Kerry’s one last chance with the great peace push

As US Secretary of State John Kerry heads off to occupied Jerusalem and Ramallah in search of a still elusive Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, he probably does not need to be reminded that nobody ever lost money betting against one.

The odds that Kerry can succeed are long; and even if he does manage to reach a Framework Agreement on Permanent Status — what we used to call a Framework Agreement on Permanent Status (FAPS) back in the day — that does not mean the piece of paper can be implemented.

Still, despite my own annoyingly negative analysis, as 2013 gave way to 2014, I am slightly more encouraged by Kerry’s prospects. And here’s why.

That a secretary of state wants an agreement and is prepared to work relentlessly towards one is no guarantee of success, particularly when it is not clear whether the two sides really want one, or that his own president has his back. At the same time, the fact that Kerry is actually thinking of presenting the two sides with an FAPS suggests strongly that there has been some narrowing of the gaps on the core issues. And that would simply not have been possible without Kerry.

Granted, in politics and in life, there is often a fine line between self-delusion, commitment to any enterprise with long odds and actual success. However, Kerry has put himself in the middle of this mix and just does not seem willing to give up. This kind of commitment in a strange way creates an infectious reality that can help risk-averse parties to a negotiation actually believe in its viability. Neither Benjamin Netanyahu nor Mahmoud Abbas know how to reach an accord on their own — or frankly would have taken the initiative to do so if left on their own. Kerry is the glue and adhesive. Let us see if his relentlessness can help the two sides own the FAPS too — and then make something stick.

Make no mistake, Kerry would not have come this far if he was not working within Netanyahu’s comfort zone. If an FAPS is to be reached, everyone will need to stretch. But Netanyahu’s willingness to acquiesce in this process flows largely from the fact that he believes he can put his own stamp on it — whether or not the accord is ever reached. Otherwise, like the P5+1 (US, Britain, France, Russia, China + Germany) interim agreement with Iran, you would be hearing a lot more static from him right now.

Of the six issues likely to be referred to in an FAPS, the prime minister believes three will break his way: Security, refugees and recognition of Israel as a Jewish state. Now, that is not because Abbas has accepted the Israeli position on these three things, but because Washington has. The Americans will not support the Palestinian view on right of return for refugees and have already endorsed the “Israel as a Jewish state” issue. Moreover, if the press reports on security issues (and Palestinian complaints) are accurate, Israel will be able to maintain its own forces in the Jordan Valley — an ability to shape security along the border with Jordan, and a lot of fancy technological counterterrorism bells and whistles.

Either way, Netanyahu is a winner. If Abbas swallows some of this, Netanyahu will claim that he got more from an Arab partner than either Menachem Begin got from Anwar Sadat or Yitzhak Rabin got from Hussain on an issue far more sensitive than any with Egypt or Jordan. If Abbas refuses, Netanyahu will still be in good terms with the US and he will look like a hero defending key Israeli principles. Indeed, there is no reference in either of the treaties with Egypt and Jordan to their recognition of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people.

On the other three issues — borders, occupied Jerusalem and end of conflict and claims — Netanyahu isn’t probably in a bad shape either. There is no proof yet, but he is likely to play with formulations that accept a border based on June 1967 lines, but with all kinds of territorial adjustments and land swaps that will essentially modify those lines significantly. End of conflict (that there are no more claims to be adjudicated and the conflict between Israel and the new Palestinian state is over) has always been an issue that the Israelis have pressed for; though it obligates them to deal with all the issues, including occupied Jerusalem. That last one is a tough cookie, but it is not beyond the realm of Deputy Legal Adviser Jon Schwartz’s brilliant mind to fashion generalised language on this issue relating to two capitals.

The Palestinians are the weakest party to these negotiations and they do not have much of an advantage to level the playing field. After all, they have threatened to walk away from the table at least twice. Lead negotiator Saeb Erekat even submitted his resignation. And, guess what? The talks continue — even in the face of significant Israeli colony activity.

Even though Abbas is weak, why would he accept an FAPS that forces him to capitulate? And what does he get out of the deal? First, the prisoner releases — so hard for the Israelis to swallow — have already provided concrete deliverables and an emotional lift on the Palestinian side. Second, if an FAPS gets done, it will produce language on borders and occupied Jerusalem that will take Netanyahu further than he has been and closer to Palestinian principles. Third, the US has almost certainly made clear to the Palestinian side what its view on these issues are; and on those two Washington is indeed closer to Abbas than to Netanyahu (which would become clear in negotiations toward a comprehensive accord). Finally, Abbas will almost certainly look for Arab state cover for his concessions and will press Kerry to help him get it.

And finally, what is the alternative? The Arabs are preoccupied with their own troubles; Abbas has not produced economic prosperity, unity with Gaza, or an end to the Israeli occupation. He has options, yes, but none of them are any good. Abbas could quit, retire, turn the keys to the Palestinian National Authority over to Israel or start a third intifada. That is not going to happen just yet. So better to hang in with the talks through the designated nine-month period, see where the Kerry effort goes and hope that if it does not end in an accord he can live with, the process concludes in a way that he can put the blame on Netanyahu.

Netanyahu will probably prefer that there not be an active effort for peace on the part of Kerry. But now that the game is on — and seriously so — he really does not want to take the hit for its collapse. He is a tough political trader, but the dislocation, political fallout and international opprobrium — if he is the one who is seen to have mucked it up — will be significant. Having climbed way up the ladder in blasting the international interim agreement with Iran, Netanyahu really does not want to be in the same position again on the Kerry peace process.

Nor do Abbas and Netanyahu want to risk the vacuum left by an outright Kerry failure.

Kerry is not James Baker and does not seem inclined to threaten placing a dead cat on the doorstep of the Arabs and Israelis who reject his effort. But there is no doubt that one of the reasons the process is still alive is that nobody wants to be blamed for its demise.

There is quite a bit we do not know about these negotiations. The degree of radio silence surrounding the Kerry effort — for a non-secret negotiation — is pretty impressive. That either means there is something to protect or that there is not much “there there”. We also do not know about back channels or the extent of direct Netanyahu-Abbas meetings, with or without Kerry.

However, let us assume the best-case outcome: Kerry succeeds in getting both sides to agree to an FAPS — essentially a document of shared principles on the core issues. It is not a comprehensive or detailed agreement, let alone a treaty of peace. But make no mistake, if a FAPS is reached — particularly if it breaks new, common ground on land and occupied Jerusalem — it will be a significant achievement, possibly even a breakthrough. For at least 15 years, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators (with and without the US) have tried; nobody has yet done it. Yes, it will be flawed and messy, but it will begin to acquire a life of its own.

At the same time — and I hate to ruin the party — can the FAPS become a CAPS (Comprehensive Agreement on Permanent Status) and then actually be implemented? Will the politics make that possible? Will Netanyahu and Abbas even be the implementers?

The obstacles that stand in the way of the creation of a Palestinian state are galactic. Dealing seriously with various aspects of occupied Jerusalem — not just as a political capital of two states; but with the holy sites and the challenges of maintaining a living city — is a monumental task.

What about continuing Israeli colony activity or the tens of thousands of Israeli colonists who will need to be evacuated from the West Bank and the established communities that exist there? How do you deal with Hamas in Gaza and the reality that in the wake of Israeli withdrawal from there, no Israeli prime minister is likely to withdraw from the West Bank — unless all the guns of Palestine, including Hamas’s high-trajectory weapons, fall silent permanently?

So many questions; so few answers. And there are no solutions in sight. But, hey, you have to start somewhere. And there is a pretty good chance that within the next month or so, we will have a much clearer and better sense as to whether Kerry’s hard-fought effort is a key to an empty room or an open door on the road to the next phase of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

— Washington Post

Aaron David Miller, FP columnist, is vice-president for new initiatives and a scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars. His forthcoming book is titled Can America Have Another Great President?