Bombing Iran’s Embassy in Beirut only fuels Hezbollah’s fire

Like the wings of a theatre, Lebanon is an inextricable part of Syria’s civil war. It serves as a staging area for fighters, refuge for fleeing civilians and both backdrop and springboard for regional powers and armed groups to play out their battles, often in exceptionally bloody fashion.

The attack on Iran’s Embassy, in the heart of its ally Hezbollah’s stronghold, was the most dramatic spillover from Syria since the war there began. It further erodes Lebanon’s political stability, demonstrates jihadists’ growing capabilities and could lead to an escalation of Iranian involvement, just as its broader relationship with the West looks set to improve.

Iran helped to establish Hezbollah 30 years ago. It has since buttressed Hezbollah’s ascent to power and legitimacy within Lebanon — Hezbollah in turn helping to extend Iranian influence. In Syria, both have been crucial to the survival of Syrian President Bashar Al Assad. Less than a week ago, Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah boasted that his fighters were in Syria “to confront all the dangers of the international, regional and takfiri attack on this country” — takfiri referring to Sunni extremists who have increasingly come to dominate the Syrian rebellion.

That it was one such takfiri group, the Abdullah Azzam Brigades — that claimed responsibility for the embassy bombing — will only reinforce the resolve of Hezbollah and Iran to prevent such groups seizing the reins of power in Damascus. The Abdullah Azzam Brigades, named after a highly influential jihadist who mentored Osama Bin Laden, are thought to have been formed around 2009. In 2010, they claimed responsibility for a major attack on a Japanese oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz. If they did indeed succeed in penetrating Hezbollah’s southern Beirut stronghold and hitting a well-defended target, it will burnish their jihadist credentials and further erode the illusion of impregnability cultivated by Hezbollah.

However, if their aim was to deter further Iranian and Syrian involvement in Syria, it may well have the opposite effect.

For Hezbollah and Iran, the Sunni-majority rebellion in Syria is framed in overlapping strategic and sectarian terms. It is seen as a conduit for Saudi Arabian influence and a threat to Shiite interests more broadly. For Hezbollah, this has additional domestic resonance: The Sunni Lebanese overwhelmingly dislike the Shiite Hezbollah (94 per cent unfavourability according to a June 2013 Pew survey) and Al Assad (92 per cent) and some have either joined the Syrian rebellion or provided assistance to it.

What is surprising is that the blowback on Iran and Hezbollah has been so limited until now. Skirmishing between pro and anti-Al Assad factions has been ongoing in Lebanese cities for years, but the first serious attack in Hezbollah’s stronghold came six months ago when rockets fired from Christian and Druze areas struck southern Beirut. In August, a car bomb killed 27 people in the same area. But this attack is a dramatic escalation, both because of its target and the role of an international group affiliated to Al Qaida.

What will the response be? Hezbollah will use its own forces and its grip on Lebanon’s security agencies to tighten security, but such attacks look likely to recur. For Iran, this will be a psychological shock. It is the most serious attack on one of its missions since the Taliban massacred Iranian diplomats in Afghanistan in 1998. Thirty years ago, huge attacks on US and French barracks in Beirut, allegedly by Iran and Hezbollah, prompted US president Ronald Reagan to pull forces out of Lebanon. But today, Tehran has invested too much in Syria to give up now and this attack will give ammunition to those within the regime — particularly in the Revolutionary Guard Corps — advocating an uncompromising stance.

Finally, the timing is also important. Hezbollah is preparing for a crucial battle in the Qalamoun region along the Syria-Lebanon border, which connects Damascus to pro-regime areas on Syria’s coast. With Al Assad beginning a series of military offensives before an anticipated peace conference in Geneva, the fighting is likely to escalate and, in turn, Syrians’ hostility to the foreign forces who have inserted themselves in to the civil war.

— Guardian News & Media Ltd

Shashank Joshi is a doctoral student at Harvard University and associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute.