Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Rouhani are to Iran what George W. Bush and Barack Obama are to America: The respective formers damaged their nations’ standing which the latters were elected on a platform to fix. Rouhani’s messages have been consistent so far and together with Javad Zarif, his Foreign Minister, have been louder than Ali Khamenei’s, Iran’s Supreme Leader.
Across the Arabian Gulf, there is a sense of betrayal. While many would argue that the deal is in fact good for the region as a whole, they fail to see it as part of a larger narrative and possibly the final nail in the coffin of a relationship solidified since the second Gulf War.
The US has attempted to untangle itself from the Arab world to focus on the elusive “pivot” to East Asia. The Arab Spring made things awkward and forced it to make quick decisions that were a product of pseudo-historic public showmanship and fear of comparisons to the Bush administration. Like Richard Nixon’s decision to outsource Gulf affairs to the Shah of Iran, while he was busy winding Vietnam down, Obama ended up accepting the Muslim Brotherhood — under the naive expectation that it would evolve similar to Europe’s Christian Democratic parties — as the only viable option to tolerate just long enough to usher the revolutionising Arab States through its nascent stage. This both culminated and plateaued with its passive rubberstamping of Mohammad Mursi’s ominous constitutional amendment. That, combined with its limited support for the once-commanding moderate forces in the Syrian opposition, a position now held almost entirely by radical jihadists, has left major Arab Gulf states very sceptical of how they could — at the very least under the current administration — work with the US on long-term challenges. Of course, a lot can happen in three years. Hillary Clinton or Jeb Bush could be president and rebalance the “pivot” and rebuild trust with the Arab Gulf states, but will it be too late? Not necessarily, but more importantly, how special is a relationship that sways this much with every new administration?
The Arab Gulf states are entering a crucial stage of key domestic challenges that they simply cannot afford to wait until a more committed administration comes about.
Demographically, almost 60 per cent of Arab Gulf national populations are below the age of 25 and who require jobs that the public sector simply will not be able to provide. Economically, we will see a fundamental transformation of the role Gulf Cooperation Council oil-and-gas play in supplying global energy consumption as well as the continuous rise in domestic consumption eating away at its capacities for export. Socially, our identity continues to be renegotiated by our evolving business model. This has all been at play prior to the Arab Spring’s fallout which, to say the least, has added an additional layer of complexity that is translated in some cases to calls for immediate political reforms, primarily with populist demands.
A new generation is taking the helm in many Arab Gulf states. Questions abound over where it will direct their interests and capacities and address the region’s priorities. Yes, Russia remains an awkward partner, China emphasises its gross domestic product/capita as a sign it is not a world power, France is too small and the United Kingdom is simply too American. However, American reluctance may end up forcing Arab Gulf states to move beyond the idea of the special relationship status with the US and consider how their region could become more independently sustainable. This is very difficult, but is not impossible.
Binding together
The UAE’s formation was driven by similar circumstances. Forced to downsize and look inwards, Britain decided to abruptly pull out of the trucial emirates. This forced seven emirates to settle past differences, renegotiate power balances and bind together. This partnership may not include all Arab Gulf states right away and some not at all; it is a choice by process of elimination.
Even after China overtakes it in economic production, the US will remain the most powerful nation for many decades, but it is spread thin, its priorities are at play and commitment in a free fall. Arab Gulf states cannot remain too dependent on it to the extent that they have been. In many ways, the Arab Gulf states should take a cue from Tel Aviv. Israel has done a very good job of seeming indispensable to the US. Support for Israel is seen as a crucial position for any aspiring politician, military and intelligence cooperation is mutually beneficially and the amount of trade, investment and knowledge exchange is staggering — e.g. US-Israel trade represents 1 per cent of total US trade. This number is more significant given the fact that US trade with China, whose workforce is 234 times that of Israel, is just 7 per cent. Caveats about historic and subliminal Judeo-Christian shared heritage, shared political values and the post Second World War historic moment all apply. The Arab Gulf states need to up their game in Washington while developing further ties in other places and types of players e.g. corporations and individuals.
To be sure, the different Arab Gulf states face different challenges at varying degrees of severity and their work is cut out for them, but it is clear that their previous special partnership with the US on energy and regional security is no longer viable or significantly valuable for the US.
Mishaal Al Gergawi is an Emirati current affairs commentator. You can follow him on Twitter at www.twitter.com/algergawi.
