, which will presumably distinguish itself from autocratic regimes.

Stacher’s contention is that the Baath Party emasculated Syria and actually created a functioning oligarchic regime that would rival Don Corleone, which is why the decentralised character of Syrian politics might limit a rapid resolution of the internecine conflict now devastating the country. Though it is fashionable to hide behind such slogans as “only time will tell if Assad will survive in office”, and despite the 15-month-long — and, by all accounts, unending — civil war, there is a strong possibility that the Syrian autocrat will follow his Tunisia, Egyptian, Libyan, and Yemeni counterparts. It might be fair to state that the only legitimate debate would be to determine how and when that outcome would manifest itself, not if.

Because Stacher’s book deciphers the political inner workings and dynamics of regimes under duress, the reader benefits from a clear appreciation of the structures of elite alliances, state institutions and governing practices of the two countries. The book helps the reader gain a better understanding as to why the January 25, 2011 revolution occurred and why the Baath regime in Damascus survives — though barely — as various masquerades, such as elections, are used to postpone the inevitable.

Dr Joseph A. Kéchichian is the author of the forthcoming Legal and Political Reforms in Saudi Arabia (Routledge, 2012).

Adaptable Autocrats: Regime Power in Egypt and Syria