US has erred with repeated use of a failed set of assumptions in Arab-Israel row
Despite an extraordinary record of repeated failures, the Palestine peace process continues to enjoy the benefit of the doubt — perhaps because there is no other alternative out there.
Nonetheless, the peace process has been conspicuously absent from the news of late. US President Barack Obama has been busy with his re-election campaign. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel could not be more satisfied with the deadlock in a peace process going nowhere, giving him a free hand to continue with colony expansion.
Mahmoud Abbas, the President of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), is gambling that some form of Palestinian membership at the United Nations will bring to the fore new dynamics to advance the Palestinian cause. It is a gamble because Washington has described the Palestinian initiative as “counterproductive” and threatened serious consequences if it were pursued.
Abbas seems to have concluded that notwithstanding Washington’s wrath, he was determined to see the Palestinian initiative through.
In addressing the UN General Assembly at its annual September gathering, Abbas poignantly described the tragedy of the Palestinian people under occupation: “We are facing relentless waves of attacks against our people, our mosques, churches and monasteries and our homes and ...”
He said he was prepared to keep the faith and urged the international community to rescue the moribund peace process before the Israeli policy of dispossession and relentless expansion made the two-state solution no longer a viable option.
Since Washington opposes the Palestinian initiative, we must conclude that the peace process Abbas was talking about is one that excludes Washington, or at least is not Washington-driven.
Yet, if there is one lesson to be learned from the history of the peace process it is that a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict will not be achieved without Washington’s blessings and its active involvement. This lesson is for the parties to the conflict as well as for geopolitical rivals to learn and profit from.
Former Egyptian president Anwar Sadat was quick to learn this lesson. He dramatically expelled Soviet military advisers from Egypt in 1972 and proclaimed his readiness to join the America-led camp.
Former US president Richard Nixon and especially former secretary of state Henry Kissinger were slow to appreciate the full significance and implications of Sadat’s dramatic gesture.
The Kissinger approach to the peace process was profoundly Machiavellian. He wanted to be involved when a conflict had reached a point of crisis and he could more effectively manipulate the balance of power, relying on secrecy and using rewards and punishment. This Machiavellian peace process literally invited confrontations as a prerequisite for conflict resolution.
Sadat understood the implications of the Kissinger peace process. In October 1973, Egyptian and Syrian troops launched a military offensive against Israeli troops occupying Egyptian and Syrian territories. Only then did Kissinger become involved in the military disengagement negotiations.
The peace process has been the stock in trade of Washington’s approach to solving the Arab-Israeli conflict since the former US secretary of state, William Rogers, brought a peace plan to the then Egyptian president, Jamal Abdul Nasser, in 1969. Nasser accepted the Rogers Plan, but Israel did not. The plan was ultimately sabotaged by Rogers’ arch-rival in the Nixon White House — the then national security adviser Kissinger.
From there on, the “peace process” went on to accumulate a series of extraordinary failures that vitiated the term of real substance. It continued, however, to raise hopes that never materialised and expectations that were never fulfilled.
The American authors of the various reincarnations of a peace process, that died a thousand times no doubt, were sincere in their quest for peace, but wrong in their repeated use of a failed set of assumptions.
The first of these is the misplaced belief that Washington could persuade Israel to stop its expansionist policies and support American peace initiatives, without use of the enormous American leverage over Israel. Washington supports Israel to the tune of $3 billion (Dh11.03 billion) in annual economic and military aid. In addition, Washington provides Israel crucial political and diplomatic support at the UN and elsewhere.
Another misleading assumption relates to the certainty of a confrontation with the Israel Lobby if Washington did use its leverage to pressure Israel. And the assumption here is that the US president, whether Republican or Democrat, will likely find such confrontation costly in terms of time and energy to fight it and worrisome in terms of its impact on the election campaign and at the polls.
Few presidents had the courage to put that proposition to the test. One president who did was George Bush senior. Despairing of Israeli prime minister Itzhak Shamir’s stubborn refusal to attend the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, Bush suspended $2 billion of credit Washington had made available to Israel. Shamir gave in and there was no costly confrontation with the Israel lobby.
Although the peace process of the Madrid conference made no breakthrough, the demonstration was made that Washington could bring Israel to the negotiation table, provided it had the political will to use its formidable leverage to secure compliance.
A third assumption is no doubt being carefully analysed in Washington and around the world. The peace process has traditionally expected the people of the region to overlook one of its shortcomings, namely the conflict of interest evident in how Washington’s role as an honest broker was undermined by its unconditional backing of one of the parties.
As long as Washington was dealing with authoritarian regimes in the region, the contradictions of the peace process mattered little. But the Arab Spring is changing all that. With rulers accountable to their people, the people must be heard. The facile reliance on dictators to take care of their streets created a false sense of manageability that replaced a concrete solution. This can no longer apply. This means the peace process has to be reinvented.
Adel Safty is distinguished visiting professor and special adviser to the rector at the Siberian Academy of Public Administration, Russia. His book, Might Over Right, is endorsed by Noam Chomsky and published in England by Garnet, 2009.
Sign up for the Daily Briefing
Get the latest news and updates straight to your inbox