Progress on nuclear or regional issues will be stymied by domestic compulsions
Without joining in the widespread speculation and drawing conclusions following the gestures of Iranian-American rapprochement, it’s probably safe to say that the Syrian chemical weapons deal between the US and Russia most likely had an Iranian angle. Yet, it might be too early to talk about a comprehensive plan for the region. However, any settlement of the Syrian civil war will be the basis for such a plan.
This does not come as a surprise, as local players couldn’t make any breakthroughs in the past couple of years or so, and major world powers felt the need to get involved directly. Apart from the cordial phone call between US President Barack Obama and his Iranian counterpart Hassan Rouhani, the brief statement by US Secretary of State John Kerry about the “potential for a quick Iran nuclear deal” is very indicative.
Of course, more than 30 years of animosity is not easily forgotten, but American-Iranian relations are set for a change. Though Rouhani talked to his French counterpart Francois Hollande during the UN General Assembly — and not with Obama — it was meant to complete the array of gestures rather than develop a concrete compromise approach. If Rouhani had anything to deliver, he would have talked to the British. (Despite the fact that the French have been more vocal on Syria, they are not as important to the Americans as are the British).
But the opening could be more serious than what happened with a previous ‘reformist’ president in Iran: Mohammad Khatemi. The reasons are clear: Iran is suffering from harsh sanctions and Obama wants to end his second term in the White House on a good note. He wants to be the president who achieved through diplomacy more than his Republican predecessor achieved through war.
Does all this amount to a pretext for a ‘deal’ between Iran and the Americans over Tehran’s nuclear programme and a bundling of regional issues? Not necessarily. Obama is constrained by the American establishment’s stance on Iran, and can’t change course dramatically. There is also Israel’s security requirements, and even though it’s believed that Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are not fans of each other, strategic interests come above personal feelings.
There are also more regional complexities than anticipated. Rapprochement with Iran would by default mean a snub to Turkey — as a main regional rival if Israel is left aside — and Washington will be seen tilting more and more towards Shiites and away from Sunnis. Though Gulf countries, and mainly Saudi Arabia, don’t trust Turkey too much, they will definitely be more alarmed by America leaning more towards Iran than Turkey.
Also, the Iranian leadership has its constraints. The Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei might want a compromise to end Iran’s economic and financial suffering, but not only with the US, but rather with the entire West. Though America can guarantee this, Israel might be reluctant and that would be a problem for the leadership to sell internally.
Part of the Iranian regime’s legacy is its stance against the ‘Great Satan’, and unless there’s some concession, the clerics in Tehran will not be able to sell any deal to the Iranian people. There are also the so-called hardliners, like the Revolutionary Guards, nurtured by the leadership over the years, and they will resist anything that leads to them losing ground. Then there are armed groups, like Hezbollah in Lebanon, that will be adversely affected by any compromise between Tehran and the West.
Yet, Iran can sacrifice the Bashar Al Assad regime if the outcome will give it clout in the country, like what happened in Iraq after the Anglo-American invasion and occupation. Most important will be a sort of deal — maybe as Kerry optimistically expected — on the nuclear programme in return for the lifting of sanctions, going along the lines of the agreement on Syrian chemical weapons. This will give America and the West the upper hand.
All attempts to get any face-saving concessions, especially regarding Israel, will further complicate such a compromise. The end-result will depend on how the Israelis would see the agreement, which is the most important thing for Washington. Arab Gulf countries are also taken into account by Washington, even if a deal is not going to include their interests — for example, Iran returning the three UAE islands it occupies in the Gulf.
The answer to whether there will be a deal on Iran or not might be something in between — a deal on the nuclear programme but one that falls short of a comprehensive settlement of all the problems Iran has with the outside world.
Dr Ayman Mustafa is a London-based Arab writer.
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