Through its recent history, particularly after the Second World War, the Middle East has seen fast-moving changes in alliances and counter-alliances on a scale previously unknown in almost its entire history under the Ottoman Empire. But it is even more striking to see a major country and prominent member of the United Nations Security Council, in this case Britain, shifting its position vis-a-vis the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by 180 degrees within merely one month.
We all remember the ‘Baghdad Pact’ of 1955 or the Middle East Treaty Organisation (Meto), also known as the Central Treaty Organisation (Cento). But for those who don’t, it is an alliance that solidly brought together countries such as Iran, Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan and the United Kingdom, to face up to the rapid rise of Arab Nationalism led by Egypt’s former president Jamal Abdul Nasser and the fast-expanding power of the Soviet Union in the region.
However, ‘Baghdad Pact’ became soon irrelevant in 1958. The Iraqi monarchy was overthrown in a military coup in July and the new pro-Soviet government of General Abdul Karim Qasim withdrew from the ‘Pact’ and established diplomatic relations with Moscow. The organisation then, dropped the label ‘Baghdad Pact’ in favour of Cento. Iran’s revolution of 1979 and the fall of another monarchy in the region put an official end to this organisation. But in reality, Cento had practically become redundant in 1974 when Turkey invaded the heavily-Turkish populated North Cyprus. This came as a retaliation at a Greece supported coup with the aim to annex the island and declare the establishment of the Hellenic Republic of Cyprus.
Now, in the current political climate, a sort of an alliance has suddenly been shaped up over Syria, oddly bringing Russia closer, for the first time ever, to both Turkey and Iran. This alliance is more appropriately defined as an unconvincing marriage because each of the three countries has its own purposes of dividing influences in the Syrian tragedy. If ‘Baghdad Pact’ lasted for three years, the current marriage my not survive that long. Though the three countries meet at a crossroad in their ambitions in Syria, each has its own plan totally different from the others.
First, for Russia, Syria has become an open playground for its forces, particularly when the world’ sole super power is politically absent from the region. With such a political vacuum, Moscow has been granted some de facto authority for a free movement. Russian President Vladimir Putin has convincingly completed his long-time ambition in reaffirming his country’s presence in the warm water of the Mediterranean, in both the naval base of Tartous and airbase of Hmaimeem in the outskirt of Latakia.
However, week before last, Moscow renewed this agreement, first signed in 1977 during the Soviet era, for another 49 years, automatically renewable for a 25-year extension, unless one party informs the other one year in advance of any change. The new agreement will allow Russia to transform the facility in Tartous into a full-fledged naval base, deploying up to 11 Russian warships in the eastern Mediterranean, at any time, within the next few years. Russia, thus, guarantees its presence as the most effective power and major arbiter in the war-torn country of Syria.
Second, with this unprecedented shift in balance of power in the region, Turkey’s President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, finds himself on the side of the Russians willy-nilly. It is not the Syrian quagmire, necessarily, that pushed Erdogan into the arms of Putin, but it is the domestic threat first and foremost. In addition to the internal upheaval following the failed military coup allegedly orchestrated by Fethullah Gulen’s movement last July and the consequent arrest of thousands of Turkish army officials and civil servants, it is the rising Kurdish national uprising that threw Turkey into Russia’s arms.
Erdogan’s priorities have suddenly changed as he began to consider the Kurdish autonomous region in Syria as the only goal of his war in Syria. With this in mind, Turkey’s president had to make some historic compromises reversing his long-held policy concerning Putin’s vision, Iran’s plans in Syria as well as the fate of Syrian President Bashar Al Assad himself.
Third, when it comes to Iran, it is obviously clear that the ‘Revolutionary Guards’ are the effective power base behind the country’s foreign policy. The West, and indeed the world, must be astonishingly shocked by the way Tehran manoeuvred through, following the signing of the nuclear deal in 2015. Instead of moderating its policy in the region, the deal has unfortunately steered Tehran into increasing its hegemonic tendency in the region extending it from Iraq, Syria and Lebanon through its military arm ‘Hezbollah’ and to the Mediterranean in the North, and Yemen — the backyard of the Arab Gulf states — in the South. Whether this policy will survive before it clashes with that of Russia and Turkey in the medium or long term, remains to be seen.
Last, there are signs of shifting positions of Britain on the Arab-Israel conflict as well as on Syria. Britain was the main mover behind the UN Security Council resolution 2334, adopted on December 23, 2016. The resolution, passed in a 14-0 vote by members, with the US abstaining form applying its veto, generally reaffirmed previous UN resolutions calling for a two-state solution. On January 16, in a surprising move, Britain blocked the European Union Council of Ministers from adopting the Paris summit statement similar to the UNSC 2334 resolution.
Furthermore, British Prime Minister, Theresa May, totally refrained, in her speech to US Congress members in Philadelphia on Thursday, from mentioning the Palestinian rights, while highlighting the right of Israel for security and peace. On Syria, London seems to be shifting away from its previous position as its Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson, explained also on Thursday. The United Kingdom, he said, accepts that Al Assad should be allowed to run for re-election in the event of a peace settlement in Syria. “It is our view that Bashar Al Assad should go ... but we are open-minded about how that happens and the timescale on which that happens,” Johnson told the House of Lords. “I have to be realistic”, he added, “about how the landscape has changed, and it maybe that we will have to think afresh about how we handle this. The old policy, I am afraid to say, does not command much confidence”.
Mustapha Karkouti is a former president of the Foreign Press Association, London. You can follow him on Twitter at www.twitter.com/@mustaphatashe.
