Can Lebanon reclaim a monopoly on arms?

The Lebanese Cabinet’s decision to task the army with drafting a plan to place all weapons under state control by the end of 2025 marks a significant shift in the country’s approach to armed groups operating outside the state framework. This issue had remained unresolved for years, but the Israeli war on Gaza, Hezbollah’s response, the losses Israel inflicted on the party’s leadership, and wider regional developments — coupled with international pressure on Lebanon — all appear to have pushed matters in this direction.

The Cabinet’s decision is based on the US proposal, which calls for implementation of the Taif Agreement, the Lebanese Constitution, and relevant UN Security Council resolutions, primarily Resolution 1701. Under the plan, the army would deploy in southern Lebanon alongside “UNIFIL” forces, subject to Israel’s withdrawal from five positions it continues to occupy in the south. Indirect negotiations would also be held to demarcate the border with Israel. However, the implementation of the decision may face several obstacles in Lebanon’s politically fragmented society, especially if it is viewed as a US-Israeli effort to pressure the country.

Despite suffering significant losses in its ranks and military infrastructure, and despite Israel’s continued strikes on southern Lebanon in violation of a ceasefire agreement, the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons is now being raised more seriously as part of a defensive strategy aimed at avoiding Israeli attacks and guaranteeing its exit from the south. The US proposal offers Lebanon a step-by-step framework, but as expected, Hezbollah’s response was firm, rejecting the decision to place weapons under state control as null and void.

The Lebanese army faces a dilemma in trying to disarm a group that has carried weapons for over four decades, has a variety of secret arsenals, and commands tens of thousands of loyal fighters.

The challenge is further compounded by the Amal Movement’s alignment with Hezbollah in rejecting the disarmament plan, as well as the army’s own struggles with salaries, training, and equipment, all of which require substantial support to carry out the mission. Also, the tight deadline limits the army’s ability to implement the proposed plan.

The risk of armed confrontation is real if domestic and external actors insist on their positions and strict timelines. Hezbollah is likely to resist with all its resources to obstruct the process, using its pressure cards, notably the “Shiite card,” both politically and on the ground. This could lead to sectarian conflict and even civil war. Early signs are emerging, with protests against the government’s decision and the walkout of ministers aligned with Hezbollah, the Amal Movement, and independent Shiite minister Fadi Makki from the Cabinet session discussing the plan.

Hezbollah and the Amal Movement justify their stance by arguing that the decision serves Israel’s interests and leaves Lebanon vulnerable without any deterrence, especially since Israel has not honoured the ceasefire and continues to prevent the return of residents from border villages. They emphasise that the United States, which brokered the ceasefire agreement, must provide guarantees for Lebanon, which are likely included in the main provisions of the US-proposed agreement.

Only Iran stands with Hezbollah and Amal, publicly predicting that the Lebanese government’s plan to disarm Hezbollah will fail. Yet Tehran appears to overlook recent regional shifts over the past two years, including Israel’s military strikes on Iran, the weakening of Syria under Bashar Al Assad, and the erosion of Hezbollah’s military strength in Lebanon due to targeted Israeli attacks on its infrastructure.

Regional developments open the door to complex scenarios involving both internal and external forces. The Lebanese government’s ability to move forward with US demands will remain a key factor, weighed against the political, economic, and military support it can secure, regardless of the cost of confrontation with Hezbollah.

Managing this issue will require the Lebanese army to act with wisdom in assessing security risks, backed by Arab and international support, to prevent Lebanon from sliding into a new cycle of internal tensions amid ongoing Israeli threats and persistent economic crises. Open dialogue could provide a mechanism to prevent sliding into confrontations that would plunge Lebanon into years of open conflict.

Hamad Abdulla AlHosani is a researcher at TRENDS Research & Advisory