An asset to Arab affairs

Mahmoud Riad (1917-1992) was one of the most privileged Egyptian diplomats who served his nation in a variety of capacities. A serious student, he enrolled in the army and, in time, joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he recorded a stellar diplomatic career.

Mahmoud earned the confidence of his superiors early on. Many came to rely on his raw talent and mild temperament, which were valuable assets at a time of great upheaval in Arab affairs.

Present at the creation of some key events that shaped contemporary Egyptian affairs, ranging from the 1949 Rhodes Armistice Conference to the 1952 coup d'état that overthrew King Farouq I to the cataclysmic 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Riad represented his government with poise and dignity. Often, it was his burden to present tempered versions of the hugely popular Jamal Abdul Nasser's rants, even if the latter dominated Arab affairs between 1956 and 1970.

True to his character, Riad fell back on erudition to master all aspects of the Palestine question, which quickly transformed him into his country's premier resource on the matter. In fact, senior leaders relied on him for expertise, though few displayed the diplomat's rare insights. A loyal Nasserite, Riad managed with gusto his love for Egypt with his genuine beliefs in Arabism, which grew intrinsically more difficult to implement in the age of the nation state.

Emergent pan-Arabism

In 1954, Riad was promoted to the directorship of all Arab affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he trained a slew of young diplomats who would, in time, serve under him throughout the Arab world. This was his baptism in the pan-Arab fire, but the energetic director was so talented that Nasser, who was about to gain full control from Colonel Mohammad Naguib, appointed him ambassador to Damascus. Whether Riad was privy to Nasser's detailed plans for union with Syria at this time was not clear, although he fulfilled his president's ill-fated 1958 unity plank with gusto.

Nasser feared Syrian communists and persuaded the Syrian president Shukri Al Quwatli that Damascus needed to rid them from his government.

According to Riad, the Egyptian leader resisted total union with Syria because of serious concerns that Syrian communists were actually capable of gaining the upper hand. In the event, the two presidents settled on a federal union, which literally ended whatever democratic experiences were ever enjoyed in Damascus.

When Adib Al Shishakli's government was overthrown by the military in 1954, Nasser faced a key decision: Would he accept a total merger that Quwatli had earlier opposed? As it turned out, and largely through Riad's skills, the United Arab Republic (UAR) came about on February 1, 1958, with Nasser as president.

What Cairo had in mind — a new federal constitution, a 600-member National Assembly (400 from Egypt and 200 from Syria) and, most importantly, the disbanding of all political parties, including Baath — displeased Syria. Outmanoeuvred, the Syrians went along, but it was most likely because of Riad's doings. Through his ambassador's skills, Nasser managed to redraw the political map in Damascus, as a few senior Baathists were entrusted with key posts.

Though relatively successful, the ruse failed to take hold as Syrian army officers resented being subordinated to Egyptian counterparts. Riad cautioned Nasser that nationalist sentiments should not be underestimated even if his president was far more attuned to advice provided by military mentors, including the overrated General Abdul Hakim Amer.

A variety of internal and regional developments, including British and US military interventions in Jordan and Lebanon, and the July 14, 1959, revolution in Iraq, changed the political map. Baghdad wished to join the UAR but that was not to be.

Rising economic difficulties and, more importantly, Nasser's unwillingness to concede nationalist sentiments to Syrians prevented the Rais from sharing power. Amer in particular neglected Riad's recommendations, including incredibly counter-productive Egyptian plans to manipulate national union elections.

Generals in both capitals were increasingly in charge, as Amer and Colonel Abdul Hamed Sarraj gradually introduced brutality and suppression, with predictable results. On September 28, 1961, a fresh coup brought into power Mamoun Al Kuzbari and while the Egyptian declared that he would never renounce his ultimate Arab union plans, the die was cast. When that ill-fated project failed, Nasser recalled Riad to Cairo, contrite for his hasty and ill-informed decisions.

Riad then served as a special adviser to the hugely popular Egyptian Rais until 1962, when he was appointed envoy to the League of Arab States. Nasser may have appreciated Riad's input and designated the erudite envoy as minister of foreign affairs in 1964, which placed him in the thick of the president's 1967 catastrophe.

Whether Nasser drew correct lessons from his UAR errors is yet to be debated by Egyptians, Syrians and most other Arabs. This major setback served Riad well, however, as the diplomat foresaw the June 1967 confrontation long before it occurred. A foreign minister during one of the most difficult periods in contemporary Arab affairs — when Egypt, Syria and Jordan lost the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, along with control over the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and the West Bank of the Jordan River — Riad understood the futility of verbal confrontations. He repeatedly warned Nasser but always supported his leader in public.

At the end of the 1956 war, Egypt agreed to the stationing of a UN peacekeeping force in the Sinai, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), ostensibly to keep the border region demilitarised. Various skirmishes along Syrian and Jordanian borders mounted tensions, which prompted Nasser to lodge official complaints against UNEF troops, allegedly because the latter were preventing Cairo from rendering assistance to Egypt's Arab brethren.

The 1967 war

According to Riad, Egypt requested that UNEF move troops away from border areas, not from Sharm Al Shaikh and other critical points in the Sinai. Whether that was the real intention or whether fast-paced diplomatic exchanges garbled everyone's radarscopes, the results were hasty and ill-advised.

In the event, and with Soviet backing, Riad inked a defence pact between Egypt and Syria in 1966, which stated that each country would support the other if it were attacked. It was not long before a minor border incident on April 7, 1967, escalated into a full-scale aerial battle over the Golan Heights.

A war of words ensued and, on May 16, UNEF Commander General Indar Jit Rikhye was handed a letter from General Mohammad Fawzi, the Egyptian Chief of Staff, requesting a withdrawal of international forces.

On Nasser's instructions, Riad cabled UN Secretary-General U Thant on May 18, informing the latter that the UNEF mandate was terminated. India and Yugoslavia started their pullbacks while U Thant suggested that UNEF be redeployed to the Israeli side of the border. Remarkably, Israel refused, itching for a confrontation. On May 22, Egypt announced that the Straits of Tiran would be closed to "all ships flying Israeli flags or carrying strategic materials", which effectively guaranteed war a few weeks later, with devastating consequences for all.

Who was responsible for escalating tensions was murky at best with Riad in the middle of a diplomatic tug of war. Against Riad's advice, Nasser turned once again to his military mentors, led by the now promoted "Field Marshal" Amer who allegedly was ready — though he was not. Once again, it was up to the seasoned diplomat to manage what were truly unmanageable circumstances.

Dejected but still loyal, Riad nursed his wounds stoically and served under president Sadat for two full years before he succeeded Abdul Khaleq Hassouna as the third secretary-general of the Arab League in 1972. Under his mandate, the Arab League held several summits, including the ones in Algiers (1973), Rabat (1974), Cairo (1976) and Baghdad (1978), when key questions regarding Arab oil embargoes and the repercussions of the October 1973 war were discussed. He also presided over the Extraordinary October 1976 Riyadh emergency summit that examined the civil war in Lebanon.

Needless to say that the 1978 Baghdad rejectionist front gathering, coming on the heels of Egyptian president Sadat's unilateral peace initiatives with Israel, dramatically altered Arab politics.

Riad could not stop the anti-Sadat and anti-Egyptian tides by Arab leaders and members of the intelligentsia, long before most convened in Baghdad. As Sadat was absent, Egypt could not cast its veto power and, consequently, Riad was powerless to stop the decision to expel Egypt from the league. This also meant that the secretariat would be moved out of its Cairo headquarters to Tunis. Although that decision would be reversed in 1989 after President Hosni Mubarak won Arab support back, Riad relinquished his post at the height of a crisis caused by Egypt's peace treaty with Israel in 1979 and was replaced by the Tunisian Chadli Klibi.

Emasculated by Nasser and made irrelevant by Sadat, Riad managed to nurse an ailing Arab League long after the league lost its value, as Arab leaders bickered over its leadership. Designed as a collegial body to serve the Arab nation, legendary figures dominated its proceedings and, for years, dictated policies that were not always acceptable to the majority.

Riad stood out as one of the institution's reluctant secretary-generals, tending to its many needs, akin to the care offered by an oncologist administering a cancer-treatment protocol.

Although a trained soldier, he believed in diplomacy to settle epochal disputes but carried out instructions from his president with utmost perseverance. Sadly, his loyalty was not reciprocated, as is often the case for those who apply ideals to protect and serve. Against some odds, Riad conserved his poise and left the political scene to successors who did not — indeed could not — ensure that Arab political coordination preceded much-touted military cooperation.

 Diplomat par excellence

Mahmoud Riad was born on January 8, 1917, in Al Qalubiyyah, Egypt, into a modest family. A serious student, the young man joined the army and graduated from the Egyptian War College in 1936, where he specialised in intelligence affairs. One of his first postings saw him in charge of military intelligence in the Gaza Strip before the 1948 war with Israel. Noticed for his talent, Riad was asked to join the official delegation representing his country at the February 1949 Rhodes Conference, which concluded a set of Armistice Agreements between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. He continued to serve on the Egyptian-Israel Armistice Commission between 1949 and 1952, when a coup d'état overthrew King Farouq I. In 1954, Riad was promoted to the directorship of all Arab affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he personally trained a slew of young diplomats. At the height of the proposed Egyptian-Syrian Union, Riad was appointed ambassador to Syria in 1955 and actually worked in earnest to fulfil Nasser's 1958 union with Damascus. When that ill-fated project failed, Nasser recalled Riad to Cairo, where he served as a special adviser to the hugely popular president until 1962. It was also that year when Riad was appointed Egyptian envoy to the league. Nasser appreciated his input and designated Riad as minister of foreign affairs in 1964, a position he kept until 1972, that is two years after Nasser's sudden death in 1970. As such, Riad was present on the Arab scene during one of the most difficult periods in contemporary Arab affairs, when Egypt, Syria and Jordan lost the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

Two years in the post-Nasser era, president Anwar Sadat appointed Riad as his political adviser before elevating him to become the third secretary-general of the League of Arab States in 1972, a position he held until his March 1979 resignation.

Interestingly, and long before he joined the Egyptian Foreign Service, Riad was a distinguished student at the military academy, where he found time to study for and successfully complete a doctorate in engineering.

Riad wrote several books about the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict, including a three-volume memoir titled ‘Mudhakarat Mahmoud Riyadh' (Memoirs of Mahmoud Riad), published in Cairo in 1986. The first volume of these highly interesting memoirs focused on the Egyptian views of the UNEF withdrawal, which literally accelerated the 1967 war. The third volume contained the author's particular interpretations of the events that led to the war itself and, according to Riad, US responsibility. In 1981, Riad published ‘The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East' in English, which was received well by critics. He died on January 25, 1992, in Cairo, survived by his wife and three children.

Dr Joseph A. Kéchichian is an author, most recently of Faysal: Saudi Arabia's King for All Seasons (2008).

Published on the second Friday of each month, this article is part of a series on Arab leaders who greatly influenced political affairs in the Middle East.