The United States’ decision to extend its campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isil) to Syria demonstrates not only the fast-changing landscape of the Middle East’s various conflicts and its belligerents, but also Washington’s flip-flopping and confusion on who its allies and enemies are. In about a year, the Obama administration went from coming close to declaring war on the Bashar Al Assad regime to actually declaring one on his enemies.
While many states and observers, including the Iraqi government, have pointed out the necessity to carry out strikes in Syria to root out Isil, legitimate questions should be raised as to whether the United States really is the best party to do so. US President Barack Obama’s Syria policy is virtually non-existent and is practised on an ad-hoc basis; his administration has struggled to lay out a coherent strategy on both Iraq and Syria. This raises the question as to whether a non-strategy is better than a last minute, flawed strategy.
US officials have said that the fight against Isil may last for four years. This will give the US airforce unprecedented and perhaps coveted access to Syrian airspace and may be a recipe for a protracted American military presence in Syria’s airspace. This understandably raises questions that the US appears unable to answer: whether there really is an exit strategy. There is little doubt that every effort should be made to stop the spread of the Isil disease and eradicate it once and for all, but the question remains: can the very country that destroyed Iraq in 2003 be trusted to save it this time round?
