Can Iran be reined in with sanctions?

When the Iranian Defence Minister, General Ahmad Vahidi, revealed that Tehran embarked on the production of short-range cruise missiles named Nasr 1, it sharply increased the tempo of future international sanctions. Likewise, when President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called the September 11 attacks a "big lie", the remarks further exacerbated tensions between key western powers and Iran over the latter's disputed nuclear programme.

According to Vahidi, the ground-to-ground Nasr 1 missiles were "highly accurate and capable of evading radar," and would soon be supplemented with sea and air versions. He boasted that they were powerful enough to destroy 3,000-tonne targets that would, presumably, include warships deployed throughout the Gulf. Even if this bombastic announcement could not be verified independently, it was, nonetheless, of some concern to neighbouring states.

Moreover, while few doubted Iran's abilities to produce a large range of weapons, including tanks, medium range missiles, jet fighters and torpedoes, its missile development projects preoccupied Gulf Cooperation Council states.

Naturally, while Iran denies it is seeking nuclear weapons, it regularly boasts of having missiles that can target the only nuclear power in the Middle East, Israel, which also places every major installation on the Arabian Peninsula at risk.

Still, the development of military programmes tends to be a very expensive proposition, and one of the many goals of key powers is to significantly curtail revenue sources that fund Iran's nuclear and missile programmes. Towards that end, a new draft sanctions resolution has been circulating among the five permanent Security Council members, one that will ostensibly target the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and its vast network of companies, which could amount up to one-third of Iran's total economy.

Ironically, the New York Times recently revealed that Washington "awarded more than $107 billion (Dh392.69 billion) in contract payments, … over the past decade to foreign and multinational American companies while they were doing business in Iran."

Not only was the Iran Sanctions Act embargo supposed to discourage such investments, it was also meant to punish foreign companies that invested more than $20 million in any given year, propositions that were never enforced.

Of course, such contradictory behavior was part and parcel of what passed for "diplomacy" during the past few decades, which intended to confuse far more than elucidate, as major powers juggled global jigsaw puzzles.

Thus, whatever new sanctions may now be imposed on Iran, one should keep in mind that a multitude of countries will chime into the decision-making process. As countries play a game of chess, Tehran may be counting on China to withstand an avalanche of antagonistic steps that seeks to hem in its nuclear programme.

Nonetheless, Beijing, like Moscow, will not sacrifice its long-term relationships with premier western markets to please a developing country. In fact, China, Russia and France, potential investors as well as customers, along with Britain and the US are all engaged in risky manoeuvres.

How will Washington persuade its fellow Security Council members to impose effective sanctions on Iran is anyone's guess. One recent initiative, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asking King Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia to guarantee more oil to China for the latter to drop its veto threat, apparently failed.

The Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud Al Faisal, travelled to China late last week to further assuage Beijing, again with little progress.

Simply stated, Beijing's current oil imports from Iran, around 540,000 barrels per day, were too valuable to drop. Remarkably, although Saudi Arabia and the UAE promised to offset any shortfall in Iranian crude shipments, China hesitated not because it did not trust Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, but because it does not wish to become subservient to major power politics.

Nevertheless, with oil prices hovering around $80 per barrel, Iran is still in the hole and cannot balance its budget (its preferred price is $90-$95 per barrel) and Ahmadinejad, who is no foolish man, ought to consider ending his cantankerous tendencies. Ahmadinejad may not know this, but of the total 2,992 victims including the 19 hijackers who perished in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania in 2001, 358 were Muslim.

Likewise, Vahidi may also wish to refrain from gratuitous declarations, boasting that Iran signed bilateral security pacts with Qatar, Oman and Kuwait, which drew at least a denial from Kuwaiti military sources.

Allegedly, such agreements would work in Iran's favour, since these states stipulated that they would not allow their territories to be used for attacks against Iran.

In the event, Tehran was under the proverbial diplomatic gun, unhappy with both Beijing and Moscow, going so far as to request hundreds of Russian commercial pilots who have been working in various companies to leave the country within two months, in what can only be described as a clear sign of strains between Iran and Russia.

Repeated threats to cut off oil supplies to China and even shut down the Strait of Hormuz fill the airwaves.

What is nearly certain now is that the UN Security Council will soon take up the Iranian nuclear issue and, most likely, impose tough sanctions. The logical follow-up question would be to assess whether GCC countries will be within Iranian sights if these sanctions fail.

Dr. Joseph A. Kechichian is a commentator and author of several books on Gulf affairs.