In this five-part series, Gulf News excerpts the fascinating conclusions of the largest ever opinion survey of the world's Muslims, carried out by Gallup. Who speaks for Islam? by John Esposito and Dalia Mogahed was published by Gallup Press.
Middle class and well-educated
For decades, scholars and pundits have been debating about how terrorists and extremists are created. The causes of terrorism are said to be psychological (terrorists are abnormal, deranged, irrational), sociological (they lack education, are alienated social misfits), economic (they're poor, unemployed, hopeless), political (they reject democracy, freedom, human rights), and religious (they're fanatics, zealots, believers in a violent religion that rejects modernisation and technology).
The conventional wisdom, based on old and deeply held stereotypes and presuppositions about extremists, has often fallen back on an intuitive sense that a combination of religious fanaticism, poverty, and unemployment drive extremism and terrorism. Reluctance to see extremists as otherwise intelligent, rational people responding to perceived grievances was apparent within weeks after 9/11. Media reported the "stunning discovery" that many of the attackers were not from the poor, downtrodden, under-educated and alienated sectors of society, but that they, like their Al Qaida leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al Zawahiri, were well-educated, middle to upper class, and from stable family backgrounds. This profile raises important questions about why people from seemingly normal backgrounds become terrorists.
But, should the profiles of the 9/11 attackers, as well as Al Qaida and other terrorist group leaders, have surprised us so much? Not if we had remembered recent history. Muslim extremism is not a new phenomenon.
Extremist groups from Egypt and Algeria to Lebanon, Pakistan, Indonesia and the southern Philippines have existed for decades. Early studies by the Egyptian sociologist Sa'ad Eddin Ebrahim and others of the assassins of Egypt's President Anwar Sadat in 1981 concluded:
The typical social profile of members of militant Islamic groups could be summarised as being young (early twenties), of rural or small-town backgrounds, from middle and lower middle class, with high achievement motivation, upwardly mobile, with science or engineering education, and from a normally cohesive family . . . Most of those we investigated would be considered model young Egyptians.
Similarly, with some exceptions, today's breed of militants and terrorists - from the 9/11 attackers to the London bombers of 7/7 - have been educated individuals from middle-class and working-class backgrounds. Some were devout; others were not. For example, according to media reports, many of the 9/11 hijackers themselves exhibited behaviours hardly practised by a religious Muslim. A number of them drank heavily and frequented strip clubs and porn shops. Most were not graduates of madrassas or seminaries, but of private or public schools and universities. Bin Laden was trained in management, economics and engineering. Al Zawa-hiri, a surgeon, and other Al Qaida leaders, as well as those responsible for the World Trade Centre and Pentagon attacks, like Mohammad Atta, were well-educated, middle-class professionals.
British-born Omar Shaikh, convicted and sentenced to death for the kidnapping and murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl, was educated at elite private schools including the London School of Economics.
What do Muslims polled across the world have to say? How many Muslims hold extremist views? What are their hopes and fears? What are their priorities? What do they admire, and what do they resent? According to the Gallup Poll, 7 per cent of respondents think that the 9/11 attacks were "completely" justified and view the United States unfavourably. Among those who believe that the 9/11 attacks were not justified, whom we'll call "moderates," 40 per cent are pro-US, but 60 per cent view the US unfavourably.
Analysing and comparing the answers of the 7 per cent with the moderate majority produced some surprising results. By focusing on the 7 per cent, whom we'll call "the politically radicalised" because of their radical political orientation, we are not saying that all in this group commit acts of violence. However, those with extremist views are a potential source for recruitment or support for terrorist groups. This group is also so committed to changing political conditions that they are more likely to view other civilian attacks as justifiable: 13 per cent of the politically radicalised versus 1 per cent of moderates say that attacks on civilians are "completely justified."
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Fear of domination drives Muslims to become radical
A primary catalyst or driver of radicalism, often seen as inseparable from the threat to Muslim religious and cultural identity, is the threat of political domination and occupation. The interplay of the political and religious is strongly reflected in responses to open-ended questions such as: "What can the West do to improve relations with the Muslim world?" and "What is the most important thing the United States could do to improve the quality of life of people like you in this country?"
Given what the politically radicalised and moderates admire about themselves and resent about the West, answers to these questions paint a consistent picture.
- Reflecting the importance of Islam, the most frequent response given by both groups to the question about what the West can do to improve relations is: more respect, consideration and understanding of Islam as a religion; not underestimating the status of Arab/Muslim countries; being fair and less prejudiced.
- Reflecting the priority they give to democracy, the politically radicalised give equal importance to the need for political independence. Their responses include: stop interfering, meddling in our internal affairs, colonising, and controlling natural resources.
The primacy of political grievances (Western domination and intervention) and the extent to which politics and religion have become intertwined are evident in many struggles.
The Gulf War of 1990-91 precipitated Osama bin Laden's transformation of Al Qaida from a support group in the Afghan-Soviet war into a global militant network. While bin Laden denounced the presence of non-Muslim armies in the homeland of Islam, Saudi Arabia, as sacrilege, he regarded the Western, especially US, military presence in Saudi Arabia as an "occupation" that would lead to increased dependency of Gulf states.
More than a decade later, the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq and Israeli attacks on Gaza and Lebanon were exploited by terrorists to recruit "freedom fighters" to resist the West and protect Muslims.
The heightened sense of the West's threat to political freedom and to Islamic identity has likely reinforced the desire for Sharia. Recourse to Sharia, the blueprint for an Islamic society, provides a centuries-old paradigm. Thus, however different and diverse Muslim populations may be, for many, Sharia is central to faith and identity. While moderates (83 per cent) and political radicals (91 per cent) alike want Sharia as a source of law, a significantly higher percentage of the politically radicalised (59 vs 32 per cent of moderates) want to see Sharia as the only source of law.
This desire for Sharia is reminiscent of the reasons behind the early development of Islamic law, to create a rule of law as a shield against the power of the caliph or sultan. As Richard Bulliet notes in The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilisation:
"All that restrained rulers from acting as tyrants was Islamic law, Sharia. Since the law was based on divine rather than human principles, no ruler could change it to serve his own interests."
Today, greater interest by the politically radicalised in the implementation of Islamic law reflects their desire to limit the power of rulers and regimes that they regard as authoritarian, "un-Islamic," and corrupt. However, this is not a call for theocracy. When asked to what extent they want religious leaders involved in public life (secular family law, curricula in schools, drafting new laws or a constitution, deciding who may run for office or how women may dress in public, or determining their country's foreign policy), majorities of the politically radicalised and moderates say they do not want religious leaders to be directly in charge. Nevertheless, radicals are more likely to want religious leaders to play an "advisory" role, consistent with the traditional role of ulama as "advisers" to rulers.
Same concerns
One of the most important insights from Gallup's data is that the issues that drive radicals are also issues for moderates. The critical difference between these two is one of prioritisation, intensity of feeling, degree of politicisation, and alienation. This accounts for key differences in the hopes of each group.
- When asked about their dreams for the future of their country, majorities of moderates and the politically radicalised cite improved economic conditions. Greater security and an end to civil tensions are the next most frequently mentioned responses, with about one in five of the politically radicalised and moderates mentioning these.
- While moderates then focus on improvements in educational systems, the politically radicalised give higher priority to promoting democratic ideals and freedom of speech, enhancing their country's international status, earning more respect, and playing more important regional and international roles.
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America is not trusted
In an opinion piece in the International Herald Tribune, Carnegie scholar Fawas Gerges recounted an interview he had with a human rights advocate, Egyptian Hazeem Salem, in Cairo.
The activist, who is in his twenties, told Gerges: "Look at what America is doing in Iraq. America is using democracy as a mask to colonise Muslim lands and to steal our oil.'' When Gerges reminded him that President George W. Bush advocates promoting democracy in the Arab world, Salem retorted, "No, he is promoting chaos and civil war.''
While the spread of democracy has been the stated goal of the United States, with few exceptions, majorities in virtually every nation with majority or sizable Muslim populations disagree that the United States is serious about the establishment of democratic systems in the region:
- Only 24 per cent in Egypt and Jordan and 16 per cent in Turkey agree that the US is serious about establishing democratic systems.
- The largest groups in agreement are in Lebanon (54 per cent), Sierra Leone (68 per cent), and Afghanistan (53 per cent). The politically radicalised are sceptical and pessimistic about world affairs. The scepticism among Muslims in general regarding the United States and its promotion of democracy is intensified among the politically radicalised: While about half (52 per cent) of moderates say they disagree that the United States is serious about supporting democracy in the region, almost three-fourths (72 per cent) of the politically radicalised disagree.
As mentioned earlier in the discussion about democratic exceptionalism, many Muslims charge that the US and the West in general have a double standard when it comes to promoting democracy and human rights in the Arab/Muslim world. "Whenever the Israelis strike the Pal-estinians, the international community and the UN turn a blind eye or keep quiet," says Saleh Bayeri, a politician and Muslim community leader in Jos, Nigeria. "But when the Palestinians launch a counterattack, it is condemned by America, the UK and other friends of Israel as a terror attack. That is the problem. It shows that the West is biased in dealing with Muslims."
One female college student at the American University of Cairo, a leading institution of Western education in the region, said in an interview with Gerges: "Bush has given Israel carte blanche to attack Palestinians and Lebanese. The war on terror is an open-ended war on Muslims."
Nearly two-thirds (63 per cent) of the politically radicalised disagree that the US will allow people in the region to "fashion their own political future as they see fit without direct US influence," while 48 per cent of moderates express this view. For the politically radicalised, their fear of Western control and domination, as well as their lack of self-determination, reinforce their sense of powerlessness.
Thus, a belief has developed among the politically radicalised that they must dedicate themselves to changing an untenable situation.
When respondents in ten predominantly Muslim countries were asked how they view a number of nations, the attributes they most associate with the US are: ruthless (68 per cent), scientifically and technologically advanced (68 per cent), aggressive (66 per cent), conceited (65 per cent), and morally decadent (64 per cent).
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Militant Muslims have better education
The Arab Development Report of 2005 and many other studies of Muslim countries well-document the existence of significant poverty and illiteracy.
These problems are found in Palestinian refugee camps and in the slums of Algiers, Cairo, Baghdad and Jakarta as well as in many other non-Muslim developing nations.
Poverty and lack of information and skills necessary for social mobility result from deep-seated econ-omic and social problems that can generate broad-based discontent. But are lack of education and poverty key factors that distinguish those with extremist views from moderates?
The data say no. The politically radicalised, on average, are more educated than moderates: 67 per cent of the radicalised have secondary or higher educations (vs 52 per cent of moderates).
Radicals are not more economically disadvantaged: 65 per cent of the politically radicalised say they have average or above-average income versus 55% of moderates.
