The Syria truce: Fire beneath the ashes

Today, Damascus is living one of the calmest weeks since the conflict in Syria began gathering steam in late 2011. The Russian-American brokered cessation of hostilities that went into effect on 27 February still holds, allowing the residents of the Syrian capital, and those who flocked to the city from war-torn areas, to enjoy an early spring. This truce however, is leading to false optimism on part of both Syrians and outside observers. Most guns in Syria are silent now, but none of the existing contradictions has been resolved, nor were any regional tensions relaxed. On the contrary, the conflict in Syria seems heading towards unprecedented escalation rather than any partial or comprehensive solutions.

The fragile truce is allowing Syrians a breathing space after five years of brutal conflict, humanitarian aid is flowing to many areas relieving thousands, and another round of political dialogue in Geneva is made possible next week. These immediate positive outcomes however should not fool anyone. In the coming weeks, the ugly results of freezing a conflict while leaving a host of explosive issues unresolved will become evident — all at the expense of Syrians.

The first issue is the fate of Jabhat Al Nusra. Recognised by the international community as a terrorist organisation, Jabhat Al Nusra represents Al Qaida’s arm in Syria, loyal to Osama Bin Laden’s successor Ayman Al Zawahiri. Major western think tanks are discussing more frequently than before the growing terror threat emanating from Jabhat Al Nusra and its foreign fighters, which is predicted to match that of Daesh in the not-too-distant future. Jabhat Al Nusra, however, shares the same trenches with almost all other rebel groups across the different frontlines in Syria. Jabhat Al Nusra’s leader, Abu Mohammad Al Julani, refused any truce or political resolution to the conflict, and vowed to continue the fight to bring down the Syrian government.

The position of Jabhat Al Nusra’s main ally, Ahrar Al Sham, is still rather vague. One wing of the organisation, operating outside Syria, is trying to pass the group as a credible political player, on top of its military role. The domestic leadership of Ahrar Al Sham, however, is more devoted to extremist views and still committed to an “Islamist” political project in Syria. More importantly, the relationship between Ahrar Al Sham and the Riyadh-based negotiating committee is ambiguous at best. How far, therefore, would Ahrar Al Sham and similar groups remain committed to an international understating if Jabhat Al Nusra breaks the truce? In any case, it is highly doubtful that they will accept any international move to eliminate Jabhat Al Nusra. And if they do, a major round of rebel in-fighting will likely break out, preventing any interim truce in an area where Jabhat Al Nusra operates from becoming a lasting solution.

The second issue is the developing “Kurdish question” in Syria. Both the United States and Russia recognise the beneficial participation of Kurdish local fighters in the fight against Daesh (the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant). But the growing Kurdish role in Syria has made the Turkish state very nervous, especially now that it is re-engulfed in internal strife against the Kurdish Workers Party. Turkey blocked the participation of any Kurdish political bodies in the Geneva talks and has designated the YPG (the Kurdish protection forces in Syria) a terror group at par with Daesh.

Just before the truce, Kurdish locals, working with close Russian air support, overran the rebel-held pocket on the Turkish border (north of Aleppo). Turkey responded by shelling Syrian territory, demanding the Kurds to retreat. They did not oblige and Turkey refused to accept their inclusion in the truce agreement. Opposition groups allied with Turkey are shelling the predominantly-Kurdish Shaikh Maksoud neighbourhood in Aleppo (alongside government-controlled parts of the city) on a daily basis, and dozens of civilians have perished since the truce went into effect. Recent reports from the area suggest that thousands of opposition fighters are massing in the city of Azaz, their last remaining stronghold on the border. These groups aim to reverse both government and Kurdish advances in the area, with Turkish support, thus reopening the road to Aleppo. A fierce battle is looming there after the truce ends, and it might even begin sooner.

Last but not least, there are still many unresolved tensions between the outside players involved in Syria. Hopes ran high when a concert of international and regional powers including Russia, the US, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey came together in Vienna in the autumn of 2015 and issued two communiques laying out a vision for a comprehensive political solution in Syria. These hopes however, were quickly dashed by the intensifying conflagrations between Iran and Saudi Arabia on the one hand and between Russia and Turkey on the other.

Apart from their understanding on the current cessation of hostilities in Syria, little agreement exists between Russia and the US on how to shape a political solution out of the crisis. The decision by the Gulf states to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist group shows that the struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia is here to stay. Turkey has not yet acquiesced to Russian presence in Syria, nor has Russia renounced its aim of cutting the Turkish lifeline to anti-government groups. These tensions will therefore continue to transpire on the Syrian battlefield and will probably escalate further after the fragile truce eventually collapses.

Fadi Esber is a research associate at the Damascus History Foundation, an online project aimed at collecting and protecting the endangered archives of the Syrian capital.