The Barack Obama administration has not made much of a secret of its frustration at the recent outbursts from outspoken Saudi princes. After all, as David Ignatius pointed out (Washington Post, October 31) essential US interests in the Middle East articulated by Obama in his United Nations address seem to coincide with Saudi interests quite well: Defending US allies against external aggression, ensuring the free flow of energy, combating terrorist networks and preventing the development of weapons of mass destruction.

However, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) leaders fear that a US-Iranian detente may, to their detriment, prompt the US to become less assertive in curtailing Iran’s regional hegemony. The Iran-backed Al Houthis and their recent military campaign in Northern Yemen, only miles away from the Saudi border, is already a grim reminder of the seriousness of Iran’s reach. Alarmingly, analysis coming out of the US policy community seems rather dismissive of Saudi and GCC concerns vis-a-vis US policy in the region, brushing them aside as mere paranoia. The prognosis, it is claimed, is that the Saudis will eventually come to their senses once the US communicates its goals to its Gulf allies more effectively.

However, the GCC’s concern is not altogether unreasonable and a similar precedent arguably exists in the history of international relations — one that I picked up in an off-the-record conference I attended on the nuclear negotiations. As part of a secret concession in the US-Soviet deal to defuse the Cuban missile crisis, the US retracted its Jupiter missiles from Turkey — US’s Nato ally — without the latter’s knowledge in 1963. Moreover, when the British decided to withdraw from the Gulf after a 150-year presence in the late 1960s, they saw the Shah of Iran as the best candidate to play ‘policeman’ of the Gulf. Sure, the Islamic regime may not be as western-friendly a regime as that of the Shah, but the US’s fiscal difficulties, projected defence cuts and most recently talk of National Security Adviser Susan Rice’s policy of “humility” in the Middle East — one may argue — all provide ample room for speculation as to the shape of the region’s future security architecture.

Beyond being understandable though, Saudi and GCC concerns are more importantly consequential for the success of the US policy and interests in the region — particularly for a war-weary America with much less of an appetite and the financial means for projecting power in the Middle East. What the US currently lacks — cash and a strong stomach — Saudi and the GCC seem to have plenty of.

Consider the Israeli-Palestinian peace process in which Secretary of State John Kerry has invested so much of his time and political capital. With Israel resorting to its typical fait accompli tactic by accelerating the construction of illegitimate colonies, pressure from the GCC could be instrumental in pressing the Palestinian National Authority to remain at the negotiating table. Furthermore, any deal that the US can possibly broker between the two sides will likely entail a bill of a few billion dollars, if only to move people and colonies around. Not only will the GCC be the only conceivable partner to pick up the tab, its help will be vital in securing the necessary political support in the Arab League.

In Syria, despite differences between the US and GCC on the desired goals and means of achieving them, both agree that some level of support for moderate rebels, like the Free Syrian Army, and a weakening of Bashar Al Assad’s forces on the ground are necessary. Yet again, the GCC has signed the bulk of the contracts needed to supply the rebels with arms shipments. Saudi Arabia is even said to be currently working relentlessly to create a large unified army of mostly Salafist fighters, exclusive of Al Qaida affiliates.

On counter-terrorism, the Saudi-US relationship is no doubt substantial and despite its obviously discrete nature, indications of its scale have been made public on occasion. Revelations earlier this year about a secret US drone base in Saudi Arabia (which have to date not been confirmed by the Saudi authorities) highlight Saudi Arabia’s role as the lynchpin of the US’s effort to combat Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which operates primarily out of Yemen. Beyond helping combat AQAP and sharing valuable intelligence — which was announced in October 2010 by John Brennan and helped uncover a terror plot targeting US commercial airliners — King Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia in August pumped $100 million (Dh367.8 million) into the United Nations Centre on Counterterrorism, a gesture recognised by Kerry in a statement to the press.

Kerry’s trip to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the UAE is a step in the right direction, albeit a symbolic, insufficient one. In order not to alienate its GCC allies vis-a-vis its new approach towards Iran, the US should consider pressing for a more substantive GCC involvement in the P5+1 negotiations — which is only fair given that Iran’s nuclear reactors are only miles away from their shores and strategically poised along the Gulf’s main source of drinking water. This should help remove much of the suspicion surrounding the nature of the concessions that the US and the West may be willing to make to Tehran in return for its compliance.

Hasan Tariq Al Hasan is a Bahrain-based economic and political analyst.