From terror to talks?

After Bin Laden: Al Qaida, the Next Generation

By Abdel Bari Atwan,

Saqi Books, 307 pages, £14.99

That Hassan Turabi, the leader of Sudan’s National Islamic Front, organised the “Popular Arab and Islamic Conference” in Khartoum in 1991 is well known. It is also on record that the conference was attended, among the who’s who of international fugitives, by Osama Bin Laden. But what is known to very few is that it was also attended by people such as the famous singer Yousuf Islam (formerly Cat Stevens), who gave such a rendering of the song Tala’a Al Badru Alayna (the full moon rises), about how the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) came to mankind with a message from God, that even hardened extremists “wiped away their tears”. And, contrary to the violent sectarianism that was to become one of the hallmarks of Al Qaida, Bin Laden seemed to engage representatives of Hezbollah — among them Emad Mughniyeh — in cordial conversation.

It is details such as these that make Abdel Bari Atwan’s second book on the terrorist organisation — After Bin Laden: Al Qaida, the Next Generation — a compulsive read. Atwan was at the conference, just as he was in the caves of Tora Bora interviewing Bin Laden. And when he warns that the organisation is still some way from being a spent force, governments around the world would do well to sit up and take notice.

Few are as well placed to write on this subject as Atwan. A genuine expert on the Middle East, he was one of the first journalists to interview Bin Laden in 1996, and then again following the events of 9/11. But all those who are aware of his combative style on TV shows will be surprised by how sober in tone his two books on Al Qaida are. As the outspoken editor of the independent, London-based Al Quds Al Arabi newspaper, Atwan has himself been mired in several controversies. He has interviewed numerous extremists and can claim to have an extraordinary insight into their mindsets. And his newspaper has been the media vehicle of choice, along with Al Jazeera, for Al Qaida to release its various statements.

In his new book, Atwan, who is also a Gulf News op-ed columnist, focuses on all known branches of Al Qaida around the world, and discusses the relevance of the organisation post-Arab Spring. In one of the more fascinating chapters, we learn that while Bin Laden, in early 2011, was happy about “the unprecedented opportunities” presented by the Arab Spring, not all the rank and file of Al Qaida and like-minded organisations were so enthusiastic. Writing in the Taliban’s Al Samud magazine, one of their ideologues, Ahmad Bawadi, observed: “... nobody should think that a revolution over bread and unemployment will close the wine shops and nightclubs ... the networks of singing, dancing, prostitution and shamelessness will not be shut down by these revolutions...”

Atwan’s main argument is that Al Qaida remains a potent force despite the annihilation of almost its entire top leadership. It has placed itself, through its myriad branches, in strategic hotspots around the world. He credits the organisation for its willingness to seal new alliances with like-minded groups globally — from Al Shabab in Somalia to Boko Haram in Nigeria — and its ability to take advantage of the chaos of the Arab Spring to expand its reach. For instance, in North Africa, after the revolutions, Al Qaida has been able to consolidate its position in the Sahel, especially in northern Mali, using sophisticated weapons acquired from Libya’s arsenal following that country’s civil war that led to the killing of long-time tyrant Muammar Gaddafi.

Some of the reasons cited by young Muslim men from across the globe, including those from the West, to join groups such as Al Qaida are still the same. These include western invasions of Muslim countries, and their frequent violations of the territorial integrity of these nations in the form of military incursions to kill or capture “terrorist suspects”. Then there is the string of incidents involving American or western soldiers — massacres or acts such as urinating on corpses of Afghans they have killed — that has fuelled the anger.

Add to that the United States’ drone strikes, which have increased dramatically during the Obama administration, in countries such as Pakistan, Somalia, Afghanistan, Yemen and Iraq. Barack Obama, the Nobel peace laureate, personally signs off on a “kill list” prepared by the CIA, inflicting havoc on remote communities. More than 3,200 have been killed in the mountains of Pakistan alone, most of them either innocent civilians or low-level local militants. This in turn has led to increased recruitment to militant causes and mindless violence perpetuated on the streets of Pakistani cities.

Atwan believes that Al Qaida, in the end, will adopt a political approach, forming a political wing and opening tentative dialogue with proxies and third parties. Contentiously, he writes that Arab Spring politicians may emerge as interlocutors, though there is hardly any evidence of that happening. Here he might have erred in his analysis.