Western coalition can't defeat Taliban

US President Barack Obama has finally announced his decision to send an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan, but the reasoning behind it remains hazy.

It took the president nearly four months to respond to US commander in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal's request for a further 40,000 soldiers to "avert mission failure". The reluctance with which 75 per cent of the General's wish was fulfilled testifies to a certain lack of conviction on Obama's part.

His compromise decision also included the proviso of a complete withdrawal by July 2011, demonstrating a desire to please all of his people all of the time. The hawks will be pleased with the increase in troop numbers, while the doves will be soothed by the prospect of an end to combat.

But Obama is a highly intelligent individual who realises that however many Nato troops are sent to Afghanistan, the war will remain unwinnable.

General David Patraeus' ‘surge' in Iraq was widely perceived as successful (although the insurgency is by no means over in that country), but Afghanistan is not Iraq and a ‘surge' is not a cure-all solution.

The ‘surge' in Iraq worked for several reasons; not least among them the fact that two-thirds of the population (the Shiite and Kurdish element) supported the invasion, and the removal of (Sunni) Saddam Hussain, from the outset.

In Afghanistan, 90 per cent of the population are Sunnis, many adhering to the hardline Hanafi school of thought promoted by the Taliban. Furthermore, almost half of all Afghans are from the fiercely loyal Pashtun tribes or have married into them. The Taliban movement is largely composed of Pashtuns.

It is highly unlikely that the majority of Afghan people, Hanafi Muslim, Pashtun, or both, would prefer the presence of US troops to the Taliban, regardless of whether or not they agree with the hardline interpretation of Sharia the latter would have them live under. For this reason the Taliban still hold sway in around two-thirds of the country, and they have gained popularity in the wake of the failed election process that saw Hamid Karzai return as president despite allegations of vote-rigging.

When George W. Bush's troops invaded Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11, their goal was to rout Al Qaida and topple its hosts, the Taliban. When Obama came to office at the beginning of this year, destroying Al Qaida was still a credible casus belli as the network's key figures had returned to their safe haven in the Hindu Kush and had established joint training camps with the Taliban.

Al Qaida is elsewhere

These days, however, few believe that any Al Qaida leader, let alone Osama Bin Laden and Dr Ayman Al Zawahiri, are still in hiding there. Some recent intelligence reports claim that less than 100 Al Qaida fighters remain in the country.

Al Qaida has regrouped elsewhere, just as it did during the ‘surge' in Iraq. The network is currently resurgent in the Maghreb, the Arabian Peninsula (with a strong presence in Yemen) and Somalia, where the indigenous Al Shabaab recently pledged allegiance to Bin Laden.

Much of the core leadership and numerous fighters are believed to have crossed the border into Pakistan, which has a burgeoning Taliban movement of its own.

Indeed, it seems that the internal security of Pakistan is now key to Obama's Afghan policy, and the reason why all pretence of bringing democracy to that unfortunate country has been dropped, depite Obama's assurances in his June speech that "no system of government can or should be imposed upon one nation by any other".

Karzai, even in the absence of a popular mandate, is America's man. If control of Afghanistan were to fall to the Taliban, the present Pakistani government's tenure would become concomitantly shaky. Pakistan, of course, is a nuclear power.

Regardless of US military strategy and ambitions, it is difficult to see a future for Afghanistan that does not involve the Taliban. The notoriously tough Afghan winter coupled with the remote, unforgiving terrain will give no ground to American troops, no matter how numerous.

Nor do US plans to enjoin urban rather than rural combat bode well. Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Taliban's second in command, told journalists that it would be easier for his men to target greater numbers of American troops in the towns and cities, where the Taliban enjoy popular support, than in the mountains.

In his Cairo speech, Obama hinted at a reversal of the drive for US hegemony that characterised the previous administration's Middle East policy. If this is indeed his long-term aim, and if he does not wish to preside over a second Vietnam, Obama would be well advised to pursue his much-advertised intention to talk to the Taliban.

No matter how long the US is prepared to stay in Afghanistan, the Taliban are battle-hardened, patient and there for the duration. A well-known Pashtun saying rings true: "They have the watches, but we have the time".

Abdel Bari Atwan is editor of the pan-Arab newspaper Al Quds Al Arabi.