Obama may bring thaw in US-Iran ties

Throughout the week, since he entered the White House, US President Barack Obama and his senior advisors have been bombarding Iran with positive signals, practically offering a dialogue with the government in Tehran.

Notwithstanding President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's cautious response, the Iranian government reciprocated by stating that it senses "encouraging" changes in US policy under the new administration.

Observers have described the exchange of "goodwill gestures" between the two sworn enemies as a radical shift in Washington's policy towards Tehran.

For the past two years, however, since the mid-term elections of November 2006, a consensus seemed to be emerging in Washington, lobbying for a different approach towards Iran.

The bipartisan Baker-Hamilton report, published two years ago, openly called for defusing the crisis with Tehran over its nuclear programme.

The report said that the US didn't want Iran as a "permanent enemy" and that better relations were possible if Tehran would give up its nuclear fuel programme.

At the time, the report fed speculations that Washington might be seriously thinking about reaching a deal with Tehran, ending the thirty-year-old hostility between the two countries. Some in Washington even started to propose that Washington may need to make a credible grand gesture, like sending a high-level envoy to Tehran with a concrete list of diplomatic and economic rewards, including a timetable for restoring full diplomatic relations with the US.

These speculations have more solid ground under the Obama administration, which lacks the personal dislike that marked the relationship between the Bush administration and Tehran.

But even before the publication of the Baker-Hamilton report, historically, the US has always had the desire to reach a compromise with the government in Tehran.

Ever since the Islamic revolution in 1979, successive US administrations have been trying to win Iran back regardless of the theocratic nature of its government.

The US has never stated publicly that it would work towards regime change in Tehran, it merely sought to change its policies to be more in line with US interests in the region.

In fact, Washington has never been concerned about the domestic policies of the Islamic government of Iran. But it is concerned about its foreign and regional agenda. US policy on Iran was, to a large extent, shaped by the latter's position on the two American interests in the region: oil supplies and Israel's security.

Since the toppling of the Shah in 1979, Washington conducted its relationship with Tehran within the context of its wider Middle Eastern strategy.

Several US officials, in public and private, emphasised that the US did not have problems with Iran because of the religious nature of its regime, but with its foreign and regional policies, particularly its opposition to the peace process and US interests in the Gulf.

Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor to president Bill Clinton, warned that: "The American quarrel with Iran should not be misconstrued as a 'clash of civilisations' or opposition to Iran as a theocratic state. Washington does not take issue with the 'Islamic' dimension of the Islamic Republic of Iran."

Former assistant secretary of state for near eastern affairs, Edward Djerejian, stated that the US "policy is not aimed at changing the Iranian government but at inducing Iran to change its behaviour."

Robert Pelletreau, who succeeded Djerejian, reiterated US policy towards Iran and expressed Washington's desire to open a dialogue with its government to resolve differences between the two countries.

Even Martin Indyk, former US ambassador to Israel, who spoke about the 'Dual Containment' policy against Iran and Iraq, agreed that the US was not interested in the religious nature of the Iranian regime but its behaviour towards US policies and regional allies.

In fact, US policy towards revolutionary Iran has always been moulded by strategic, economic and security considerations, not culture or religion.

The loss of the Shah was a major setback to US foreign policy during the Cold War. And US policy towards post-revolution Iran was conducted to offset the loss of such a strategic regional ally.

The expected shift in US policy under Obama is nothing but a reaffirmation of the traditional US position on Iran.

In practice, Obama wants to say that the US is ready to embrace the Mullahs if they are willing to accept its interests and meet it half way.

Is this possible? In principle yes, but maybe not under Ahmadinejad.

Dr Marwan Kabalan is a lecturer in Media and International Relations, Faculty of Political Science and Media, Damascus University.