A nation turns against itself

Speaking to the Italian daily Corriere della Sera back in December 2001, the late Yasser Arafat bluntly said: "Hamas is a creature of Israel which, at the time of Prime Minister [Yitzhak] Shamir [in the late 1980s], gave them money and more than 700 institutions ... Even [former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak] Rabin ended up admitting it, when I charged him with it, in the presence of [Egyptian President Hosni] Mubarak."

One week later, in an interview with another Italian newspaper L'Espresso, Arafat added: "Hamas was constituted with the support of Israel. The aim was to create an organisation antagonistic to the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organisation]."

Two days later, I had interviewed Khalid Mesha'al, chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau. In sharp contrast to Arafat's words, Mesha'al said: "Arafat cannot be discredited nor can his role in the Palestinian struggle be forgotten or ignored."

However, he did not seem to mind the idea of a post-Arafat Palestine. "The Palestinian people are rich in their experiences and qualifications. They are also very strict in who they choose as a leader. They are capable of producing a leader for every stage of their struggle, and Yasser Arafat was a leader for a certain period of Palestinian history."

Last month, however, Mesha'al watched members of Hamas storm Arafat's home in Gaza, tear it apart, bring down and then tread on his portrait. This was part of the bloody takeover of Gaza. An apologetic Mesha'al called a press conference, swearing that what happened in Gaza "was not directed against the Fatah movement".

A Damascus-based journalist who is close to Mesha'al, said: "He doesn't approve of what is happening in Gaza. But what can he do? If he says no to it, he will be swept aside by the popular current within the Occupied Territories." That might be true but it does not explain, or justify, the violent and bloody takeover of Gaza, the insult of Palestinian symbols, or the execution of members of Fatah. If Mesha'al feels he cannot control the situation — and neither can Prime Minister Ismail Haniya — then both of them should step down.

It is a crime if they are unable to stop the bloodbath. It is an even more horrendous crime if they approve of it.

Rafi Eitan, a former commander in the Mossad, said: "The Israelis must not worry. All that is happening in Gaza is in the interest of Israel. All of it proves what we have been saying for a long time; that the Palestinians are still far from being able to administer their own affairs. Nobody can say that they appreciate democracy or have leadership. The world will no longer demand that we give them statehood."

Not an Al Qaida

It would be wrong to draw parallels between Hamas and Al Qaida, as some in the West have inferred, or to believe Arafat's statement that they were a creation of Israel. A newcomer watching the scene in Gaza, however, would immediately write Hamas off as another "terrorist" organisation, because it looked, acted, and spoke very much like the Al Qaida in Gaza.

That, however, is where the similarity ends. Hamas preaches war against Israel. Al Qaida preaches it against Christians, Westerners and the United States. Hamas has relationships with a variety of Islamic groups in Palestine, some of whom are connected to the global jihad movement. Some stalwarts of Hamas might also be equally influenced by Al Qaida, but this does not mean that the movement as a whole is allied to, or influenced by, the doctrine of Osama bin Laden.

Hamas is a political and military group that has a jihadi agenda. The attacks it carried out against Israel after the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000 endeared it to millions of Arabs and Muslims around the world. Then, it took the suicidal decision of running for office in 2006.

After the Hamas victory, Esmail Haniya was welcomed as a pragmatic man who wanted to run a state, rather than lead a resistance movement. Throughout the last year, Haniya was more interested in paying wages to the Palestinians than sending bombs into Israel.

A courageous man with an unblemished record and unwavering commitment to the Palestinian cause, Haniya's first blunder was his refusal to recognise the Oslo Agreement of 1993 and consequently, scaring away the international community. However, by accepting office under the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) — a product of the Oslo Accords — Haniya and the Hamas leadership effectively legitimised and recognised the accords.

Haniya's second blunder came with the selection of his ministers; men who have been unable to convince the world of the legality of their cause. Instead of appointing Mahmoud Al Zahhar, a medical doctor-turned-cleric, Haniya should have appointed someone who was more seasoned in world affairs and well-known within the international community, even if he were a member of Fatah, such as Saeb Erekat or Nabil Shaath. Hanan Ashrawi, who is a Christian, would have been an even better choice. She could have worked wonders for the image of Hamas in the West.

Why has the situation reached its current gridlock? Hamas was shunned by the international community, not because it was an Islamic group, but because it said it would never recognise Israel. Also, it failed to show pragmatism upon coming to power in 2006 when it offered a 10-year truce to Israel but fell short of recognising it.

The Palestinian Territories had a deficit of $700 million, while another $400 million was being withheld by Israel. The leaders of Hamas could have made a symbolic gesture for the release of Palestinian money. They realised that their being in power was the reason behind the added suffering of the Palestinians, yet they refused to step down.This was Haniya's second major mistake.

Search for solutions

So, what is the future of Hamas and the Occupied Territories? One option is a two-state solution — one part run by Haniya and a yet-to-be-elected Hamas president, and the other by Fatah. This is ridiculous because Gaza cannot survive on its own for long, given its high poverty rate, if the status quo continues.

The real problem is that Hamas won't just disappear if Abbas discharges Haniya. Nor will Abbas be able to impose a peace treaty on Gaza, or root out Hamas.

Once all sides understand the reality that Hamas is here to stay, they could move on to how to work with Hamas. That would be difficult but it is the only way to avoid civil war in the Occupied Territories. If war does break out, Fatah realises that it cannot win. Abbas needs to re-engage Arab nations close to Hamas, especially Syria. The leaders of Hamas trust the Syrians, who are the only Arabs who still seem committed to the greater Arab cause. Although Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have mediated in the past, true credibility — at least for Hamas — lies with the Syrians.

A changing face

Once on the negotiating table, however, all sides must decide which Hamas they must deal with. The one of 1987-2006? That Hamas — which believed in suicide bombings — does not exist anymore. If it had, it would not have clung on to power over the past 15 months.

The other Hamas is the one characterised by its actions between January 2006 and June 2007. This is a Hamas that insists on being a partner in governance. This is a Hamas that is giving de facto recognition to Oslo, without explicitly saying it. This is a Hamas whose leaders are willing to have a 10-year truce with Israel. This is the Hamas everybody should invest in.

The third Hamas is the one that showed its face in June 2007. This is a vicious Hamas which is hungry, angry and desperate for vengeance. It is a wild animal that will strike anyone around it, for the sake of survival. Nobody wants that Hamas to survive and persecuting it — or refusing to deal with it — will only help it prevail. It will move underground and create more trouble.

Abbas does not have strong support in the West Bank and Gaza. Neither does he have the money Arafat dished out to buy it. While Arafat had millions of people who loved him and thousands who relied on him for their livelihood, Abbas has no one. Arafat received $300 million per year as assistance from the Arab world, which he used to establish social services, education programmes, media campaigns and diplomatic missions.

Abbas does not have that and must compensate for his weaknesses. So he must deal with Hamas. The only way to prevent Hamas from becoming a state-within-a-state, and take over security as it did in Gaza, is to make Hamas the state. Once in power, Hamas will share responsibility for security, success and accountability for failure.

If it succeeds, while abiding by international norms, then Abbas must live with the reality that Hamas is there to stay for another term in office. A Hamas that is not firing bullets — at him or Israel – shouldn't be a problem.

If it fails in government, then it gets voted out in the next elections. Or its role can begin to diminish in consecutive legislative elections. Hamas came to power and promised better wages, an end to corruption and the liberation of Palestine.

When Palestinians realise that Hamas cannot deliver, they will not vote for Hamas. They might vote for another Islamic group, but not for Hamas. That is the only way to end Hamas. Warfare — as history has shown — will only make Hamas more radical.

Timeline of vengeance

-December 1987: Hamas is created in the Occupied Territories by Shaikh Ahmad Yassin and establishes a wide popular base for fighting the Israelis in the first intifada. Hamas publishes its first manifesto calling for a "holy war" against Israel and pledges to create an Islamic state from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. It challenges the PLO's claim to be the sole representative of the Palestinians.
n 1989: After repeated attacks against Israeli targets, Israel outlaws the Islamic group and labels it a "terrorist organisation". It then arrests Shaikh Ahmad Yassin.

-1991: Hamas forms the Izz Al Din Al Qassam Brigade, its military wing to attack Israel. The militia is named after the resistance leader (who was Syrian) who fought the British in Palestine in 1936.

-September 1993: Arafat signs the Oslo Peace Accords on the White House lawns and is greatly criticised by Hamas for having "sold out" to the Israelis.

-April 6, 1994: Hamas carries out its first car-bomb attack, killing eight in Afula.

-April 13, 1994: Hamas carries out its first suicide bombing, killing five people in Hadera.

-January 6, 1996: Hamas master bombmaker, Yehiyeh Ayyash, killed in explosion. Hamas blames Israel.

-January 20, 1996: Arafat is elected president of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) with 88.2 per cent. Hamas frowns at the elections, saying that they are illegal as long as occupation continues.

-February to March 1996: 47 Israelis killed in three suicide attacks in retaliation for killing Ayyash.

-September 25, 1997: Under orders from Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, the Mossad tries to assassinate Khalid Meshaal in Jordan. Embarrassed by its failed attempt and under the pressure of Jordan, Israel releases Yassin from jail.

-September 2000: The second intifada breaks out after Ariel Sharon carries out a provocative visit to the Al Aqsa Mosque.
n June 2003: Negotiations held between Hamas chief Abdul-Aziz Al Rantissi and Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas over a ceasefire. The talks collapse when Abbas calls for an end to "armed resistance".

-June 8, 2003: Rantissi is found responsible for directing the Hamas-led attack in which four Israeli soldiers were killed at the Erez Checkpoint in the Gaza Strip.

-July 23, 2002: Israel bombs Hamas leader Salah Shehadeh's house in Gaza, killing him and 14 others.
n August 21, 2003: Hamas leader, Ismail Shanab, killed in Israeli airstrike.

-January 26, 2004: Rantissi offers "a 10-year truce in return for withdrawal and the establishment of a state".

-March 22, 2004: Yassin killed in an Israeli airstrike in Gaza City.

-March 27, 2004: Rantissi addresses 5,000 supporters in Gaza and declares US President George W. Bush as an "enemy of Muslims".

-April 17, 2004: Abdulaziz Al Rantissi is killed by Israel after having succeeded Yassin on March 23. Israel vows to eliminate Khalid Meshaal as well.

-November 2004: Yasser Arafat dies at a hospital in Paris, removing a major obstacle to Hamas' political agenda.
n January 26, 2006: Hamas wins the legislative elections in Palestine.

-June 14, 2007: Hamas hails the "liberation" of Gaza from Fatah.

-June 15, 2007: Abbas fires Esmail Haniya.

Fatah through the years
October 10, 1959: A group of about 20 Palestinians met in Kuwait and secretly formed Fatah (or Al Fatah), an organisation that became the principle component of the PLO. The actual date of founding is controversial.
1965: Backed by Syria, Fatah began carrying out raids against Israeli targets, launched from Jordan, Lebanon and Egyptian-occupied Gaza.

1968: After the Six Day War, the PLO altered the Palestinian National Covenant to demand the establishment of a Palestinian state on the entire territory of Israel. Fatah's popularity among Palestinians grew until it took control of the PLO. Since then it has been the PLO's most prominent faction, under the control of Yasser Arafat.

December 1988: As part of a strategy to gain recognition, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat publicly renounced "terrorism" on behalf of the PLO.

The US considers that all PLO groups, including Al Fatah are bound by Yasser Arafat's renunciation of "terrorism". The facts contradict the speeches as the PLO-supported attacks against Israel continued through the 1990s and accelerated after the start of the Al Aqsa intifada in 2000.

Sami Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.